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"Forty years since, I found three hundred
people assembled, to see, at a shilling
each, a coach which went without horses;
... but a small paper of snuff, put into
the wheel, soon convinced every person
present, that it could not only move,
but sneeze too, perfectly like a
Christian. That machine was not a wheel
within a wheel, but a Man within a wheel
- Philip Thicknesse (1784) -
"Professor Bouillaud...confronted by
Edison's phonograph, assaulted the
technician; 'Wretch'. We are not going
to let ourselves be dpped by a
ventriloquist!'"
- J3rian Inglis (1976).
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ABSTRACT
The aim of this thesis is to ask, and attempt to answer, some
pertinent questions about that* type of psychological explanation which
proceeds by simulation, or model building. The method chosen is a
detailed examination of some models, mostly 18th and 19th century
mechanical ones, together with a theoretically motivated discussion of
the relations between these models and the development of psychological
%
theories contemporary with them.
Two types of model, formal and intimate, are distinguished, both
by their aetiology and by the way they are used by working scientists,
and several examples of each type are subjected to scrutiny, as are
the intentions of their modellers in building or adopting them.
Four main foci of interest emerge: the history of experimental
psychology (the myth that experimental psychology was born circa 1870
is exploded); the sociology of science (the impact of developing
technology on psychological theory, via the proffering of models, is
clearly demonstrated); the philosophy of psychology (issues such as
the nature of explanation and the problem of representation are dis¬
cussed); and, last but not least, theoretical psychology (the value of
work in cognitive simulation, and of some work in Artificial Intelligence,
is stressed and, partly, explained).
1.
INTRODUCTION
"the scientific materialists trusted that
the world could be dissected into its parts,
and that an understanding of the world was
equal to a knowledge of how these parts fit
together. Indeed this is the appeal of the
mechanical model..."
Frederick Gregory (1977)-
What is it to give a psychological explanation? This question is
far from easy to answer, with the result that there is, in psychology,
as Deutsch (i960) has pointed, out, not only a lack of explanations, but
even a lack of consensus as to what it is to explain! To ask a lesser
but still formidable question, what are, if not the best, at least
viable methods of extending our understanding of the cognitive capaci¬
ties of intelligent beings?
One bold reply to the former challenge has been offered intermit¬
tently but persistently throughout the centuries: we start to explain
(and therefore understand) a cognitive capacity when we can say or show
how it is systematically related to that entity which has the cognitive
capacity and we complete the process when we can say or show how the
cognitive capacity is systematically related to any entity which can
have it, i.e. when we can show how the cognitive capacity is a product
of a structure instantiated in organised matter.
A major inroad into the explanation of a human cognitive capacity
is then made when we can say how some other entity e.g. a machine,
which has the same capacity, works. Of course, the notion of 'same'
needs some unpacking and explication, which will be attempted later,
but, in essence, the answer offered is simple: we begin to understand
an entity e with capacity c insofar as we understand a model of e which
does the same as e in the same way.
If the desired end of research into a cognitive capacity is a
systematic account of the relations between that cognitive capacity and
any possible material instantiation of it, the implications for the
means of research are clear and profound, and these provide a reply to
the second challenge: we must avail ourselves of, and use, models.
A close look at the ways models have figured in psychological
research reveals, however, two relatively distinct modes of scientific
practise. In the one case, pre-existing entities or phenomena are seen
to be similar in conceptually interesting ways to that which is to be
explained and the status of model is bestowed upon this pre-existing
entity by the modeller. In the other case, the model is actually con¬
structed by the modeller to be_ similar in conceptually interesting ways
to that which is to be explained.
Both of these ways of modelling have their own individual charac¬
teristics but both have made great contributions to the development of
scientific psychological explanation. Both, of course, bring with them
their own retinue of problems and apparent paradoxes.
In the pages that follow, we will fully discuss these two sorts of
model, which I have named intimate and formal respectively, with copious
illustrative examples. We will debate the ways they have facilitated
and hindered psychological research, the problems they raise and those
they resolve.
The models we shall discuss are, however, not ones typically met
in connection with psychological model building - flow charts, logogens
and, if we are lucky, perceptrons, but bold, imaginative, mechanical
fabricata, sometimes even life-size automata, real working machines in
their clanking grandeur, and objects with which men of genius have made
illuminating comparisons to mental functioning.
What is perhaps most surprising of all, to readers coming new to
this field, is the fact that many of these psychological models were
created in the 18th century. There seem to be two main reasons for the
surprise. Firstly, due to what could be called the Boring myth, of
which more later, many psychologists find the idea of a thriving
experimental psychology of the 18th century impossible to believe.
Secondly, over-whelmed by the received opinion that the 20th century
is the age of the technological miracle, the ingenuity and sheer genius
displayed by the engineers and simulators of the 1700s is almost lit¬
erally incredible.
The motivation for this piece of research is not, however, merely
the intrinsically fascinating nature of the subject matter - although,
as we will see, the automata and simulacra of the 17th and 18th
centuries (and even earlier) do, by their complexity, strain the limits
of credibility of the 20th century mind. It is, though, a significant
aim of this thesis to set straight somewhat the historical record.
This is necessary in two ways.
Firstly, few, if any, of the men and simulacra discussed below,
in the chapters on formal models, will be familiar figures. They sel¬
dom^ even figure in histories of technology - let alone histories of
science in general, or psychology in particular - and when they do, it
is nearly always condescendingly as 'mere' gadgeteers or toy-makers.
As will be shown below, this is a gross slander. They were interested
in toys - but then these men had such exuberant imaginations and appar¬
ently boundless energy that they were interested in virtually every¬
thing. Toys as such were not however their principle concern but the
principles they embodied were. As we shall see, Vaucanson's musical
automata were not toys but material instantiations of theories of flute-
playing-man. To generalise the point, these men were trying to -under¬
stand that part of the natural world which is man by simulating him.
Secondly, and more particularly, the histo'ry of psychology, post
Boring, has been plagued by the erroneous conviction that psychology
as an experimental science began in 1860 when Fechner got out of his
armchair and went into his workshop. It is.true that, in his revised
second edition, Boring did pay lip service to earlier movements in
philosophy and physiology as precursors of psychology but 'scientific'
psychology itself was still, according to Boring, 'founded' in 1860.
In this thesis will be found persuasive evidence for the existence of
an experimental science of psychology long before Boring's 'foundation
stone' was laid.
Lakatos has correctly remarked that philosophy of science without
history is empty and it is equally true that history of science without
philosophy is blind. Accordingly, I have tried, in writing this thesis,
to contribute not merely to the histoiy of psychology but also to the
philosophy of psychology ... and in particular to the philosophy of
current psychology.
The term 'philosophy of psychology' is, however, open to some mis¬
interpretation. Most of the work produced in the name of philosophy of
psychology recently has not gained and, I believe, has not earned, the
respect of psychologists ... partly because it is a philosophy of
psychology devoid of psychology!
There are three main representatives of this type of work. Firstly,
what we might call the ordinary language criticisms of psychology, as
given by authors such as Hamlyn, Peters and Bennett, is based primarily
on the claim that the realms of discourse of 'ordinary people' and
psychologists respectively are distinct, incommensurate and non-
intertranslatable and thus statements of the latter can never act as
an explanation of the former. By illicitly identifying the ordinary
realm of discourse with reality, these writers attempt to undermine
the psychologist's case. In response to this, however, the psychologist
may maintain that the 'ordinary man's' language of thoughts, minds,
hopes etc. is itself a theory ... and not a statement of how things
are. The psychologist's and the ordinary man's theories are thus in
competition as rival accounts, and the psychologist may claim, at
least without absurdity, that his theory is for various reasons the
better alternative. The second common form of philosophy of psychology-
is a sort of poor man's philosophy of science ... usually of physics...
extended arbitrarily and inappropriately to psychology e.g. the Kuhnian
account of psychology attempted by Palermo. Thirdly is a rather futile
sort of historical exegesis apparently merely intended to show that we
all had it wrong about old x, or that y had said it all before.
None of these three approaches, it seems to me, is very helpful
to the working psychological scientist. The first prescriptively tells
him what he is doing is impossible (and he goes ahead and does it any¬
way) , the other two are almost totally retrospective. What is needed
is a new sort of philosophy of psychology, let us call it theoretical
psychology, which recognises that psychological theories must be both
empirically constrained and conceptually viable, which pulls out and
makes explicit the theoretical implications of empirical research and
which points out the empirical consequences of theoretical positions.
There is no lack of data in current experimental psychology, but
there is a lack of evidence. This is because evidence is evidence for
theories, and theories are sadly missing in psychology. Data, on the
other hand, are available in profusion, frequently the result of a con¬
venient experimental procedure (maze running, nonsense syllable learn¬
ing etc.), but it is not clear to what these data are relevant.
One area in which there are general theories, as opposed to experi¬
mental paradigms, has mushroomed in recent years, that is the field of
Artificial Intelligence (A.I.). Practitioner"- of A.I. disagree as to
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whether they are trying to simulate human intelligence or whether they
are'trying merely to get machines to do, hy any means'"whatsoever, -tasks
which, if a human were to do them, would require intelligence.
One well represented view, however, can be described as seeing the
main aims of A.I. to be studying the structure of problem solving pro¬
cesses independently of its realisation (McCarthy), a view in accord
with the answer given earlier to the question of what constitutes a
psychological explanation. Psychologists, frequently embroiled in
methodological disputes, are now more and more beginning to discuss the
relevance of A.I. research to their own work. Unfortunately, apart
from a few oases of interdisciplinary cognitive studies, psychologists
are likely to have had dealings with computers only in the context of
data-processing, an experience destined to bias them against the A.I.
enterprise. Depressingly, in discussions with psychologists, one meets
the standard objections to machine intelligence ... that computers are
'just' super calculators, that they cannot do anything original, can
not learn,etc. ... as one hears from naive (non-cognitively concerned)
laymen, as if psychologists believed themselves not to be studying a
special sort of (neural) machine. Admittedly, some (dualist) psychol¬
ogists do maintain that psychology is not confined to the study of the
complex functioning of a part of the natural material world, but it is
not to these, but rather to monistic psychologists with impoverished
concepts of machines, to which I address this complaint. For us, the
interesting question is not whether the brain is or is not a computer,
but what sort of computer it is I
However, there are other interesting questions to be asked about
the relations between A.I. and psychology, at least in so far as the
former tries to model the subject matter of the latter. What, for
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example, is_ a model ? What relation does a model bear to what it models
What is the relation between models and further research? Between
models and theories?
In the pages that follow, I shall try to give some answers to these
questions. The problems I tackle are intended to be relevant to the
Current debate about the relation between simulation and psychological
explanation. However, as mentioned above, instead of dealing with
modern A.I. projects, which are usually so technically complex that .
they require so much lengthy exposition that there would be no time or
space for discussion of the issues relevant to psychology, I deal mostly
with pre-20th century models.
I maintain that the same important issues can be discussed in con¬
nection with these early simulacra as with modern ones, but with con¬
siderable extra interest owing to their rather exotic nature.
The substantiation of this claim, is however, the thesis itself




"models...not products of the imagination,
but representatives of real things."
Max Born (1953/4)
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What is a model? To limit the domain of discourse from the outset,
we shall not here be concerned with models in the sense of ...exemplar
("Nixon was not a model President."); scaled imitation ("Gerald Ford was
a model President."); type ("She owns a well preserved model T Ford.");
mannequin ("Twiggy was a successful model in the 1960s."); poser ("The
art students paint from live models."); etc., but rather with what it
is to be a model in the sense in which a computer is a good (or bad)
model of the brain (mind).
As a first approximation: a model is an entity or phenomenon which
helps us understand some system's functioning. (Boden (1977) '• "I use
the expression (Artificial Intelligence) as a generic term to cover all
machine research that is somehow relevant to human knowledge and psycho¬
logy") .
However, this use of the term is surely over-extended...if this
were the criterion, slide-rules- and microscopes would count as models
and tachistoscope manufacturers would automatically count as psycholo¬
gists - or at least as 'artificial intelligentsia' (this ugly term is
due to Dr. Louis Fein).
(Only slightly) less roughly: a model is an entity or phenomenon
which stands in place of something i.e. represents it.
The problem of representation is raised in many areas of psychology,
for example, in perception, psycholinguistics and modelling i.e. it
seems to be a general problem. However, one might ask whether there is,
in fact, a problem ... or many separate (and different) ones.
Some seem to think that there is an underlying account which applies
to all cases of representation. Dennett (1977) has written: "What is
needed is nothing less than a completely general theory of representation,
with which we can explain how words, thoughts, thinkers, pictures,
11.
computers, animals, sentences, mechanisms, states, functions, nerve
impulses and formal models can be said to represent one thing or another.
It will not do to divide and conquer here - by saying that these various
things do not represent in the same sense. Of course that is true, but
what is important is that there is something that binds them all to¬
gether, and we need a theory that can unify the variety." Note that,
broad as the extension of the term 'representation' is (as used by
Dennett), it does not include representation in the sense of 'deputa¬
tion' , or the way a lawyer represents a client ... though these are no
doubt related ... I shall conform with this usage.
We cannot hope to give a general theory of representation here
and now, of course. Most of what is said below concerns representation
and modelling, although issues in psycholinguistics and perception are
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touched upon.
Perhaps we can say, then, that: Every model of something is a
representation of that thing in the sense that it stands in place of
that thing (for certain purposes). (c.f. Sloman (1975): "representation
... a more or less complex structure which has addressable and signifi¬
cant parts and which as a whole is used to denote or refer to something
else.")
However, fairly obviously, not every representation of a thing,
for example, a portrait of the Queen or the word "Tokyo", is a model
of it, the Queen or Tokyo.
Accordingly: models are a species of representation. However,
although it seems almost a truism that representations are representa¬
tions - of something or other ... paradoxically, they may fail to be of
anything at all (we have all seen pictures of unicorns, and what are
inaccurate models models of?). It is, then, too strong a claim to say
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with Goodman (1969) that the essence of the representation relationship
is denotation.
An approach using Frege's (1970) distinction between Sinn and
Bedeutung seems to have more hope of success ... representations not
only have a denotation (or reference) but also a sense. The reference
of a sign is "that to which the sign refers", the sense is that "wherein
the mode of presentation is contained." Two representations may have
the same reference but different senses. Frege's classic examples are
"The Morning Star" and "The Evening Star", both of which expressions
refer to Venus but express different senses (they identify Venus by
different procedures). Two portraits of the Queen, say by different
artists, or two models of the brain will equally have different senses
but the same reference. Some representations, for example, "the least
rapidly converging series", a painting of a unicorn or a hydraulic model
of motivation (literally interpreted), may have a sense but no reference
at all.
Denotation, then, is not necessary for representation and neither,
in the case of modelling at least, is it sufficient.
To move from the logic of the modelling relationship to the prag¬
matics of it for a moment, we may ask what models are (typically) used
for.
Models are not merely intended to denote, they also figure in
explanatory theories. As noted above, this is a point about the prag¬
matics of model use - rather than about the logic of modelling - but we
may nevertheless use the insight it provides to help us bear in mind the
question of what it is about the model-modelled relationship, which
makes it suitable to be used in explanations.
Tentatively then: a model is a species of representation with a
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particular use ... it figures in an explanatory account.
This still requires further qualification however. As it stands,
this characterises words (at least referring expressions) in theories
as models. It seems that, for the case of models at least, we require
a stronger notion than mere representation ... the model not only stands
in place of the modelled hut resembles it and functions explanatorily
by resembling it.
How then does a model resemble what it models? In other words,
what properties do a model and what it models have in common? A reason¬
able first approximation to an answer is ... a function (they 'do' the
same thing!) In this sense, a mousetrap is a weak model of a cat. A
stronger requirement is that, not only should the model and the modelled
fulfil the same function, but insofar as function is a product of struc¬
ture, they should instantiate the same structure.
The relation between structure and function is a complex one. In
19th century biology (St. Hilaire, Cuvier) a useful distinction was made
between organs in different species which were homologous and those
which were analogous. Organs in differing species are homologous if
they correspond in position and connections relative to the whole organism
and are made up of corresponding parts, whatever the difference in func¬
tion. The human hand and the bat's 'wing' are thus homologous. Organs
are analogous if they have the same function, irrespective of structural
dissimilarities. The bat's 'wing' and the bird's wing are thus analo¬
gous. We might say bat's 'wing' weakly models a bird's wing. To
strongly model it, it. would also need the same■structure and structural
relations. Whether our pre-occupation in modelling is with structure
or function depends on our concerns. If we are crudely modelling a
process, we can analyse it into functional components, replace each
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component with a functionally similar one (q. black box) and. we may not
mind, that the structural relations are ignored or even violated.
Stronger modelling (cognitive simulation) requires that the components
of the model are structurally isomorphic with those of the modelled.
This reflects the insight that functions are given the very possibility
of their function by their structure.
Is the structure of a structure written into it or is it read into
it by a modeller?
Anything which has a structure also is a structure. For example,
a house is_ a structure, but it also has a structure, in fact many'such.
The structure which a house is, is quite unique and individual. My
house and yours are different structures. However, the structure which
my house has may exemplify a sort. Two houses on an estate may have
the same structure ("there's the same house again") but be_ different
structures. Conversely, the structure my house has qua load-bearing
elements may be quite different from that which it has qua living spaces.
To the engineer the important parts are girders and rafters, to the
interior decorator the rooms and their connections ... to the former a
hardboard dividing wall is negligible, to the latter crucial. But the
structure which my house is is the same to the engineer and the inter¬
ior decorator ... it is what makes them talk about the same thing.
Similarly machines (and brains) both are and have structures. In
the case of computers we are usually interested in the aspects of
structure relevant to the storage and handling of information. Of
course, computers are also physical objects. They must, for example,
stand without collapsing. This is effected by both the structure of
the machine and its material constitution. A machine made of metal
and one made of tissue, whilst being identical with regard to information
handling structure, would (.probably) differ as regards their possible
physical realisations.
Note in passing:
a) Structure does not imply construction. The human body is
structure which grows and evolves, drops of snow are structures which
foim and a collection of pebbles thrown ashore by a stormy sea might
constitute an abacus of great power.
b) Structures (and models) are not necessarily three dimensional
entities. A structure is basically an ordered set of primitives
(where the structure is defined over the elements) ... Ron Atkin (1972)
has recently demonstrated a relationship between chess..pieces, board
squares and possible moves which possesses a geometrical representation
in 53 dimensional space.
We are now in a better position to answer the question of whether
the structure a thing has is written into the structure a thing is.
Each structure a thing has is (but is not caused by) an ordered
set of primitives (order given by a syntax). This is independent of
any modeller. However there are indefinitely many of these structures.
The modeller reads a particular structure in, in the sense that he
gives it preferential treatment as regards focus of attention.
We may take a horse chestnut leaf as a model or representation of
(one aspect of) a human hand. We draw the connection. But there is
still something about a horse chestnut leaf which makes it more suitable
as a model of the human hand than, say, a beech leaf. It is I_ that make
three billiard balls a model of three atoms but three billiard balls
lend themselves (due to their structure) better than does a blob of
jelly to be such a model.
Thus the structure a thing has, which makes it a good or bad model,
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is written into the structure itself (the structure of the salt crystal
was discovered not invented). But many other structures are equally
written into the structure; in choosing one as the root of a modelling
relation, we are guided by our purposes ... the function to be fulfilled
by the model.
Does any mention of similarity presuppose, as one of its conceptual
criteria, an exempt agent? On a trivial level perhaps ... in the sense
in which, if all living things were wiped out overnight by a mysterious
virus there would be nothing which answered to the concept 'similar',
because there would be no concepts at all! Equally, in this sense,
there would be no stones, nor seas nor even undifferentiated matter.
But is it true at a more interesting level, (in the sense in which
there would be no dreams or pains)? I don't think so.
There would still be ordered sets of primitives ... there would
still be disparate sets of primitives ordered by the same set of rules.
Therefore there would still be 'similar' structures ... which represen¬
ted each other ... instantiated in different ways.
The account so far sketched, makes use of the notion of similarity
... which is presently ill-favoured as an ingredient of the representa¬
tion recipe. Why?
Evidently, similarity is not sufficient for representation. Two
twins, or any two objects off a production line, are highly similar,
but do not (necessarily) represent each other ... though a wax effigy
of a person in Madame Tussaud's or a prototypical model of a car, in
some sense less similar, might do so.
Is similarity necessary for representation? The usual answer is
"no" ... anything can be taken as a model of anything else ... but is
this as obviously true as is usually assumed? I do not think so.
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Suppose after witnessing a traffic accident, at tea I take a salt
pot to represent a car ... surely the salt pot doesn't resemble the car?
(in anything but the most trivial way ... they are both physical objects).
But does it make sense to think of a single undivided entity, such
as a salt pot, as representing anything?
Suppose I say, holding up a salt pot: "this represents the car"
and then do not say or do anything else, my doing so was quite empty
... only when it is related to something else does it become a representa¬
tion ... say the sugar bowl represents a stationary van and the pepper
pot a pedestrian.
It is only systems which represent ... or, more correctly, only
in systems that items can represent; but then in some sense the system
does resemble what it (the system) represents. The relations of the
salt pot to the sugar bowl e.g. motion of one relative to the other,
are similar to those of the car relative to the stationary van ... this
is just their point.
Structures are defined over primitives by a system of rules (a
syntax). The primitives of two systems can only model each other via
the structure. It is only as members of a system that primitives are
made the primitives they are. The content of the constituents lies in
their relations with the other elements of the structure. Examples
could be taken from autonomous syntax, formal semantics or first order
logic. In the case of the former, all that is required is that the
relations between a fixed number of discrete primitives be stipulated
by a grammar. What the language is (what the primitives are primitive
of) is laid down (defined) by the syntax. (One of the central problems
of semantics is whether there could be a formal semantics, in this sense
- where semantic primitives have no intrinsic content). Two words may
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be spelled, similarly ("bank" and "bank") but two letters cannot be.
(c.f. How do you spell 'cat'? vs. How do you spell 1c'?). Sentences
can be ungrammatical, words cannot. Correspondingly, systems can be
representational, primitives cannot.
Thus, whilst we have found similarity to be insufficient for
representation. We have not, so far, found reason to believe it not
to be necessary for representation, in modelling at least; just reason
to think that the unit of similarity is not the primitive but the system
in which the primitive plays its part.
However, I have to admit that this is not initially quite so
plausible in cases of representation other than by modelling, e.g.
language use.
In the sentence "The ant is carrying a stick", the word "ant"
presumably represents an ant ... but it doesn't seem to resemble one ,
except perhaps in their both being rather small!
Note though, that there have been attempts by psycholinguists to
explain representation of words by resemblance.
Werner and Kaplan (19^7) in their studies of onomatopoeia, the
phenomenon of words whose sounds imitate non-verbal sounds e.g. "cuckoo",
and "splash", found them to be a universal phenomenon - occurring in
all known languages. Nevertheless, they are still rare and, as they
never violate phonemic rules, they are at least partly conventional.
It is moreover noteworthy that the sound systems of languages are chosen
from a very limited sub-set of physiologically realisable vocalisations
... just the opposite of what one would expect if onomatopoeia played
a significant role. The evidence for cross-modal similarity ...
synaesthesia ... e.g. zigzag, is even more tenuous. On similar lines,
Kohler (1947) has reported experiments showing that subjects spontaneously
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recognise relations between drawings of sharp objects and nonsense, words
like "takete"; and Kaden (1955) has found that subjects tend to make
characteristic errors of judgement of elevation of projected images of
words like "climbing" or "falling". However, there seems no way to
decide whether such effects are the cause or consequence of perceived
similarity. Did the word "climbing" get chosen to mean what it does
mean because it was in some way inherently 'similar' to some Platonic
'upness', or does it appear so similar (to those who claim it does)
because of what it means? Instructively, there is no tendency for full
synonyms to exhibit phonemic features in common e.g. "bachelor" and
"unmarried man".
However, we should note that all of these attempts, weak as they
are, are ones to show how the primitives of the system represent by
resemblance ... which, from earlier considerations we would not expect
to succeed.
How much more likely is it that sentences represent states of
affairs by resembling them? How does the sentence "The ant is carrying
a stick" resemble the state of affairs in which the ant is carrying a
stick?
One sort of answer - the Davidson-Tarski Correspondance theory of
truth and its semantic ramifications and Montague's Semantics can be
seen as an attempt to elaborate an 'imitative semantics', albeit at a
very abstract level, but a discussion of that goes beyond the scope of
this chapter.
Note, however, it does at least seem plausible that the state of
affairs in which the ant is carrying a stick is related to the sentence
"The ant is carrying a stick" in a very similar way to that in which
" the state of affairs in which the ant is not carrying a stick is related
20.
to the sentence "The ant is not carrying a stick" (i.e. the state of
affairs obtains whenever the sentence is true).
It is meaningless to talk of the structure of a representation;
structure is relative to the processes which construct and use the
representation. Pylyshyn (1975) has suggested we should speak of the
structure of the representation relative to a "Semantic Interpretation
Function" (S.I.F.). Then we can say representations "preserve the
structure of what they represent" to the extent that the "same struc¬
ture" is extracted by some appropriate S.I.F. Pylyshyn observes,
interestingly that, "in that sense, the sentence, 'the book is on the
table' can be said to preserve (part of) the structure of a scene con¬
taining a book on a table." Finally note, as Sloman (1975) has pointed
out, the way some sentences represent is_ partly by analogy ... or
similarity. Compare: "She shot him and kissed him" vs. "She kissed
him and shot him." (The order of phrases is similar to the order of
events).
On the other hand, although representations of all kinds are com¬
plex structures, linguistic representations have primitive parts which
do not correspond straightforwardly to primitives of what they represent.
"The man who shook hands with the Queen at t" is a complex representa¬
tion which contains as a proper part "the Queen"; however, that which
the complex representation denotes, say Jim Callaghan, certainly does
not contain the Queen as one of his proper parts.
Summary of main points.
" 1. What is the relation between the model and the modelled?
2. The model 'stands in place of' the modelled ... it represents it.
5. All models are representations; not all representations are models;
therefore models are a species of representation.
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4. Models are used to explain/understand things.
5« ' Not all things which are similar to each other represent each'
other ... similarity not a sufficient condition for representation.
6. Is similarity a necessary condition for representation i.e. are
all representations similar to what they represent? Possibly
but, if so, at a very abstract level, at least for many sorts of
representation e.g. linguistic.
Suggestion.
Models are a special case of representation in that they resemble
what it is they represent - indeed, they can be used as they are in
explanations because they resemble what they represent. (The similarity
must play a role in producing the explanation, otherwise a microscope
used to explain the workings of a tiny instrument, which turned out to
be a minute microscope identical to itself, would count as a model).
In conclusion, whilst we are as yet unable to give an acceptable
general theory of representation, we can say a few interesting things
about particular cases of it e.g. modelling. The proper 10111 of repre¬
sentation is the system or structure within which primitives may repre¬
sent. All representations appear to strive (but may fail) to denote
... they are representations - of; (although we may choose to deny that
a representation not of anything is a representation at all). However,
mere denotation seems too weak a notion to totally capture that of
representation. Representations (being structures) always have struc¬
tures and these correspond in some way1 to what is represented. Some
representations correspond directly with the represented. Others
correspond with the structure of the procedure by which the thing is
identified. The former type of representation lend themselves - because
of their isomorphism - to being used in explanations as models.
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Models, then, are a special case of representation ■which can "be
used in certain types of explanation because they resemble what they
represent. _
Some preliminary appreciation has now been gained of what, in the
context of this thesis, is meant by the term "model".— Further discussion
will, however, be opaque without particular concrete examples. Accord¬
ingly, in the next chapter we shall look fairly closely at a case of
18th century formal model building, and in the chapter to follow, we
shall discuss the impact of an intimate model (the clock) upon the




"All things are Artificial; for Nature itself
is nothing else hut the Art of God ... to
find the various turnings and mysterious
process of this divine Art, in the management
of this great Machine of the World, must needs
he the proper Office of onely the Experimental
and Mechanical philosopher ... he that will
give a satisfactory Account of those Phaenomena,
must he an Artificer indeed, and one well
skill'd in the Wheelwork and Internal Contrivance
of ... Automaticall Engines."
Henry Power (1664)-
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Jacques de Vaucanson, born in February 1709 in Grenoble, was the
youngest of ten brothers and sisters. Something of a prodigy, he was
fascinated by machinery from a very early age; as a small boy he managed
to build a clock, which "marquait les heures assez exactement", out of
nothing but wood and using only the few crude tools available to him.
Only slightly after this, his mother, a strict and pious woman, allowed
him to make and furnish a 'child's chapel' ... and he repaid her by
equipping it with tiny angels complete with beating wings and automaton
priests, who carried out certain sacerdotal duties. This experience
stood him in good stead for his later career. We are told (Tence, 1836),
perhaps apocryphally, that whilst a pupil at a Jesuit college, his
mother of course expecting him to go into the church, he made and re¬
leased some automaton angels which proceeded to fly around the chapel.
The offending aviators were destroyed as heretical and the outraged
Vaucanson took the opportunity as a pretext to leave the custody of the
Order of Minims forthwith for Paris, where he gave himself over largely
to a life of dissipation and revelling ... finding time however for
in-depth studies of anatomy, music and mechanics.
Early on, Vaucanson had made plans for a pump at Lyons to raise
much needed water to the town, but had been too shy and lacking in
confidence to put them forward. In Paris, however, he came across a
pump working on similar principles and his self-confidence appears to
have been boosted. A great admirer of Coysevox's statue in the Tuileries
of a rustic figure playing a flute, Vaucanson dreamed of animating it.
He began plans for such an automaton, but a threatening letter from
his uncle - who no doubt thought his nephew was taking leave of his
senses - discouraged him. Three years later however, the urge returned
irresistibly and he threw himself into the plans and calculations with such
ardour that he fell ill. The hard work paid off handsomely though ...
although various parts of the automaton were entrusted to several
different artisans, when they were eventually assembled together the
automaton played perfectly at its very first attempt. The spectacle
was so awe-inspiring that Vaucanson's manservant fell on his knees in
homage - thinking his master somewhat more than a mere mortal.
Vaucanson made several other automata: his famous duck and tabor
player, to be discussed below, and at a fair in St. Germain in 1749 he
exhibited three other automata: firstly, a Moor who swung a bell in one
hand and a hammer with which to strike it in the other ... the Moor no
doubt served the function of collecting a crowd; secondly, a country
woman carrying a pigeon on her head and a wine glass in her hand ...
on the word of command, she raised up her glass to the pigeon who filled
it with red or white wine from its bill; thirdly, a grocer's stall to
the counter of which an, initially seated, mechanical shopkeeper would
bring ordered merchandise.
De Solla Price (1964) and Bedini (1964) have recently argued that
many such early gadgets and machines were neither "trivial toys" nor
"immediately useful inventions". Rather, they were simulacra. That is,
the devices were models of a very special sort, models "... whose very
existence offered tangible proof, more impressive than any theory, that
the natural universe of physics and biology was susceptible to mechan¬
istic explication". This leads Price to reverse the usual interpreta¬
tion of the relationship between high technology and "pure Science" in
the Hellenistic and Roman world. It is not the case, he suggests, that
"... certain theories in astronomy and biology derived from man's
familiarity with various machines and mechanical devices". On the
contrary, "... some strong innate urge toward mechanistic explanation
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led to the making of automata, and (....) from automata has evolved
much of our technology...". Another alternative might, of course, be
that this urge towards mechanistic explanation led both to the construe
tion of automata and to our practical technologies.
As Bruce (1977) rather inelegantly put it concerning Descartes:
"He justified his mechanistic view of bodily■movements after observing
and constructing elaborate moving dolls. (Descartes thus anticipated
not only later developments in science but also amusement park technol¬
ogy.)"
With Price's distinctions in mind, we shall attempt to answer the
following question: Does the aim of understanding behaviour by simula¬
ting it also inform the work of Vaucanson or has the urge degenerated,
as Brewster suggests, into the mere desire to amuse by displays of
mechanical exuberance? —
There can be no argument over the fact that Vaucanson's automata
did indeed delight enthusiastic audiences. Demonstrated to courts,
learned societies, and the lay (i.e., paying) public, Vaucanson's flute
player, duck, and tabor-pipe player "astonished all Europe" (Brewster,
1832). So great was the demand in London that these mechanical figures
could be viewed in operation at the Opera House in the Hay-market "at
I
1|, 2, 5 an(l 7 o'clock in the Afternoon" (Vaucanson, 1742). When we
consider both its imposing physical appearance and its virtuoso perfor¬
mance, it is hardly surprising that the flute player was so popular.
According to Brewster "The body of the flute player was about five and
a half feet high, and was placed upon a piece of rock, surrounding a
square pedestal four and a half feet high by three and a half wide".
The pedestal was packed with machinery, bellows and the like, and the
trunk was riddled with pipes and small reservoirs. "These reservoirs
were thus united, into one, which, ascending into the throat, formed by-
its enlargement the cavity of the mouth terminated by "two small lips,
which rested upon the hole of the flute. These lips had the power of
opening more or less, and by a particular mechanism, they could advance
or recede from the hole in the flute. Within the cavity of the mouth
there is a small movable tongue for opening and shutting the passage
for the wind through the lips of the figure" (Vaucanson, 1742)-
For the London exhibition, J. I. Desaguliers, LL.D., F.R.S.,
Chaplain to his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, translated "out of
the French Original" two of Vaucanson's most illuminating papers, "a
Memoire,to the Gentlemen of the Royal-Academy of Sciences at Paris"
and a letter to the Abbe de Fontain. The work was printed by T. Parker,
and sold in the Long Room of the Opera House during the exhibition. It
is thanks to this publication that'we have a fairly full and accessible
record of the philosophy of Jacques de Vaucanson.
What, then, did Vaucanson imagine that he was doing? In the-first
part of the memoire, he describes in considerable detail the structure
of the German flute, its components and their inter-relationships. He
also describes how such an instrument is played by a man, specifying
the motions of, and positions taken up by, the lips, tongue, and fingers
in obtaining various notes, sequences and timbres. Finally he discusses
the properties of the "strength" and velocity of wind necessary to pro¬
duce certain effects, and mentions the gross anatomy which underlies
these variations in the force of the air stream.
The difficulty, however, is to know how these elements - instrument,
mouth, fingers, airflow and so on - work together, simultaneously and
sequentially, in a co-operative fashion to produce the desired result.
There is a sense in which Vaucanson's seemingly "objective description"
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is really a hypothesis concerning the mode of operation of man plus
flute. Vaucanson accordingly summarises the position thus:
"These, Gentlemen, have been my Thoughts upon the sound
of Wind-instruments and the Manner of modifying it.
Upon these Physical Causes I have endeavour'd to found
my Enquiries; by imitating the same Mechanism in an
Automaton, which I endeavour'd to enable to produce
the same Effect in making it play on the German Flute".
Vaucanson clearly regards his automaton as a test of the principles
he has formulated: "It will then follow ... according to the Principle
settled in my First Part, the flute will give a low Sound: and this is
confirmed by Experience". This theme is stressed in the second part
of the memoire. The construction of the automaton is itemized and each
part of the device is carefully linked with the proper part of the pre¬
vious functional description. The four elementary operations are sta¬
ted as follows:
"By the action of the Lever, which increases the Opening
of the Lips, the Action of a Living Man is imitated, who
increases that Opening for the Low Sounds. By the Lever,
which draws back the Lips, I imitate the Action of a Man
who removes them farther from the Hole of the flute, by
turning it outwards. By the Lever which gives Wind from
the unloaded Bellows, I imitate the weak Wind which a Man
gives when he drives it out of the Receptacle of his Lungs,
by only a light Compression of the Muscles of his Breast.
By the Lever which moves the Tongue, in unstopping the
Hole Thro' which the lips let the Wind pass, I imitate the
Motion of a Man's Tongue, when he pulls it back from the
Hole to give Passage to the Wind, to articulate such a Note".
But how should these elementary motions be combined? The first
note (D) is formed by a relatively simple procedure, described on page
sixteen of the memoire. In order to produc.e E, however, various com¬
pensatory adjustments must be made:
"If I wou'd make the Flute found the Note above, namely E,
to the four first Operations for D, I add a fifth; I fix
a Bar under the Lever, which raises the third Finger of
the Right Hand to unstop the sixth Hole of the Flute; and
I make the Lips to come a little nearer to the Hole of
the Flute, by fixing or making a little lower the Bar of
the Barrel which held up the Lever for the first Note,
namely for D. Thus, giving an Issue to the Vibrations
sooner, by unstopping the first Hole from the End, as I
said above, the Flute must found a Note above; which is
also confirm'd by Experience".
All now continues smoothly throughout the remaining notes of the
first octave; only the appropriate programming of finger positions
needs to be worked out. Further problems of co-ordination arise,
however, when the simulation of the second octave is attempted:
"
... we must change the Situation of the Mouth, that is,
we must place a Bar under the Lever which serves to push
the Lips beyond the Diameter of the Hole of the Flute,
and thereby imitate the Action of a Living Man, who in
that Case turns the Flute a little inwards. Secondly,
we must fix a Bar under that Lever, which bringing the
Lips towards one another diminishes their Opening; as a
Man does to give a less Issue to the Wind. Thirdly, a
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Bar must be fix'd under the Lever which opens the Valve of
that Receptacle that contains the Wind coming from those
Bellows which are loaded with two Pounds; because the Wind
being then driven with more Force, acts in the same Manner
as that with which a Living Man blows by a stronger action
of the Pectoral Muscles ... "
The succeeding paragraphs of part two describe the further adjust¬
ments which are necessary if the higher notes of the second octave,
and the whole of the third octave shall be faithfully produced. There
follows a discussion of how to obtain correct tempi and phrasing, inter¬
spersed with remarks about the very subtle modifications which are
needed to produce a "swelling of notes" and an echo-effect. It is
clear that Vaucanson"'must have run into some horrendously difficult
problems in debugging his device, for he closes the Memoire with the
transparently heartfelt comment that:
"The fear of tiring you, GENTLEMEN, has made me pass over
a great many little Circumstances, which tho' easy to
suppose are not so soon executed: the Necessity of which
appears by a View of the Machine as I have found it in
the Practice." —
There seems little doubt, then, that Vaucanson was concerned to
formulate and validate - in the most precise and foimal language avail¬
able to him - a theory of the German flute player. Certainly this is
how Vaucanson's translator interpreted him. In the preface, Desaguliers
boldly claims that " ... this Memoire ... in a few Words gives a better
and more intelligible Theory of Wind-Musick than can be met with in
I
lprge Volumes". Explicitness is the paramount virtue. As Vaucanson
himself puts it, his aim is to imitate "by Art all that is necessary
for a Man to perform in such a Case."
This refrain recurs in the letter to the Abbe de Fontaine. Here,
Vaucanson compares the difficulties he encountered in the construction
of the flute automaton with the new problems posed by the tabor-pipe.
He had expected this latter simulation to be somewhat -easier; the task
is merely " ... to articulate Sound by Means of a Pipe of three Holes
only, where all the Tones must be performed by a greater or less Force
of the Wind, and half stopping of the Holes to pinch the Notes".
Yaucanson finds, however, that the essence of pipe playing lies
in its speed of operation " ... every Note, even Semi-Quavers, must be
tongued", for otherwise the sound of the instrument is "not at all
agreeable". It turns out that, for some melodies, his automaton actu¬
ally performs better than a human player:
"In this the Figure out-does all our Performers on the Tabor-
Pipe, who cannot move their Tongue fast enough to go thro'
a whole Bar of Semi-Quavers, and strike them all. On the
contrary, they slur above half of them; but my Piper plays
a whole Tune and tongues every Note".
In this respect, the automaton can be regarded as a competence
model. Contingent limitations are lifted. Just as our finite wind and
memory capacities ensure that many sentences which are strictly within
our formal competence will never be uttered or comprehended, so are
there many "Minuets and Rigadoons" which are formally within a (human)
pipe player's. competence but which are not attainable due to the tongue'
lack of agility. Yaucanson's automaton is able to transcend (some) of
these difficulties.
The fact that Vaucanson's theory (i.e., his automaton) must actu¬
ally perform enables a variety of surprising phenomena and unforeseen
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relationships to be uncovered; "Discoveries of Things which could never
have been so much as guessed at", as Vaucanson writes. For instance,
of all wind-instruments, the pipe must be "one of the most fatiguing to
the lungs".
"For in the playing upon it, the Performer must often strain
the muscles of his Breast with a Force equivalent to a Weight
of 56 Pounds; For I am oblig'd to use that Force of Wind,
that is, a Wind driven by that Force of Weight, to sound the
upper B which is the highest Tone to which this Instrument
reaches: Whereas one Ounce only is sufficient to ...
produce the lowest Tone, which is an E".
The direction of information flow here is interestingly similar to
the "intellectual boot strapping" talked of by present day simulation
theorists. From observation of the world we derive enough information
to construct a model - then from this model we infer further properties
of the world. "The Performer must often strain etc. ... for I (qua
simulator) am oblig'd to etc. ...".
Most interesting of all, however, is Vaucanson's discovery that
the. force required to produce a particular note is not solely dependent
upon the nature of the note itself, but is rather determined, in part,
by the note which precedes it:
"That Wind, for example, which is able to produce a D
following a C, will never produce it, if the same D is
to be sounded next to the E just above it; and the same
is to be understood of all the other Notes".
Vaucanson accordingly finds it imperative to have at least "twice
as many different Winds, as there are Tones, besides the Semi-Tones,
for each of which a particular Wind is absolutely necessary". It is
pleasing to observe that a more recent formal model of one aspect of
musical competence reaches a similar conclusion; Longuet-Higgins1 (1976)
computer program for the transcription of classical melodies into stan¬
dard notation demonstrates very conclusively that "the tonality of any
note cannot in general be established unambiguously until the following
note has been heard". In both cases, then, a simple "chain-reflex"
account of musical competence is falsified. This need to utilize
"context-sensitive" machinery had first impressed itself upon Vaucanson
during the construction of his most famous device, "the marvel of the
last century" as Helmholtz (1901) wrote - an artificial duck. Vaucanson's
primary aim here was "to represent the Mechanism of the Intestines".
In addition, however, he made the duck capable of many other overt motions
which included stretching out its neck ("to take Corn out of your Hand"),
moving the neck from left to right, flapping its wings, and raising it¬
self up on its legs. If these co-ordinations were to be achieved with¬
out the bird falling over, the "same" piece of elementary machinery
(the same structure) had to change its "function" dependent upon the
overall pattern of behaviour that was being executed. Upon observing
the duck, "Persons of Skill and Attention" will see that:
"
... what sometimes is a Center of Motion for a Moveable
Part, another Time becomes moveable upon that Part, which
Part then becomes fix'd. In a word, they will be sensible
of a prodigious Number of Mechanical Combinations".
It is the duck that affords a final illustration of Vaucanson's
motives. The entire internal mechanism of the automaton is "exposed
to view". This gesture is made, Vaucanson writes, because "my Design
(is) rather to demonstrate the Manner of the Actions, than to show a
Machine". Because the intellectual cards are more than usually on the
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table, Vaucanson can risk a little joke against both his public and. his
competitors:
"Perhaps some Ladies, or some People, who only like the
K
Outside of Animals, had rather have seen the whole cover'd;
that is the Duck with Feathers. But besides, that I have
been desir'd to make every Thing visible; I wou'd not be
thought to impose upon the Spectators by any conceal'd or
juggling Contrivance".
From oui. current vantage point, then, the most interesting fact
about Vaucanson is not that he constructed automata, nor that his' auto¬
mata were so superbly realized. Vaucanson's main achievement lies
rather in the clarity with which he perceived and articulated the
character of the explanatory mode he sought to attain. Recent discus¬
sions of the philosophy of psychology have stressed a number of desid¬
erata which are directly paralleled in Vaucanson's memoires. For
example:
1. That the theories must be explicit:
It is generally conceded that psychological theories phrased in
'ordinary language' suffer from an incurable vagueness; they only work
(if at all) when a liberal dose of human intelligence has been added to
them, thereby opening the way to disagreements over interpretation.
Chomsky's (19^5) requirement that a grammar should generate without
benefit of intuition all and only the 'objects' within its domain has
accordingly been called "the most important conceptual demand on psy¬
chology of this century"(Suppes, 1968). The necessity of explicitness
is only too obvious to Vaucanson who describes all his efforts as
"raised on the solid Principles of Mechanicks", and points out (in a
passage we have previously quoted) the difference between supposing
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that something will work and showing that it does.
2. That occult entities may not interact with machines:
A number of early mechanistic theories in psychology have always
been vulnerable to attack on the grounds that they postulated (or at
least left room for) a ghost within the machine. As late as the nine¬
teenth century, one finds Johannes Miiller (1842) proposing that "The
fibres of all the motor, cerebral and spinal nerves may be imagined as
spread out in the medulla oblongata, and exposed to the influence of
the will like the keys of a pianoforte".
Needless to say, Vaucanson will have no truck with flute-players
within flute-players or ducks within ducks. It is imperative for
Vaucanson that the " ... Machine, when once wound up, performs all its
different Operations without being touch'd any more". No hidden soul
or mind pulls the levers which cause the wings to flap.
3• That stimulus—response psychology nonetheless leaves out a vital
ingredient:
Whilst Vaucanson is a behaviourist in the sense that behaviourism
may be contrasted with vitalism or dualism, he clearly cannot believe
in an 'empty organism' approach to psychology. No manipulation of re¬
inforcement contingencies will provoke the duck to partake of liquid
refreshment ("I forgot to tell you, that the Duck drinks, plays in the
Water with his Bill, and makes a gurgling Noise like a real living
Duck".) - unless it has been constructed to do so. You can take the
duck to water, but only the fact of Vaucanson's having got the wiring-
diagram right will make it drink. The oft-repeated refrain in the mem-
oire is " ... we must fix a Bar so that ... ". Or as Q,uine (19^9) puts
it, the behaviourist is " ... cheerfully up to his neck in innate
mechanisms".
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4• That the behavioural repertoires of organisms must be characterised
Chomsky has emphasized that any finite corpus of sentences is only
a selection from the infinitude of examples which are, in principle,
known to a competent speaker. The point generalizes to other behaviour
domains. As Fodor (1968) puts it: "The potential behaviour of the or¬
ganism defines a space of which its actual behaviour provides only a
sample". It is therefore a condition upon any theoretically illumina¬
ting simulation that, unlike a gramophone recording, it should generate
the entire behavioural repertoire of the organism within a particular
domain.
Vaucanson is not entirely insensible of such pointa, although the
recursive function theory that would solve the problem was, of course,
not available to him. His tabor and pipe player does not quite manage
to play all and only the sequences of notes which are melodies within
some formal musical system. It does nonetheless play some " ... twenty
tunes, Minuets, Rigadoons, and Country-dances". (Sadly, we formulate
our mathematics in such a fashion that twenty is no closer to infinity
than one is.) The pipe, however, " ... employs but one Hand" of the
automaton. In addition:
"The figure holds a Stick in the other, with which he strikes
on the Tabor single and double Strokes, Rollings varied for
all the Tunes, and keeping Time with what is played with
the Pipe in the other Hand. This motion is none of the
I
I . easiest in the Machine; for sometimes we must strike harder,
sometimes quicker, and the Stroke must always be clean and
'
smart, to make the Tabor sound right. The Mechanism for
this - consists in an infinite Combination of Levers, and
different Strings, all moved to exactness to keep true to
the Tune".
We suspect that "an infinite Combination of Levers" really means
"many levers"; but at least the importance of modelling a reasonably
large and varied behavioural repertoire is obvious to Vaucanson. In
this respect, there is a parallel between the tabor-pipe and the flute
automata; as Brewster remarks about the latter: "The airs which it
played were probably equal to those executed by a living performer."
5• That the theorist must choose an appropriate level of representation
for his simulation:
Any formal theory should set boundary conditions for the phenomena
which fall within its scope. Vaucanson's duck " ... stretches out its
Neck to take Corn out of your Hand, it swallows it, it digests it, and
discharges it digested by the usual Passage". These, then, are the
limits of what is being modelled. Vaucanson continues:
"I don't pretend to give this a perfect Digestion, capable
of producing Blood and nutritive Particles for the Support
of the Animal. I hope no Body will be so unkind as to
upbraid me with pretending to any such thing. I only
pretend to imitate the Mechanisms of that Action in three
o
things, vis. First, to swallow the Corn, secondly to
macerate or dissolve it; thirdly, to make it come out
sensibly changed from what it was."
Let us say, with Fodor, that a machine is weakly equivalent to an
organism when the behavioural repertoire of the machine is identical
with that of the organism within a particular domain. Let us further¬
more say that "a machine is strongly equivalent to an organism in some
rdspect when it is weakly equivalent in that respect and the processes
upon which the behaviour of the machine are contingent are of the same
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type as the processes upon which the behaviour of the organism are con-
tigent." This notion of weak and strong equivalence is obviously re¬
lated to the distinction that many modem computer theorists draw between
"artificial intelligence" and the "simulation of behaviour". Clearly,
it is the notion of strong equivalence which is of interest to the
empirical scientist:
"The Food is digested as in the real Animals, by Dissolution,
not Trituration, as some Natural Philosophers will have it."
It was likewise the strong equivalence of flute-player and flute-playing
automaton which so impressed the French'Academy of Science. This learned
body:
_ I
I ■ | I ! '"
... did not hesitate to state that the machinery employed
for producing the sounds of the flute, performed in the most
exact manner the very operations of the most expert flute-
player and that the artist had imitated the effects produced,
and the means employed by nature with an accuracy which
exceeded all expectation."
Conclusions.
It should be obvious, then, that Brewster's claim that the primary
objective of Vaucanson's work was "to astonish and amuse the public"
is hardly fair. Vaucanson was an entertainer, but he was also deeply
committed to the development of an explanatory psychology.
One might wish to praise Vaucanson both for his achievements and
for his modesty:
"I own freely, that I am surpriz'd myself to see and hear my
Automaton play and perform so many and so differently varied
Combinations."
And above all, for his refusal to succumb to wishy-washy metaphysics
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about the limits of psychology:
"And. I have been more than once ready to despair'of succeeding;
but Courage and Patience overcame eveiy Thing".
Yet despite Vaucanson's fame throughout the eighteenth and nine¬
teenth centuries, his name is not to be found in any standard (twentieth
century) histories of science; he is occasionally mentioned in histories
of technology, albeit briefly and only in the context of his later con¬
tributions to industry. These contributions were by no means meagre.
As Bedini reminds us, Vaucanson was responsible for pioneering the dev¬
elopment of machine tools. In 1741> having been appointed an inspector
in the French silk factories, Vaucanson invented and perfected an appa¬
ratus, wrongly attributed to Jacquard for the automatic weaving of bro¬
cades. In 1760, he developed an industrial metal cutting lathe with
prismatic guideways, inspiring Maudslay, a generation later, to continue
work on machine tools in general and metal cutting lathes in particular.
Later, as examiner of new machine inventions for the Academie Royale
des Sciences, Vaucanson designed countless machines, including one for
producing an endless chain.
Moreover, in constructing his machines, Vaucanson was obliged to
make many technological breaks through. Vaucanson was the first to
make use of flexible tube of India rubber (caoutchouc), which he had
employed in representing "the Mechanism of the Intestines". "While M.
Vaucanson was engaged in the construction of these wonderful machines,
his mind was filled with the strange idea of constructing an automaton
containing the whole mechanism of the circulation of the blood. From
some birds which he made he was satisfied of its practicability; but
as the whole vascular system required to be made of elastic gum or
caoutchouc, it was supposed that it could only be executed in the
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country where the caoutchouc tree was indigenous. Louis XVI took a
deep interest in the execution of this machine. It was agreed that a
skilful anatomist should precede to Guyana to superintend the construc¬
tion of the blood vessels, and the King had not only approved of, but
had given orders for, the voyage. Difficulties, however, were thrown
in the way: Vaucanson became disgusted, and the scheme was abandoned."
(Brewster, 1832).
Nevertheless the disparaging label of "toy-maker" seems to have
stuck to him, just as it had done to Hero in earlier times. Even
current day automata theorists persist in this libellous misrepresenta¬
tion Raphael (1976) for example, concludes his discussion of the models
of Vaucanson (and others) with the remark that "These eighteenth century
gadgets were developed purely for their entertainment value."
It has, however, been pointed out by Cohen (1966) that at least
one major nineteenth century scientist - Hermann von Helmholtz - did
take Vaucanson seriously. After describing the automata of Vaucanson
and of the elder and younger Droz, Helmholtz (1901) comments:
"That men like those mentioned, whose talent might 6ear
comparison with the most inventive heads of the present
J
age, should spend so much time in the construction of
these figures which we at present regard as the merest
trifles, would be incomprehensible, if they had not hoped
in solemn earnest to solve a great problem."
The "great problem" in question was, of course, the same problem
on which Helmholtz and his colleagues were engaged, namely, to complete
the "mechanization of the world picture" (Dijksterhuis, 1961) by bring¬
ing physiology and psychology within its scope.
Helmholtz is aware, however, that serious scholars other than
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himself had taken a very considerable interest in these masterpieces
of simulation. Following a public exhibition of the writing-boy made
by the elder Droz, Helmholtz notes that " ... this boy and its construc¬
tor, being suspected of the black art, lay for a time in the Spanish
Inquisition, and with difficulty obtained their freedom."
The tribute is well-taken. Throughout history, those who accused
the automata-makers of necromancy were at least closer to the truth




"So if unprejudiced you scan
The goings of this clockwork man
You find a hundred movements made
By fine devices in his head;
But 'tis the stomach's solid stroke
That tells this being what's o'clock
Matthew Prior (1721)
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Clockwork has been responsible for a great many formal (purpose
built) models used by simulating natural scientists ... just think for
I S! I
a moment of the astrolabes, planetaria, orreries, planispheres, equa-
toria, armillary spheres and astronomical clocks of former times.
However, in this chapter we are concerned with the use of the clock as
an intimate model - a pre-existing entity seen to be similar in con¬
ceptually interesting ways to something the modeller wishes to under¬
stand.
The clock has frequently figured as an intimate model, perhaps
first of all in astronomy. Oresme (1370) compared God's creation of
the heavens to a man's creation of a clock ... in both cases what is
made is later self moving and without the necessity of further inter¬
vention on the part of the creator. Oresme took the model much more
seriously than this may suggest however ... indeed, he went so far as
to maintain that the actual mechanism of the heavens must be similar
to that of a clock: "In the absence of any resistance similar to the
balance which regulates the movement of clock hands, the speed of the
spheres would not stop increasing so that to keep the stars' rate, the
divine clockmaker had to calculate a complicated system of actions and
reactions."
The use of the clock model was by no means confined to the astro¬
nomically naive. The supreme Kepler (1605) wrote: "I am now engaged in
investigating physical causes; my goal is to show that the celestial
machine is not the likeness of the divine being, but is the likeness of
a clock."
Gradually, however, scientists lowered their eyes from the skies
to the earth, whilst firmly retaining the same model. Thus Boyle (1686)
writes that: "The world is like a rare clock such as that at Strasbourg,
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where all things are so skilfully contrived, that the engine once being
set going ... the motions ... do not require the peculiar interposing
of the artificer, or any intelligent agent employed by him", and for
Powell (1661) the world was "a kind of Automaton or Engine that moves
of it self much like a great Clocke with wheels and poyzes and counter-
poyzes."
Once the universe and within it the world, had been conceived of
as like a clock, the way was clear to think of the denizens of the world
in a similar way. An intermediate position has sometimes been adopted
however, where men are seen as mere components of the vast machine of
nature ... for example as the bell on a clock, whose function is to
chime the praises of God. Cristobal Goncalez (1609): "If we look at a
clock we shall find therein a whole host of springs, wheels, chains,
pins, cogs and weights, all of which move and function so that a bell,
placed in the topmost part of the mechanism rings and strikes the hours.
But if this bell were not to ring, nor to keep time, we should say, and
rightly, that the whole of this cunning mechanism was rendered useless.
After this fashion we may philosophize about the whole fabric of the
world, which is like a clock, set by God on those mighty wheels (circles)
of the heavens, some of which move slowly, others quickly, some turn one
way, others another, and all in time with the primum mobile. And having
created the elements and all the other creatures, which are the chains
and weights of the clock, and having set man, the most perfect of crea¬
tures, like the bell atop all of them, so that like a well-regulated
clock he should give perpetual praise and glory to God ..."
Soon, however, man was not merely a component of a machine, but a
machine himself. Hobbes (1651): "For seeing life is but a motion of
links the beginning whereof is in some principal part within; why may
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we not say, that all automata (engines that move themselves by springs
and wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life? For what is the
heart but a spring; and the nerves, but so many strings; and the joints,
but so many wheels, giving motion to the whole body, such as was inten¬
ded by the artificer? Art goes yet further, imitating that rational
and most excellent work of nature, man." (Both Hobbes' and Goncalez'
models were pre-figured by Suso's 14th century conception of the soul
and body as like the various parts of a single clock which, when they
were in accord, rang a bell symbolising the surge of joy experienced
by the heart moving towards God.)
With the comparison even of the rational part of man to a time¬
piece, the stage is set for a discussion of human psychological models
in teims of clocks.
The influence of clocks on psychological models could itself be
traced from the present day (Deutsch, I96O: "The mechanism of a clock
is related in the same way to its behaviour as the neural mechanism of
an animal to the behaviour which psychologists attempt to explain.")
right back to the ancients ... were one to begin with clepsydrae and
hydraulic models. But we shall begin rather later. According to some
sources (Encyclopaedia Britannica 1929), the first (weight powered)
clock was built by Pope Silvester the Second in A.D. 996, although main¬
spring clocks, called Nuremberg eggs, were not being made until the six¬
teenth century. However, by 1265, when he started to write the Summa
Theologica, Aquinas had obviously given the parallel between clocks and
animal functioning some thought:
"Et idem apparet in motibus horologiorum et omnium ingeniorum__,
humanorum quae arte fiunt ... Et propter hoc etiam quaedum
animalia dicuntur prudentia vel sagacia: non quod is eis sit
aliqua ratio vel electio."
Nearly four hundred years later, whilst a student at La Fleche, '
Rene Descartes studied Aquinas' Summa (Gilson, 1914) , and this study no
doubt formed one root of his conviction that animals "have no reason at
all and that it is nature which acts in them according to the disposition
of their organs, just as a clock which is composed of wheels and weights
is able to tell the hours and measure the time more correctly than we
can do with all our wisdom." (1637)* Four years before this (Treatise
of Man), Descartes had fully adumbrated a completely mechanical model
of man: "I wish you to consider, finally, that all the functions which
I attribute to this machine, such as digestion ... nutrition ... res¬
piration, waking and sleeping; the reception of light, sounds, odours..;
the impression of ideas in the organ of the sensus communis and imagin¬
ation; the retention ... of these ideas in the memory; the interior
movements of the appetites and passions;■ and finally the movements of
all the external members ..; I desire, I say, that you consider that
these functions occur naturally in this machine solely by the disposi¬
tions of its organs, not less than the movements of a clock or other
automaton ... Thus it is not necessary to conceive that it has a nutri¬
tive soul, or sensitive soul, or any other principle of motion and life
except its blood and spirits ... which have no other nature than (that)
found in inanimate bodies." Even four years before this, Descartes was
already occupied with the problem of mechanical life. In his Cogitationes
privatae he writes: "From the very perfection of animal actions we suspect
that they do not have free will." Readers of more recent literature will
recognize the above argument: when a man is more skillful than a computer,
the conclusion is drawn that men are not machines; but similarly, when
the computer outperforms the man, exactly the same conclusion is drawnl
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(Actually, not all commentators concur with,Descartes in his suspicion.
As Biichner observed: "A watch, ... has, as is frequently said, a head
of its own; it goes, it stops, frequently in a manner that makes it
appear to have a will of its own; But how singularly crude and simple
is the combination of matter and force in these machines, compared with
the complex mechanical and chemical composition of the animal organism.")
In Cogitationes privatae - Descartes proposed the construction of
a man-machine to be worked by magnets and, according to Pere Poisson
(1670), Descartes also drew blueprints for a flying pigeon and a phea¬
sant hunted by a spaniel. And the motivation for all this? "Voulant
verifier par experience ce qu'il pensoit de l'ame des bestes, il avoit
invente une petite machine qui representoit (un homme)". Descartes'
observations on the regularity and perfection of animal behaviour, com¬
bined with the mechanistic leanings which had been fuelled by his dis¬
sections, led him to assert that animals are machines; he had also been
greatly impressed by the hydraulically operated statues in the royal
gardens at St Germain en Laye, and reasoned that if man can make such
machines, then God could certainly create even more perfect ones, namely,
animals.
During the period dominated by the genius of Descartes, the clock
analogy" was pursued at varying levels of sophistication. In his Physica
Clauberg (1664) likened the living animal to a clock in running order,
and a dead one to a clock that has stopped. Indeed according to Sir
Kenelm Digby (1658) "The King of China upon his first seeing a watch
thought it a living and judicious creature because it moved so regularly
of itselfe, and believed it to be dead when run out; till the opening
of it and the winding it up, discovered unto him the artifice of it."
In Exeter Cathedral, on the tomb of Lady Dodderidge, who died in
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1614j there is an epitaph which also compares death to the breakdown of
a clock, though in the most charming of manners; resurrection is likened
to the clock's repair;
"As when a curious clock is out of frame
a workman takes in peeces small the same
and mending what amisse is to be found
the same reoiynes and makes it true and sound
so god this ladie into two parts tooke
too soone her soule her mortall corse forsooke
But by his might att length her bodie found
shall rise reoiyned unto her soule now cround
Till then they rest in earth and heaven sundred
att which conioyned all such as live then wondred."
For Malebranche (1678) who followed the main tenets of Cartesian
biology but avoided mechanism by the doctrine of Providentialism, the
apparent intelligence of animals (and watches) is simply a manifestation
of God's divine intelligence quotient. Accordingly, Malebranche writes:
"Les mouvements des betes ... marquent une intelligence:
mais cette intelligence n'est point de la matiere, elle
est distinguee des betes, comme celle qui arrange les
roues d'une montre, est distinguee de la montre."
But the more interesting insights of the period concern the possibility
that the nature of thought itself can be explained mechanistically.
Common sense suggests a continuity between the mental functioning
of animals and that of man. If men are intelligent, surely animals
are also - albeit to a lesser degree. Descartes, of course, denied
this (in some of his writings at least) and argued that animals are
purely automatic. It was now a simple step for La Mettrie (174Q) "to
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supply the missing position - animals are indeed automata, but so are
men. •
As Frederick the Great wrote in his Eulogy, La Mettrie believed
that "thought is but a consequence of the organization of the machine".
In fact, La Mettrie put it rather more strongly than that:
"Thought is so little incompatible with organized matter,
that it seems to be one of its properties on a par with
electricity, the faculty of motion ... etc."
For La Mettrie, the clock analogy was an integral mainstay of this
conviction: "Man is to the ape, to the most intelligent of animals, as
the pendule planetaire of Huygens is to a watch of Julien Leroy." Else¬
where in L'Homme Machine he writes: "The body is but a watch, whose
watchmaker is the new chyle." However, if one wants to demonstrate that
a functioning system is independent of a celestial intelligence (as La
Mettrie unquestionably did), there is something patently lacking in the
model of a simple clock - a device, that is, which requires a winder, a
great key-turner in the sky. Accordingly, La Mettrie proposes the fol¬
lowing innovation: "Man is but an animal, or a collection of springs
which wind each other up." And elsewhere he writes: "The human body
is a machine which winds its own spring." It is in this fashion that
La Mettrie can conceive of man as being both mechanical and self-
regulating.
Was the independence issue the only stimulus to La Mettrie's devel¬
oping thought, or was he heir to the whole automata tradition in Western
science? Budding mechanists in Heron's time visited automatic theatres
for their amusement and timed their eggs by clepsydrae; in Descartes'
time weight-and-pulley clocks were sufficiently complex to make inter¬
esting models of the mind. By the time La Mettrie was writing could it
be that self-winding watches were already in vogue?
It would appear so. The oldest known patented self-winding watch
was that of Louis Recordon in 1780, but the principle had been discussed
long before it was realized that, when patented, time equals money. In
1751 Kratzenstein, the inventor of one of the eighteenth century's most
famous talking heads, is reputed to have designed a clock which wound
itself as a consequence of variation in temperature (Chapuis & Jaquet,
1955)* Before this, in 1678, Abbe John of Hanteville supposedly made
"a means to provide that the weight of the pendulum should be wound up
by the guidance of several pinewood boards, placed transversely in two
slide ways, the said boards continually rising and falling according to
the humidity or dryness of the air."
Still earlier, in 1651, Daniel Schwenter, the Professor of Mathematics
at Wittenburg, entitled a chapter of his opus magnum: "Eine Uhr so man
nicht aufZiehen darff mit immer warender Bewegung sonder grossen unkosten
zu machen." (A watch which need not be wound because fitted with a con¬
tinuous motion mechanism cheap to make). Interestingly, he starts the
chapter off: "It is a well known fact that the human heart,like a going
watch, is incessantly in motion and beats day and night." Breguet, on
the other hand, suggests that the very first self-winding watch was made
in 1600 by a Jesuit father. In 1686 an advertisement appeared in the
London Gazette. The advertisement read: "Lost, a watch in black sha¬
green studded case, with a glass in it, having only one Motion and Time
pointing to the Hour on the Dial Plate, the spring being wound up with¬
out a key, and it opening contrary to all other watches, 'R. Bowen,
Londini, fecit' on the back plate."
Unfortunately, there is some doubt as to whether this watch,
although being keyless, was indeed self-winding. Although the modern
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method, of winding by means of a knurled knob did not come in until 1820
(and was not in general use ■until 1870) it now seems likely that the
Bowen watch was powered by the pumping of a spring plunger on the rim
of the watch body. More reliably, if we prefer not to believe all that
we read in the press, Chapuis and Jaquet inform us that the first -really
genuine self-winding watch was invented by Abraham-Louis Perrelet around
1772.
All things considered, it seems reasonable to assume that the idea
of a self-winding watch is certainly current by 1748, when L'Homme
Machine was published. Furthermore, it is clear from the researches of
Chapuis and Jaquet that the period which immediately surrounds 1748 is
characterized by some fairly intense competition to develop small,
accurate, and reliable self-winding watches. It is more than possible,
then, that a technological advance in clockmaking led to the develop¬
ment of La Mettrie's psychological theory.
Familiarity with technology is not a totally unrecognised influence
on psychological theory, as Romanes (1885) puts it: "Hobbes was perfec¬
tly right in saying that with respect to its movements the animal body
resembles an engine or a watch; and if he had been acquainted with the
products of higher evolution in watch-making, he might with full pro¬
priety have argued, for instance, that in the compensating balance,
whereby a watch adjusts its own movements in adaptation to external
changes of temperature, a watch is exhibiting the mechanical aspects
of volition. And, similarly, it is perhaps possible to conceive that
the principles of mechanism might be more and more extended in their
effects, until, in so marvellously perfected a structure as the human
brain, all the voluntary movements of the body might be originated in
the same mechanical manner as are the compensating movements of a watch;".
Neither is it a coincidence that the master, clock makers of the time
were also, in general, responsible for the most ingenious automata; at
first as jacks (automated figures to strike the hours), then as elabor¬
ate ornamentation, and simulations (that is, as theories of the natural
world). Pierre Jaquet-Droz (1721—1790), an eminent horologist of
Neuchatel was also famous for his singing birds, and together with his
son (Henri-Louis, 1752-1791) made astonishing mechanical puppets.
There grew up around them a whole team of automata-makers: Leschot,
Maillaidet and James Cox of Shoe Lane, London, who was renowned for
his museum of "mechanical puppets, singing bird boxes and strange'
clocks" which opened in Spring (sicl ) Gardens in 1773•
As can be read above, the philosophes of Europe had plenty of
stimulus to keep them occupied with the problem of mechanistic explana¬
tion during these times. Only ten years before the publication of
L1 Homme Machine, Vaucanson had exhibited his spectacular duck, and his
tabor and flute players. In 1 745 j Vaucanson had hoped to create "mov¬
ing anatomies" which would reproduce life artificially, and he only
gave up the project through lack of adequate research funds. As we
have seen, Descartes had thought of making a man-machine and La Mettrie
too writes that "to make a talking man, a mechanism, is no longer to
be regarded as impossible."
L'Homme Machine is arguably the most important psychological text
of the eighteenth century - certainly for those with materialist in¬
clinations. La Mettrie had realized that the central problem of the
conception of man as machine was neither moral or practical but cogni¬
tive: how are we to make sense of the notion that matter is endowed
with the faculty of thought? The key, La Mettrie affirmed, lay not in
matter itself but in its organization: "to ask whether matter can think,
without considering it otherwise than in itself, is like asking whether
matter can tell time."
Criticisms of the clock analogy (and, by extension, of the whole
research programme of the mechanists) were, of course, as frequent in
the eighteenth century as they are today. Some of the objections were
fairly trivial. Bougeant (1739) > for instance, pointed out that whilst
Descartes had tried to represent animals as clocks, it was nevertheless
the case that we do not caress our watches. But, of course, explana¬
tory models are necessarily impoverished. Everything can't be true of
a model that is true of the modelled. If it were, then the model would
be the modelled. A brain is not a model of a brain, it is one. And in
any case, Bougeant*s remark seems peculiarly inappropriate in the light
of the later Romantic Tradition in which people did fall in love with
(and presumably caressed) automata such as Olympia. Moreover, even in
1632, Sir John Suckling was actually comparing lovers to timepieces:
"That none beguiled be by times quick flowing
Lovers have in their hearts a clock still going;
For though Time be nimble, his motions
are quicker
and thicker
where Love has his notions:
Hope is the main spring on which moves desire,
And these do the lese wheels, fear, joy inspire;
The ballance is thought, ever more
clicking
and striking
and ne'er giving oer.
54-
Occasion's the hand which still's moving round,
Till by it the Critical hour may be found,
And when that falls out, it will strike
kisses
strange blisses
and what you best like."
Another of Bougeant's criticisms, that: "an inner persuasion makes
the Cartesian hypothesis repugnant" had earlier been stated by La Motte
(1721). He wrote that it was a "depraved way of Reasoning that could
dare to make them (animals) mere Machines, or pieces of clockwork."
This objection, commonly enough raised even nowadays, was also voiced
by Noel Antoine Pluche, the Jansenist author of Spectacle of Nature,
who criticised Locke as "a man who degrades our soul far enough to con¬
sider it a soul of clay." We can let La Mettrie answer this attack
for himself: "The excellence of reason does not depend on a big word
devoid of meaning (immateriality), but on the force, extent and pers¬
picuity of reason itself. Thus 'a soul of clay' which should discover,
at one glance, as it were, the relations and consequences of an infinite
number of ideas hard to understand, would evidently be preferable to a
foolish and stupid soul though that were composed of the most precious
elements." The material in which the structure of reason is instantiated,
is irrelevant to psychological theory, though it may be of interest to
a neurologist, a physiologist or a physicist.
Another basis for the repugnance felt (and still felt in some quar¬
ters) was the supposed ill-treatment of animals that follows from the
thesis. Thus Fontaine (1738): "They said that the animals were clocks;
that the cries they emitted when struck, were only the noise of a little
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spring which had been touched, but that the whole body was without feel
ing."
A less emotional (but no less pertinent) criticism was that of
Fontanelle (1764): "Mais mettez une machine de chien et une de chienne
l'une aupres de 1'autre, il en pourra resulter une troisieme petite
machine: au lieu "que deux montres seront l'une aupres de 1'autre toute
leur vie sans faire jamais une troisieme montre."
To go further than Fontanelle is beyond the scope of this chapter,
but it is high time that a more thorough and systematic study of the
clock analogy was undertaken. As Frederick the Great said, La Mettrie
"tried to explain ... the thin texture of understanding, and he found
only mechanism where others had supposed an essence superior to matter.'
To what extent was the rapid rate of advance in the clockmaker's art
responsible for the fact that La Mettrie completed the philosophical




ARE MODELS ABERRATIONS OF MINDS TOO FEEBLE
TO THINK ABOUT'ABSTRACTIONS?
Calculating machines and adders.
We are told (Ghiselin, 1952) (perhaps somewhat apocryphally) that,
after a hard but unsuccessful period slaving over a hot desk trying to
solve the chemical problem of the benzene molecule, Kekule had a vivid
daydream in which a snake swallowed its own tail. We are not told why
the snake adopted such an unnatural posture; (perhaps it was like the
Gryphon's whiting which "would go with the lobsters to the dance. So
they got thrown out to sea. So they had to fall a long way. So they
got their tails fast in their mouths. So they couldn't get them out
again. That's all." (Carroll, 1865)). Luckily, we do not have to
decide how the snake got its tail into its mouth ... only what the
result was. Kekule came to his senses, with the image reverberating
in his mind's eye, to find that he had solved the problem - the struc¬
ture of the benzene molecule was a ring rather than a chain.
The present point is that one would search in vain through chemis¬
try textbooks for illustrations of the snake, and lecturers seem to be
quite capable of explaining the structure of the benzene molecule to
aspiring chemists without referring to suicidal anacondas or masochis¬
tic vipers.
t
Similarly, the doodles (if any) which Einstein drew in the margin
as he was formulating the general theory of relativity may in some
sense have helped him to solve the problems, yet neither do they figure
in textbooks of theoretical physics.
According to some (e.g. Duhem, Braithwaite etc.), models are no
more essential to theory than doodles or daydreams ... at the best, all
three are mere psychological aids, private and personal to their indi¬
vidual creators and playing no part in the intersubjective language of
science; at their worst (i.e. usually) models are superficial and
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distracting.
What these critics strive for, instead of models, are purely formal
deductive systems only some of whose consequences need he interpreted
into observables and empirically tested ... what they see as theories
(which are abstract, logical and systematic) as opposed to models (which
are concrete, visual, imaginative and incoherent).
Duhem's classic: The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, publi¬
shed in 1914> was, as might be expected from the title, directed prim¬
arily at physicists, but one might as well put the "Physical" of the
title in parentheses and take it as an attack on model building as a
form of explanation in any science. Chapter IV in particular, which
deals with "Abstract Theories and Mechanical Models", might have speci¬
fically been written about one of Vaucanson's or von Kempelen's auto¬
mata ... or indeed even of a more modern computer model such as Winograd's.
In this chapter, we shall discuss the relation between theories and
models, starting with a discussion of Duhem's ideas, and see that we
need to split up the somewhat monolithic concept of 'model' into two
separate but related parts.
Mad dogs and Englishmen.
According to Duhem, (physical) theory should be the result of the
application of two processes: abstraction and generalisation (achieving
economy both in substituting a few hypotheses for a vast set of laws
and, previously, substituting a law for a multitude of facts). However,
he realised that not all "vigorously developed minds" are endowed with
high powers of abstraction but some are rather "endowed with a powerful
faculty of imagination." As Pascal (1669) put it, there are: "two kinds
of minds: one kind, able to penetrate quickly and profoundly the con¬
sequence of principles, we call the exact mind; the other, able to
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comprehend, a great number of principles without confusing them, we call
the geometrical mind."
Variations in terminology are common. Duhem discusses Napoleon
as an example of a broad but weak intellect ... "the slightest and most
fleeting detail ... did not escape Napoleon's scrutiny" but (as Taine
said) "a general principle displeased him as.a bad joke."
However, according to Duhem, Napoleon was something of an exception
- being a Frenchman with an ample mind ... more typically an English
failing: "There is one people in whom ... ampleness of mind is endemic
... the English" (who have an) "extraordinary facility for imagining
very complicated collections of concrete facts and ... an extreme dif¬
ficulty in conceiving abstract notions and formulating general princi¬
ples." Duhem cites Dickens' novels as "nightmarish series of concrete
things" and criticises Bacon's "The True Philosopher" as showing no"
attempt "to construct a clear and well-ordered system of truths logi¬
cally deduced from warranted principles", but rather, he goes on scath¬
ingly, "its object is quite practical not to say industrial."
Duhem clearly intended the shop floor references perjoratively.
Why, is not so obvious - as a theoretical physicist we might have expec¬
ted him to be fascinated by the concept of mass production - but he
continues in1 a similar withering vein in discussing a book by Oliver
Lodge (1890).
First he mentions what he expects in a theory: "This whole theory
(should constitute) a group of abstract ideas and general propositions,
formulated in the clear and precise language of geometry and algebra,
and connected with one another by the rules of logic."
Secondly he mentions what he finds: "Here is a book ... intended
to expound the modern theories ... In it one finds nothing but strings
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which move round, pulleys, which roll round, drums, which go through pearl
heads ... toothed wheels which are geared to one another and engage hooks.
We thought we were entering the tranquil and neatly ordered abode of
reason, but we find ourselves in a factory."
These strings, pulleys and gears were of course, collectively,
Lodge's model. Another modelling physicist, William Thomson (I884)
(later Lord Kelvin), said, as explicitly as we could wish: "It seems to
me that the test of 'Do we or do we not understand a particular subject
(in physics)?' is 'Can we make a mechanical model of it?' ... I never
satisfy myself until I can make a mechanical model of a thing. If I
can make a mechanical model, I understand it. As long as I cannot make
a mechanical model all the way through I cannot understand." To this
Duhem's response is predictable enough ... these models should not be
taken as explanations (which would be logico-deductive systems). Rather
they are ("not combinations intended to be conceived by reason, but)
mechanical contrivances intended to be seen by the imagination."
That some researchers do, as Duhem said, have a "need to imagine
concrete, material visible and tangible things" is undeniable. Oliver
Lodge did express a desire to "form a mental representation of the
phenomena which are really happening" and even Deutsch (i960) admits
that expressing a theory in terms of a model by giving it an identifi¬
cation which is already familiar makes it easier to think about than a
completely abstract system - and that, in this respect, it is a mere
psychological aid, which neither adds to nor detracts from the explana¬
tory value of the system itself. For Duhem, though, modelling doubles
the problems - we not only need to grasp the operation of the model it¬
self - often fairly complex, as in Kelvin's models of vortex atoms or
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Winograd's natural language understanding system - but we also have to
grasp the analogy between the properties of,the model and the propo¬
sitions of the theory.
However, whilst Duhem did violently oppose the use of models as
explanation, his opposition to models (or at least analogies) as sources
of inspiration for discovery has perhaps been over-emphasized in the
literature - probably because Mary Hesse's Models and Analogies in
Science (1966) polarised the positions of Duhem and Campbell for the
purposes of exposition.
It is true that Duhem was sceptical of claims of theoretical ad¬
vance due to model use. He believed that models were often parasitic
on theory - which withered away after the birth of the model, but with¬
out which the model would never have been born. Yet on the other hand,
he was moved to write that "the search for analogies between two dis¬
tinct categories of phenomena has perhaps been the surest and most
fruitful method of all the procedures put in play in the construction
of (physical) theories." Note however that for Duhem the process of
analogy was an abstract one, far removed from concrete, mechanical
apparatus or models: "Analogies consist in bringing together two abstract
systems; either one of them already known serves to help us guess the
form of the other not yet known, or both being formulated, they clarify
each other."
What exactly is at issue here? Duhem objects to models but commends
analogies. It is not merely that the models he was considering were
mechanical. Indeed, he wrote that what he objected to in the English
school was not that it had tried to reduce matter to mechanism - after
all his beloved Descartes (with his "strong and restricted mind") who
believed animals were machines, La Mettrie, who believed men were
machines, and Huygens, whom Duhem respected, had done just that - to
name but three. No, it was not the reduction itself of matter to
mechanism to which he objected, but "the particular form its attempts
have taken" (in the English school). The essence of the respectable
mechanists was a desire for an explanation which was economical and
systematic (highly abstract concerns); but that of the English was "a
lapse in the faculty of abstracting, that is, to a victory of imagina¬
tion" ... a yielding to the inner "need to imagine concrete material,
visible and tangible things." (Though Descartes did build automata to
test his mechanical theories and can Duh'em have heard of Vaucanson?).
One result of the tendency to be concerned with the tangible pre¬
sent, which Duhem criticised in the English school, is still as relevant
today ... if not more so. The English (physical) theorist "does not aim
to deduce his model from a philosophical system, nor even to put it into
accord with such a system." The result is that a model may be completely
ad hoc - it may not be theoretically motivated at all, its only justifi¬
cation being that it 'works'.
Guide lines on model-adequacy'may be derived from Chomsky's (19&5)
suggestions regarding adequacy of a theory of language. A model is
observationally adequate if it is indistinguishable in. the relevant
respects from the modelled, i.e. it passes the Turing test, provides
the same input - to - output conversion etc; it is descriptively adequate
if it does the same thing in the same way, i.e. the processes upon which
the output of the model are contingent are of the same type as those
upon which the output of the modelled are contingent - where "same"
means "receiving a common description by a theoretically relevant meta¬
language"; it is explanatorily adequate if it is suggested/supported
(e.g. if it is unified) by some theoretical concerns etc.
These conditions on adequacy render more precise what was said
above regarding weak and strong modelling ... observational adequacy-
is equivalent to the weak requirement and descriptive adequacy to the
strong one. These constraints on modelling have however long been
appreciated. It is of considerable interest, and consistent with the
general theme of this thesis, that these sorts of considerations are
at once an integral part of the concrete process of building models and
of the theoretical process of the philosophising about explanation.
To take a couple of examples from the use of clocks as intimate models:
Descartes (1647) was well aware that, although the theory of man he was
offering was observationally adequate, he could not guarantee its des¬
criptive adequacy.
"Although I may have imagined causes capable of producing effects
similar to those we see, we should not conclude for that reason t'hat
those we see are produced by those causes; for just as an industrious
watch maker may make two watches which keep time equally well and with¬
out any difference in their external appearance, yet without any sim¬
ilarity in the composition of their wheels, so it is certain that God
works in an infinity of diverse ways (each of which enables Him to make
every thing appear in the world as it does, without making it possible
for the human mind to know what of all these ways He has decided to use.)
Cotes (1729), too, was aware of the strong/weak distinction, but
insisted that descriptive adequacy alone should be our goal:
"The business of true philosophy is to derive the natures of things
from courses truly existent; and to enquire after those laws in Y/hich
the Great Creator actually chose to found this most beautiful Frame of
the World; not those by which he might have done the same, had he so
pleased. It is reasonable enough to suppose that from several causes,
somewhat differing from each other, the same effects may arise; but the
true cause will be that, from which it truly and actually does arise;
the others have no place in true philosophy. The same motions of the
hour-hand in a clock may be occasioned either by a weight hung, or a
spring shut up within. But if a certain clock should be really moved
with a weight; we should laugh at a man that should suppose it moved
with a spring, and from that principle suddenly taken up without further
examination should go about to explain the motion of the index; for
certainly the way he ought to have taken should have been, actually to
look into the inward parts of the machine, that he might find the true
principle of the proposed motions."
Differing enterprises have differing requirements upon them as
regards satisfaction of the three levels of adequacy; observational;
descriptive and explanatory.
Cognitive simulation should satisfy all three, whereas artificial
intelligence need only be observationally and explanatorily adequate -
it is no part oftheir brief to ensure that their programs solve problems
in the same way as people, although, through the use of protocols and
because the programmers are human, this may incidentally occur. To be
of theoretical interest however, both C.S. and A.I. should be theoreti¬
cally motivated: ad hoc patching of a program simply to get it to do
what we want may be useful but yields no insight. As an example,
Michael Arbib (1969) has written an interesting program simulating the
self-reproducing properties of a three segment worm, which, when 'chopped
into pieces, regenerates itself. However, the simulated worm regrows
itself in unnatural combinations, e.g. head-tail-head. Arbib solves the
problem by adding a set of context sensitive rules to filter out unwanted
combinations. Yet the only motivation for these rules is the desired end
state ... they have no natural justification in terms of the model itself
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Similar allegations of arbitrariness have been levelled against
Winograd's program for understanding natural language by Drescher and
Hornstein (1976).
Thus it is not the mechanical side of machines to which Duhem
objects but their concreteness and the way they seduce the mind from
more abstract issues such as theoretical motivation. Duhem openly
endorses the use of analogies as discovery procedures. Yet mechanical
models have an analogical side - it is just that in which we are inter¬
ested. What we'need is a way of teasing apart the concrete physical
side of mechanical models from their abstract analogical side.
Before we can satisfy this need, however, we shall have to look a
little more closely at the relationship between models and what they
model.
Two ways to approach this are:
(i) From the point of view of the system:
(ii) From the point of view of the primitive.
(i).
Of two structured systems., A and B;
A (e.g. a chess machine) strongly models B (e.g. a brain)
insofar as (a) A and B both perform some common relevant function
(e.g. chess-playing);
(b) A's and B's respective functioning are a consequence
of A's and B's respective structure and there is an
. I
I ! interesting (information processing relevant) level
of description such that they both satisfy a single
(probably complex) referring expression;
-(c) A's structure is explanatorily adequate.
(ii).
Of two primitives , a and. b;
a (e.g. a transistor) strongly models t (e.g. a neurone) within a
structured system A;
insofar as (a) a has a function within A (a computer);*
(b) b has a function within B (a brain);
(c) A and B have some relevant function in common
(e.g. chess-playing competence);
(d) the structuro-functional relationships of a and b
to other elements in their respective systems satisfy
some interesting common level of description;
(e) A's structure is explanatorily adequate.
Such a schematic characterisation of models has the advantage of demon¬
strating why such disparate phenomena as Yaucanson's duck and La Mettrie's
clocks both count as models; of exhibiting what it is they have in common.
But there is a problem - the necessity of the use of the term
"relevant". As has been stressed ad nauseym, everything cannot be true
of the model that is true of the modelled ... or the model would be_ the
modelled, indeed, "only by being unfaithful in some respect can a.model
represent its original" (Black, 1962). Model and modelled will have some
commonly shared properties (relevant ones) and some properties which
distinguish them (irrelevant ones). The Turing test was designed to
minimise distraction by 'irrelevant'aspects of the model. The motion
and behaviour-on-impact of billiard balls were relevant properties in
their modelling of atoms - but not their colour or being made of pottery
or ivory*
However, whilst ontologically the division of properties into those
equally true of the model as of the modelled and those true of the model
but not true of the modelled (and vice versa) may be exhaustive, epis-
temologically it is not ... there are also those properties of which
we do not know whether or not they also belong to the modelled.
Let us call this latter set of properties the neutral component
of the model. Let us also call that which the model and modelled have
in common the positive component and that which distinguishes them the
negative component.
Now let us clarify all this by means of an example. Take Craik's
(1943) use of the railway system a3 an intimate model of the nervous
system. Here the positive component is the modelling of neural path¬
ways (neural tubes?) by the railway lines and of nervous impulses by
locomotives; the negative component consists of facts like e.g. trains,
but not nerve impulses, were powered by steam, made of metal, travelled
on wheels etc. The neutral component (that part of the model of which
we are unsure whether it is part of the negative or part of the positive
component) is the growth area of the model ... that which gives rational
grounds for new hypotheses and experimentation (i.e. which licenses
hypotheses as opposed to mere guesses). In the Craik example, the neu¬
tral component is the way the railway system is organised ... the fact
that (pre-Beeching at least) there was not only one line to each destin¬
ation, but many alternative routes. Once grasped, this neutral compon¬
ent can be transferred to the modelled from the model and it generates
predictions e.g. that just as bombing one of many lines to/from a._
destination (Craik was writing during World War II) would only minim¬
ally disrupt communication to/from that place, interrupting a neural
pathway - and thus derailing the nervous impulses - would only minimally
disrupt the function of the area to/from which the impulse was travell¬
ing (a sort of naturally occurring response buffer?) ... other impulses
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would reroute and eventually arrive, though possibly late (unless they
put on steam in the meantime). The neutral component yields almost
indefinitely many testable predictions - we can block lines and time
trains over set routes, try and isolate an area completely by blocking
all its lines etc., etc.
Note though, that this sort of analysis does not seem to apply in
an equally natural manner to all of the models with which we have con¬
cerned ourselves. Take, for example, Vaucanson's flute player - the
positive and negative components are easy to identify but where is the
neutral one? It is .true that expression of a theory in rubber, leather
and metal forces you to be totally explicit about your..intuitions and
shows the difference in degree of difficulty between glossing over
theoretical inadequacies on paper and making a machine work by wishful
thinking. The working out of concepts in steel (or transistors) reveals
connections and interactions you had made-, or failed to make, inadvert¬
antly. It may even be that there are unexpected bonuses (implications
for the modelled), which stem from unlooked-for aspects of the assembled
model, but, compared to the Craik model, the role of the vestigial neu¬
tral component is minor. The major concern of Vaucanson was to present
a theory of the flute player in terms of leather and rubber i.e. he was
interested in exhibiting in as explicit a mode as possible just that
which the model and the modelled shared - the positive component. His
aim was precisely to exclude from the model any properties not shared
by the modelled. He purposely created a machine to possess precisely
those properties which we have expressed as the positive component.
Craik, on the other hand, seized on a ready made artefact - the railway
system - knowing full well that, in some respects, it was quite unclear
as to whether or not properties of the railway system were properties
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of the nervous system.
We now have the concepts at our disposal to meet an apparent
criticism of the account we gave in Chapter I as to the nature of a
model. Recall that we suggested there that models are a species of
representation which resemble what they represent.
It may be objected that models tend to resemble other models more
than they resemble that of which they are models (for example, two IBM
computers, modelling completely different psychological processes, may,
in some sense, seem to be more similar to each other, than either is
to what it respectively represents.)
Now, though, we can see that, as A can only model B by leaving
something out, A will have both a negative and a positive component.
However, what we take as the negative and positive components depends
on our interests. The model may be like other models in some respect(s)
e.g. in its colour, or that of which it is made, and it may be like
that of which it is a model in other respects e.g. in its information
handling capabilities. To assert that any one respect is the positive
component (wherein lies the similarity) is but a shortsighted and un¬
justified dogmatism.
Two sorts of model.
"In everyday practical thought, physical analogy
metaphors play a large role, presumably because
one gets a large payoff for a model of apparently
small complexity ... It would be hard to give up
such metaphors, even though they probably inter¬
fere with our further development, just because
of this apparent high value-to-cost ratio. We
cannot expect to get much more by extending the
mechanical analogies, because they are so inflex¬
ible in character. Mental processes resemble more
the kinds of processes found in computer programs:
arbitrary symbol associations ... etc. In short,
we can expect the simpler useful mechanical analogies
to survive, but it seems doubtful that they can grow
to bring us usable ideas for the parallel unification
of the internal modelling mechanism."
(Minsky, 1968).
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Let us now distinguish, and name, the two types of model we have
illustrated in the cases of Vaucanson and La Mettrie (and Craik)
respectively:
A FORMAL model is one which has been intentionally devised or construc¬
ted to match, in some relevant respect, the structure and/or function
of some system the modeller wishes to understand.
e.g. those of Descartes (in his automata), von Kempelen,
Longuet-Higgins, Vaucanson, Winograd.
An INTIMATE model is a pre-existing entity or phenomenon which is seen
to be similar, in a conceptually interesting way, to something the
modeller wishes to understand.
e.g. those of Craik, Descartes (in his use of the clock),
Pearson, Plato, Romanes.
These two categories are not mutually exclusive; for example, a
computer program (potentially) constitutes one of the most precise and
explicit formal models of cognitive psychology available, yet, merely
to say that man is a computer, tout court, is to indulge in the use of
an intimate model.
Both sorts of model contribute to research - but with differing
emphases. Formal models concentrate on rendering explicit the positive
component, the neutral component purposely being kept to a minimum.
Intimate models seldom fit so well or so extensively (not being speci¬
fically designed for the job), but exploit a fertile neutral component
as a source of testable predictions beyond the positive component.
"A fact m, known to be true of A, is more likely to be true of B, if
B agrees with A in some of its properties (even though no connection
is known to exist between m and those properties) than if no resemblance
at all could be traced between B and any other thing known to possess
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the attribute m." (Mill, 1891). In the limiting case, where B resembles
A in all its properties, its possession of m would of course be certain,
and it does (intuitively) seem that the more B can be shown to resemble
A, the more likely is B to possess m too. It is however, far from tri¬
vial to show that this intuition is valid, although there is limited
inductive support for the notion. Take the model ABD, the modelled BC,
the evidence that all ABs are D and the problem of whether BC is D.
The evidence is compatible with each of four hypotheses: (i) everything
which is A is D and everything which is B is D; (ii) everything which
is A and B is D; (iii) everything which is A is D; (iv) everything which
is B is D. Of these (i) and (iv) support BCs being D; (iii) is irrele¬
vant and only (ii) is contrary. On balance this appears to support, if
only weakly, the belief that BC is D. (Accounts in terms of probability,
falsify ability and simplicity are no more successful.)
Certainly the neutral component is not a stopping but a starting
place. Mill: "the competent inquirer into nature (will) consider the
analogy as a mere guide post, pointing out the direction in which more
rigorous investigations should be prosecuted."
We can now reap the benefit from the ambiguity of the term "intimate"
- these models are intimate (homely) but they are also intimate (point
a direction) by virtue of their neutral component.
As I have written elsewhere, there is no entity or phenomenon too
low or ludicrous to function usefully as a psychological model. Mill
supports this notion (and gives a reason why): "any suspicion, however
slight, that sets an ingenious person at work to contrive an experiment,
or affords a reason for trying one experiment rather than another, may
be of the greatest benefit to science." Indeed, Mill is quite adamant
" in his insistence that 'inquirers' should not "restrict themselves
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arbitrarily to the particular hypothesis which is most accredited at
the time, instead of looking out for every class of phenomena between
the laws of which and those of the given phenomenon any analogy exists,
and trying all such experiments as may tend to the discovery of ulter¬
ior analogies pointing in the same direction."
By this stage, the reader should have a fairly good idea of what
I am trying to do in'this thesis, of what I mean herein by the term
"model", both intimate and formal, of how important I think models are
and, finally, some idea of how modelling is actually achieved.
We now move on to consider more models in more detail. In the
next four chapters (i.e. 5 -.8) we discuss some formal models, and in




ANCIENT AUTOMATA ... AND ALL THAT JAZZ!
"the Greek civilisation ... favoured,
intuition, insight and. the intellectual
processes, but not the extraction of
secrets from nature by mechanical
contrivance and experimental technique.
This was not to come until almost 2,000
years later."
E. Boring (1950)
We are going to look presently, in some detail, at some 18th and
17th century automata and androids (completely 'mechanical figures which
I !'' '
simulated a living human or animal, operating with apparently respon¬
sive action: Bedini, 1964.)- an(l "the motives of their builders. Of
course, this work did not spring into being fully-fledged and uniquely
original, but was part of a long and venerable tradition. But in virtue
of which aspects did it belong to a tradition and (indeed) just which
tradition?
This section is short, partly because information about automata
before the 17th century is not always as totally reliable as one might
wish and partly because it is not as obviously of crucial import to the
central arguments of this thesis, which could anyway be maintained purely
on the basis of the later simulacra. However, some brief survey of more
early automata and androids is in order for several reasons: firstly,
there is good reason to think that these early efforts, and the records
kept of them, did actually materially affect the work of the later
European simulators (e.g. the Alexandrians via Islam to Prance,);
secondly, we gain further insight into the (multiple) attractions of
simulation; thirdly, there is some little evidence that these early
precursors were, whatever else they were doing, indeed trying to under¬
stand by modelling; and fourthly, the material is intrinsically fascina¬
ting.
It has been claimed that it is a "deep rooted urge of man to simu¬
late the world about him through the graphic and plastic arts" (de Solla
Price, 1964); that there is a dualism deep in man's very nature, which
leads him both to try "to uncover the mystery of man's making" (and
perhaps even try to usurp the powers of the gods) and to "exercise to
the full all that his ingenuity has to offer" and that, moreover, this
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dualism "is already apparent in his early twofold role as cave artist
and toolmaker" (Cohen, 1970). The reason that, although there seems to
have been a continuous and strong tradition leading man to simulate liv¬
ing animals and even man himself, there is little (and especially little
concrete) evidence of early simulacra, was the limitation due to lack of
technical skill (de Solla Price 1964). However, limited though that
skill might seem as compared to that of the engineering genius Vaucanson
and his contemporaries, the skills we are about to witness are surely
remarkable.
Let us now briefly trace the early history of the automaton,
which is, incidentally, a particularly interesting example of cultural
transmission (Battisti, i960).
There are two proven routes for the passage of interest in auto¬
mata from Alexandria to Europe:-
(1) Alexandria—> Islamic World —> Sicily —* court of Frederick II
(1194-1250) —> France.
(2) Alexandria—> Arabic table games —> 1 6th century Germany,
and two possible (but unproven) ones:-
(5) Alexandria —>India.
(4) Alexandria —> China.
We shall take a (slightly) closer look at these major centres of
the automaton industry, but first let us take a glimpse at some (alleged)
automata from Ancient Greece, contemporaneous with, or even earlier
than, the Alexandrians.
It is almost impossible to disentangle legend from (purported)
fact in early (and for that matter modern) Greece, but one thing is
certain ... there was a profound interest in the notion of androids;
after all the very word 'automaton' is Greek in origin ( cxuyS/».ocyo ' ).
For Homer, an automaton was anything which operated independently
(Iliad). In the Iliad Homer mentions banquetting hall tripods, built
by Vulcan, which ferried to and from the tables with wine and delica¬
cies, whilst in the Odyssey (vii, 91, ff) we hear of Talos, the Cretan
hero with the bronze body and of the golden and silver dogs "endowed
with a certain intelligence" in the palace of Alcinous. Aristotle
spoke of a wooden Venus, who moved about as a consequence of quick¬
silver being poured into her interior (Brewster, 1832) and Daedalus,
also according to Brewster, "enjoys the reputation of having construc¬
ted machines that imitated the motions of the human body." Plato and
Aristotle said of Daedalus' "spontaneously moving statues" that it was
riecessary to tie them to prevent them from running away and Callistratus ,
Demosthenes' tutor, said the statues were mechanical. One of the most
bizarre androids of all was perhaps the mechanical snail which, accord¬
ing to Polybius (XII, 13 > II) appeared in the triumphal procession of
Demetrius Phalerus in 307 B.C.
In discussing the Alexandrians, who were by no means averse to
automata, we are on a much surer footing. The Alexandria School is
centred around the work of Ctesibius (c250 B.C.) who constructed water-
clocks and automata; Philo (200 B.C.), who wrote a treatise on hydraulic
and pneumatic mechanisms and, above all, Hero (285-222 B.C.), who wrote
many treatises on hydraulic and pneumatic automata, such as libation
vessels, singing birds, automatic wine and water mixers, temple doors
which opened automatically on the lighting of the altar fire and a slot
machine holy water dispenser (a "Sacrificial Vessel which flows only when
Money is introduced") which accepted a 5 drachmae piece.
Hero was also a builder of mechanical theatres. In his Treatise,
he describes.one and explains that he purposely built it in miniature
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to preclude the suggestion that a man was hidden inside 1 (The interest
of this remark becomes even more apparent when we consider von Kempelen'
chess automaton).
Hero's work is of the highest importance and Battisti is almost
certainly right when he says: "Alexandrian treatises, especially the
writing of Hero, were determinant in influencing the development of
automata towards technical and decorative virtuosity." Naturally, the
Greek word for automaton appears in the title of one of- Hero's treatises
"ntpi ociroyvxt-o/toiqr ? n ", which appeared in French in the 16th and
other western languages in the 17th centuries. The Pneumatica was trans
lated into French in 1598 and German 1688. I give here three examples,
all involving androids, from the latter work to give an inkling of the
complexity achieved. (Woodcroft, 1851).
Number 40.
"On a pedestal is placed a small tree round which a
serpent or dragon is coiled; a figure of Hercules
stands near shooting from a bow, and an apple lies
upon the pedestal; if anyone raises, with the hand,
the apple a little from the pedestal, the Hercules
shall discharge his arrow at the serpent and the
serpent hiss."
■ Number 49*
"A trumpet, in the Hands of an Automaton, sounded
by compressed air."
Number 78.
"An Automaton, the head of which continues attached
to the body, after a knife has entered the neck at
one side, passed completely through it, and out at
the other; the animal will drink immediately after
the operation."
All of these are, of course , supplemented in the treatise itself with
detailed construction information.
As we have seen, historians of ideas believe that the tradition in
automata, with their complicated gearing mechanisms, shifted from
Alexandria to Islam. In fact, Hero's Mechanics were translated into
Arabic by Qusta b Luqua about 864 A.D. and Philo's Pneumatics were also
translated early into Arabic, although the exact date is not known.
A1 Kindi, an Islamic philosopher of 970 A.D., refers both to Hero (as
knowledgable of geography, pneumatics and time measurement) and Philo
(as skilled in the construction of Ingenious Mechanical Devices).
Moreover, examination of the devices of the Banu Musa shows they were
directly derived from Hero's and Philo's work, and al-Jazzari, the
most important automaton maker of Islam in this period, actually refers
to the Banu Musa as one of his sources.
'The Banu Musa' (813-833 A.D.) has been given as a name to a work
by three brothers, only one complete copy of which exists for certain,
and that in the Yatican. It describes 100 devices: fountains, self-
trimming lamps, an automatic musical instrument, a mechanical grab for
excavating stream beds, a vast number of drink dispensing trick vessels,
and, interestingly, a gas mask for approaching polluted wells. These
devices do employ an advance in valve technology (cone instead of crude
clack or plate valves) but, as Hill (1974) says, this is the main differ¬
ence between the Banu Musa devices and those of Philo and Hero apart
from "the greater complexity of the foxmer."
Vife pass over Mafatih al-Ilium (975-991 A.D.) and a work of Ridwan,
to discuss al-Jazzari's Book of Knowledge of Ingenious Mechanical Devices,
a treatise which is "the most elaborate of its kind and may be considered
the climax of this line of Muslim achievement." (Sarton, 1931 )•
Al-Jazzari, originally from Mesopotamia, had settled in Diyar Bakr
(now northern Iraq) and constructed automata and mechanical curiosities
for the local prince. In 1206 he wrote down for posterity descriptions
of 50 of the devices. Many of these were hydraulic and among them there
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was an astonishing range of living beings represented: birds, cows,
dancers, ducks, elephants, falcons, fish, horses,- lions, kings, monks,
monkeys, peacocks, sailors, scribes, slaves and swordsmen; made from
materials as various as beaten copper and papier mache, wood and brass.
There were clepsydras in which as many as 8 or 9 different jacks were
activated by a single water flow, automaton whistles and flutes, robots
which dispensed water and towels for washing, automatic wine and water
dispensers and so on almost indefinitely.
It is worth describing two such automata in more detail:
The Water Clock of the Drummers.
"It is a frieze like a ledge projecting from the face
of the wall about /[ft in a straight horizontal line.
Along it's edge there are 12 battlements and at the end
of the ledge stands a man. His right hand is out¬
stretched and his index finger points towards the
battlements; when he moves behind 'the battlements
his finger almost touches their points. Above the
frieze and parallel to it are 12 glass roundels in
a straight line (set) in holes (cut) through to the
inside of the house. Below the centre of the frieze
is a mihrab with falcon in it ... with a vase in front
of it on a projecting bracket, with a cavity (in the
wall behind it).
In the floor of the chamber is a platform occupy¬
ing all the foreground, raised about the height of
one man above the ground. On this platform are seven
men: on the right, two blowing trumpets, on the left
two playing cymbals - the rest are drummers ... at
daybreak the man is at the end of the frieze and moves
smoothly until he is behind the first of the 12 battle¬
ments, whereupon the falcon leans forward and casts a
ball from its beak onto the cymbal in the vase, and the .
musicians play. This happens every hour."
A Boon Companion - a man who drinks the king's leavings.
This little fellow, who looked like a five year old boy,
was employed at drinking parties. The steward having
poured the leavings into the boon companion's goblet,
the automaton lifted the goblet to his lips, lowered
80.
the empty cup, nodding and raised a water lily in his
other hand. However, as its party piece, the boon com¬
panion evacuated over the lap of an unfortunate guest,
whom the king had persuaded to hold. In fact, ingeniously
the wine went from the goblet not between the android's
lips, but through the stem of the goblet, down the arm,
into a reservoir. The raising lily signalled to the
initiated that the automaton was near capacity and the
evacuation was accomplished by siphon action.
Of course, al-Jazzari made technical advances in constructing these
machines. In addition to "elaborate systems of trip-levers, pullies,
tipping buckets, floats,runners, trapdoors and ballraces", we witness
the first appearance of conical valves (previously thought to appear in
Leonardo's drawings) and segmental gears (previously thought to appear
in de Dondi's astronomical clock), and we have the first unequivocal
description of metal casting in closed mould boxes with green sand, not
met in the west until the 15th century. He was also the first to des¬
cribe (and perhaps invented) the suction pump and he introduced the
notion of a leaking float, which sank in a given period.
These automata raise interesting questions in many directions.
One would have expected them never to have existed at all for two rea¬
sons: firstly, there was a traditional Moslem predilection for two
dimensional treatment (Ettinghausen, i960) and secondly, there was a
more general Moslem horror of images, which commonly precluded statues
(Keller, 1975)• Still, interestingly from our point of view, historians
do suggest, I use no stronger term, that simulation was an underlying
urge. Thus Keller: "It is surprising to find figures that move and
really do try to imitate human actions" and Ettinghausen: "in these
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automata, Islamic art attained a greater realism than in any other
medium."
Two other possible directions of influence from Alexandria were
mentioned earlier ... to India and China, respectively.
Philostratus informs us that Apollonius saw self-moving banquetting
tripods amongst the sages of India (Brewster), but the first concrete
evidence comes in the 11th century with the treatise by Bhoja
(Samaranganasutradhara), in which is described a wooden flying machine
in the form of a bird and powered by steam from a shell of boiling mer¬
cury (Vallauri, i960). Treatises and stories agree in drawing a para¬
llel between the machine of the universe, composed of the five elements
ether, air, fire, water and earth, and the yantra, manufactured by men,
in which the same elements reappear in a new order. Knowledge of the
science of automata was yantrasastra.
In China, there are many records of automata. There is mention of
a mechanical orchestra being in the treasury of Ch'in Shih Huang Ti in
206 B.C., whilst (more psychologically?), in the 2nd century B.C., Ch'u
Chi built a rat's.market in which automata closed doors as soon as the
rats tried to escape (the first Skinner box?). Later on, in the 4th
century A.D. Wang Chia speaks of a mechanical man made of jade who could
walk and jump by means of a well concealed mechanism and in a 6th century
manuscript (Hsi ching tsa chi) are mentioned "12 men in bronze 3 feet
high • • • seemed like living men ... the figures performed like real_.musi-
cians." (Needham, i960).
In Europe itself, automata have figured in legend and record, and
that hazy ground that lies between, for nearly 1,000 years. Pope
Sylvester II (999-1003) is reputed to have built a speaking figure and
Albertus Magnus (1193-1280) an iron man. Villard de Honnecourt (active
12^0-55) tells of a moving angel which pointed to the sun with its
finger and Vergil the magician built a mechanical- fly to frighten
other flies out of the butchers' shops of Naples. Two drawings by
the Tuscan architect Giovanni Fontana of 1420 survive, showing devils
with horns, eyes, tongue, arms, fingers and wings all moved by strings;
and, when the Emperor Maximilian arrived at Nuremberg on 7th June, 1470,
an artificial eagle, constructed by Johannes Muller, or Regiomontanus,
allegedly flew out to meet him, then returned to perch-on the town.gate.
Muller was also responsible for "an iron fly, which was put in motion
by wheelwork, and which flew about and leapt upon the table" (Brewster.)
Gianello Torriano de Cremona (c1500-85), who was entertainer to
Emperor Charles V, is reputed to have built fighting armies, flying
birds, a ballerina a palm high, who danced and played the tambourine,
and a working cornmill which could be concealed in a glove. In 1509,
Leonardo da Vinci made, in honour of Louis XII, an automaton lion which
crossed the room to the throne and opened its breast with a paw to
reveal the lilies of the royal house of France. In 1588, Agostino
Ramelli's Diverse et Artificiose Machine was published, followed a year
later by Hans Schottheim's automaton lobsters and ten years later
Reidel's mechanical spider, now both in Dresden. Perhaps the most com¬
plicated set of androids was that of Friedrich Hentsch (1660) who con¬
structed two armies of more than 100 men: horsemen, foot-soldiers .and
musketeers who fought and performed complicated manoeuvres to the sound
of firearms.
Hentsch's prototypical 'action men' brings this brief survey up to
the heyday of Vaucanson and his contemporaries. But to what interest¬
ing theoretical questions is this amassed data relevant?
Were these fabricata indeed simulacra? This is a difficult question
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to answer. Some historians think so. As Battisti puts it: "their
essential aesthetic quality lies in their imitation and, elaboration
of movement." However there are at least three tendencies evident in
the tradition of android building. One is indeed "man's dauntless
ambition to exercise to the full all that his ingenuity has to offer"
(Cohen) and we can think of "old technical experiments" (Battisti) in
this way too. Separate from (but parallel to) this tendency was the
desire to understand the mystery of life itself, with perhaps a view
to usurping the power of the gods; this tendency is evidenced in the
stories of Prometheus (remember that Voltaire called Vaucanson a
Prometheus), Paracelcus and Faust. The third (related) tendency was
towards magic and the black arts - an accusation often levelled against
'respectable' scientists. In ancient China the making of masks and
puppets was believed to be related to the cult of the dead (A. Bulling);
a chronicle of Luxemburg of 1398 states that "Turning mechanisms which
perform strange gestures come directly from the devil." An interesting
later example of this sort of interpretation is provided by Thomas
Nashe in "The Unfortunate Traveller":
"These birdes by the mathematicall experimentes of
long silver pipes secretlye inwinded in the intrailes
of the bough whereon they sate, and undiscernablie
convaid under their bellies into their small throats
sloaping, they whistled and freely carold their
natural fieldnotes ... But so closely were all these
organising implements obscured ... that everye man
there present renounst conjectures of art, and sayd
it was done by inchantment."
Modern model-building psychologists and practitioners of A.I. are
seldom accused of black magic or prometheanism, although critics often
seem to suggest that there is something rather profane about the enter¬
prise. The perforative use of the term 'hubris' as applied by critics
like Dreyfus or Weizenbaum has intriguing classical connotations - tacit
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recognition perhaps of the'long tradition to which I have made, in this
chapter, a mere gesture.
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CHAPTER SIX
OPINIONS ON PINIONS - AN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY TURING GAME.
"that an Automaton can he made to move
the chessmen properly, as a sagacious
Player, in consequence of the preceding
move of a stranger ... is ... utterly
impossible".
Philip Thicknesse (1784).
"How much of the business of thinking could a machine possibly be
made to perform?" (Peirce, 1870). Thus stated, the question displays
two depressingly common properties - it is apparently central to many
important issues in cognitive psychology yet it is hopelessly vague.
In 1950, in an influential paper, Turing sought to tighten up such
questions by introducing the concept of an "imitation game". The prin¬
ciple of such a game is simple; an interrogator is alone in a room with
teleprinter connections to two other rooms; in one room is a person,
in the other is a machine. By means of questions and general conversa¬
tion, the interrogator has to decide which responder is the machine and
which the person. Both machine and person may, of course lie, although
it is probably in the latter's interest to tell the truth. A machine
which (in this situation) is indistinguishable from a human being is
said to pass the Turing test, as it is now known. More precisely:
"A machine successfully simulates the behaviour of an organism when
trained judges are unable to discriminate the behaviour of the machine
from the behaviour of the organism in relevant test situations." (Fodor,
1968). Programs, need not be staggeringly complex to pass this test;
Weizenbaum's "Eliza-Doctor" program, which worked by reflecting the
interrogator's statements back at him, passed the test with such flying
colours that, to Weizenbaum's horror, suggestions were made, e.g., by
Colby et al (1966) that the program would soon be ready for clinical use.
Weizenbaum (1976) admits that Eliza had a "relatively simple computer
program". Nevertheless, the Turing test is an extremely powerful lower
constraint on programs, at least.
The principles of the Turing game are however by no means new^
From 1769 to 1834-» the "whole of Europe" (and much of America) was
"astonished and delighted" (Brewster, 1832) by what amounted to a grand
87.
(commercial) Turing game - von Kempelen's (later Maelzel's) Automaton
Chess-player.
In 1769 5 Wolfgang von Kempelen was summoned to the court of the
Empress Maria Theresa of Austria to explain various tricks of magnetism
being performed by the itinerant Frenchman Pelletier. Yon Kempelen, a
court counsellor, was already famous for his mechanical ingenuity and
would later be responsible for a talking head and the hydraulic foun¬
tains of Schonbrunn.
After the demonstration, von Kempelen vowed to produce something
still more amazing and, six months later, he reappeared at court with
"an object of intense curiosity to all persons who think" (Poe, 1836):
the Automaton Chess-Player.
This Automaton Chess-Player resembled a man, approximately life
size (only Poe disagrees about this), sitting at a chest. The whole
construction was mobile. The upper part of the body was dressed in
Turkish style and had a roughly carved wooden face; both the head and
eyes moved. The right arm reached forward towards the spectators and
the left hand held a long pipe, which was removed just before commence¬
ment of play - the Turk, as he was soon called, playing left-handedly.
The chess board was permanently fixed to the top of the chest. The
lower figure was not body-like, but consisted of a tall box, apparently
full of machinery, although a pair of drooping slippered legs and a
long cloak disguised the fact during a game.
The chest itself consisted of two cupboards and a drawer at the
front, and three cupboards at the back. These cupboards were opened
with a considerable element of ritual before a game and audiences were
generally satisfied that it was impossible for anyone to have remained
inside. An eye witness allegedly reported: "I searched into its darkest
corners but found no possibility of its concealing any object of even
the size of my hat." (Levy, 1976). A third of the cabinet was to all
appearances densely packed with machinery and the largest cupboard was
almost empty; the drawer v/as very shallow and extended the full depth
of the chest. A pair of candelabra, one on each side of the chest,
ensured that all was well lit and the whole Automaton was wheeled about
on casters to any point in the room requested by a member of the audience.
A challenger from the audience having volunteered, the machine was
(seen and heard to be) wound up by the exhibitor or "governor", as he
was known. It is interesting to note that the term "governor" was also
used to refer to the person employed to look after, repair and collect
clocks - he was usually either the inventor (maker) or, at least, a
talented mechanician (Cipolla, 1967). The challenger sat at a nearby
table, in order not to obscure the view of the audience. The pipe was
removed and, the governor having manipulated machinery inside the lower
torso, the game began. The Automaton played white (i.e. first) and
moved his pieces with jerky angular movements to the accompanying-sound
of clanking machinery. He would occasionally drop a piece if it had
not been exactly centred in the squares (the governor moved the oppon¬
ent's pieces on the Turk's board) - but carried on as if it hadn't
"noticed". The Automaton was occasionally rewound.
Games lasted for about thirty minutes, in order not to weary the
audience, who were presumably usually more interested in the mechanical
mp.n than the game itself. In addition to merely playing, the Turk would
roll his eyes and move his head as if surveying the pieces. When he
threatened the opponent's Queen he would nod twice and three times when
putting the opponent's King in check. He was also somewhat imperious.
If an opponent made an illegal move, he would rap the table top and shake
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his head, correct the move and then himself, move without giving his
opponent a second chance. On occasion, in an apparent fit of mechanical
pique, he would sweep the pieces from the board. According to some,
this happened in 1806 when the Turk was playing against Napoleon. Three
years later, in a second contest at Schonbrunn, Napoleon was soundly
beaten. The game is reproduced in Levy (1976). The Automaton gener¬
ally, but not invariably, won his games, and at times would undertake
virtuoso demonstrations and end games.
The willingness of the governor to move the Automaton to any point
requested by the audience, and its being raised from the ground oil
castors, precluded the use of trapdoors, thin wires or whispering.
The inside was openly shown to be either empty or else packed with
machinery. What could one conclude except that one was witnessing the
"most amazing automaton which has ever existed." (Windisch, 1784)?
If Augustus, Duke of Brunswick was right in 1676 when he remarked
"Chess is the Art of Human Reason" then the Automaton seemed to offer,
at last, tangible proof that machines could think. As Edgar Allen Poe
reports : "we find everywhere men of mechanical genius, of great general
acuteness, and discriminative understanding, who make no scruple in
pronouncing the Automaton a pure machine ... The most general opinion
... an opinion too not unfrequently adopted by men who should have
known better, was ... that no immediate human agency was employed -
in other words, that the machine was purely a machine and nothing else".
This was certainly true in some cases, at least. In his worthy
A Dictionary of Mechanical Science, Arts, Manufactures and miscellaneous
Knowledge, published in 1827, i.e. fifty to sixty years after the crea¬
tion of the Automaton, Alexander Jamieson described and discussed it
without revealing the slightest suspicion whatsoever of fraud. Francis
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Bowen still took the Automaton Chess-Player .seriously enough in 1877 to
take the trouble to draw (for him) worriesome conclusions ... he mista¬
kenly pays Maelzel, the Turk's second owner, the compliment of attribu¬
ting the authorship to him: "Mr. Huxley pithily expresses the necessi¬
tarian doctrine, when he protests, 'that if some great Power would agree
to make me always think what is true and do what is right, on condition
of being turned into a sort of clock, and wound up every morning before
I got out of bed, I should instantly close with the offer.' The ingen¬
ious Mr. Maelzel, who, nearly a century ago, constructed a wooden man,
about three feet high, that played a good game of chess, also fashioned
a smaller puppet, which pronounced quite distinctly a number of words.
Now, it matters not at all, most persons will think, whether a sentence
uttered by this puppet be true or false, since there would be just as
much merit, or demerit, in the one case as in the other. And if all
mankind were wooden images so constructed, I think that the difference
between truth and falsehood, or between a right action and a wrong one,
would not concern them in the least, and in fact would have no meaning
for them. Mr. Huxley's remark, if intended to be taken seriously,
merely shows the lamentable cynic-ism, which is the only state of mind
that can logically result from belief in a materialistic and fatalistic
theory of the universe."
However, if this was the "most general opinion," many records of
it have not survived. Claude Shannon (1950) is probably nearer the
truth when he remarks "Most analysts concluded ... that the automaton
was operated by a human chess master concealed inside." The interesting
thing for us though is not what these conclusions were, so much as the
way in which they were reached.
The acid test, of course, would have been to interrupt the Automaton
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mid-game, to have dismantled it and tried to find the hidden "master".
Happily this never came about, although it was at times a possibility
from at least two directions. Early automata makers, with their suppo¬
sed Promethean aspirations and Paracelsian leanings, were frequently
suspected of necromancy or black magic. Windisch remarks on an old lady
in the audience who, during a game, crossed herself and moved to a far
corner of the room "in order to be as far as possible from the evil
spirit which she probably thought animated the machine". Fortunately,
von Kempelen, a court counsellor and highly respected mechanician and
later Maelzel, a consummate showman, never allowed any suspicion of
hysteria to develop.
The other mare "empirical" line was voiced by Thicknesse (1784)>
a highly incensed Englishman, outraged at the thought of a "Foreigner
... collecting an immense sum of money in this Kingdom, to carry into
some other, by mere tricks" and indignant at the "folly of my own
Countrymen, and the arrogance of the imposing stranger". He recalled,
gloatingly, his exposure of a previous "automaton" ... "a coach which
went without horses". Then "a small paper of snuff, put into the wheel,
soon convinced every person present, that it could not only move, but
sneeze too, perfectly like a Christian". It doesn't take much perspi¬
cuity to see that Thicknesse would dearly have liked to extend this
"empirical" line of enquiry to the Automaton Chess-Player. It is, pre¬
sumably, a muddling of stories that makes Raphael (1976) wrongly main-
I
tf,in that "the secret finally came out one day when, in the midst of a
match and in front of a large audience, a loud sneeze was emitted by
the midget, an expert chess player who was hidden in the cupboard".
Given that commentators couldn't dismantle the machine, what then
was their approach? Interestingly, not to say why von Kempelen's
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creation v/asn' t an automaton - but why it couldn' t be. Poe again
(typically) gives the least cautious line: "It is quite certain that
the operations of the Automaton are regulated by mind and by nothing
else. Indeed this matter is susceptible of a mathematical demonstra¬
tion a priori". Unfortunately (but predictably) he doesn't give that
demonstration. David Brewster too, with the benefit of hindsight,
thought: "Upon considering the operations of this automaton, it must
have been obvious that the game of chess was performed either by a
person enclosed in the chest or by the exhibitor himself".
On the contrary though, it was not obvious. Why should it have
been? The crux; of the matter (sic) v/as the near total antonymy in many
minds of "rational" and "inanimate". Thicknesse remarks in a slightly
different context (of a speaking doll): "a rational answer conveyed
through the head of an inanimate being ... consequently made by a ra¬
tional being". Either the Automaton Chess Player was rational and ani¬
mate and therefore not an automaton, i.e. a fake, or inanimate and
arational and therefore not a chess player, i.e. a fake. The very
expression "Automaton Chess Player" seemed to make analytic nonsense.
Moreover since it manifestly did play chess, it simply couldn't be an
automaton.
Commentators then, decided that there must be a human agent invol¬
ved: the "movements (were not) really performed by mechanical powers
... (but) supported ... by invisible confederates" (Thicknesse, 1784).
But where was the confederate?
There were two ready resolutions of the dilemma - either someone(s)
in some fashion influenced the game from outside, or was/were concealed
inside. In these early days of rapid technological innovation, the
mental ground was fertile for suggestions of the employment of new
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physical forces. The willingness of the exhibitors to move the Automaton
about at request, did away with mundane direct contact methods of communi¬
cation, e.g. wires, strings, etc., but some commentators did suggest the
use of that strange new phenomenon - magnetism. Hindenburg (1784), for
example, thought the effect to be caused by a combination of machinery
and magnetism. Certainly the exhibitor at times encouraged the credibi¬
lity of the use of magnetism - for example by keeping in a pocket a hand
Y/hich was obviously holding something. The exhibitor "is supposed to be
the person with whom the stranger actually plays, by causing the arm and
head of the Automaton to move the Chess-men by some incomprehensible and
invisible powers ... a Magnet concealed in his pocket" (Thicknesse).
At the same time, however, both von Kempelen and Maelzel allowed a member
of the audience to stand a powerful magnet on the cabinet, thus mystify¬
ing the speculators. Note that von Kempelen could quite reasonably have
objected - if his Automaton were a sensitive machine, it would have been
quite possible that a strong magnet could have interfered with its deli¬
cate workings. And, after all, magnetism is a physical force - what an
achievement to have built an Automaton built on magnets 1 But, of course,
the public was set on the notion that although given a rational director,
magnetism might be the way of communicating via the machine, the thinking
would of course have come from an intelligent (i.e. animate) source.
The other immediate reaction was the "midget concept". This crops
up again and again: the "real mover is concealed in the counter"
(Thicknesse) ... "the Automaton Chess-Player is a man within a man; for
whatever his outward form be composed of, he bears a living soul within".
The midget concept has several obvious sources. Firstly, the exhibitors
had apparently demonstrated that there simply wasn't room for a full-
sized man. Secondly, there were precedents. Brewster mentions the case
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of M. Raisin, the organist of Troyes, who built an automaton harpsichord
player - later discovered to contain a five-year-old. Moreover there
seems to be something intrinsically satisfying about the "little man"
type of explanation. Who is able to resist the temptation of an assem¬
bled set of Russian nested dolls? More formally (but only slightly)
Osgood has inveighed against theories which suppose "a new homunculus
in our head", whilst Jerry Fodor (1968) has openly advocated their adop¬
tion as explanatory tools. To return to the Automaton. Legend embelli¬
shed the tale by suggesting that von Kempelen, whilst visiting Russia
to study the mechanics of speech, built the Automaton to smuggle out of
Russia a Polish insurgent named Worousky, whose legs had been blown off
in battle. (An heroic tale which is, alas, quite definitely false.)
In any event, the mistaken view that the Automaton contained a midget
or child persists in some quarters till this day. A recent children's
introduction to computers (Scharff, 1975) > states that the Automaton
contained "a midget who was an excellent chess player and who manipula¬
ted the automaton from his hiding place" and Raphael makes the same mis¬
take .
If intelligent systems are necessarily animate, what characterises
machines? According to Poe "regularity" is "important in all kinds of
mechanical contrivance". Once given data and started "it should continue
its movements regularly, progressively, and undeviatingly towards the
required solution", "these movements, however complex, are never imagined
to be otherwise than finite and determinate". Thicknesse corroborates
this view: "that an Automaton can be made to move ... in certain and
regular motions, is past all doubt; but that an Automaton can be made to
move the chessmen properly, as a sagacious Player, in consequence of the
preceding move of a stranger ... is ... utterly impossible".
95-
Robert Willis (1821 ); "however great and. surprising the powers of
mechanism may be, the movements which spring from it, are necessarily
limited and uniform".
Commentators expected the Automaton, if truly mechanical, to make
moves almost to the beat of a metronome. However, not only did it vary
in the time it took to move (this was surely to be expected even on the
mechanical hypothesis), but it flexibly adjusted itself to its opponent's
game. This was unthinkable: "it cannot be made to vary its operations
so as to meet the ever varying circumstances of a game of chess. This
is the province of intellect alone" (Willis); even if the "movements
of the Automaton Chess Player were in themselves determinate, they would
be necessarily interrupted and disarranged by the indeterminate will of
his antagonist". It is interesting to compare this attitude with that
of Spielmann: "In the opening a master should play like a book, in the
middle game like', a musician, in the ending like a machine" (Levy, 1976).
Ironically then, the fehess Automaton would have been more convincing if
it had been less successful. Alas the mechanical simulation of intelli¬
gent processes stands to lose either way; if it is too good then it can¬
not be mechanical, if it is not good enough, it is not intelligent.
Connected via appropriateness, to the problem of its mental compe¬
tence (in the twentieth century style) was that of its behavioural per¬
formance. Two points were made in this respect - firstly it was noticed
that whilst the Turk did indeed shake his head and roll his eyes during
a game - he did it most of all during easy periods of the game! It did
occur to the critics that this was perhaps because only then was there
sufficient "computational space" to co-ordinate such actions - that during
difficult periods, the directing intelligence was too fully engaged in
working out its moves; but they took this as proof that the directing
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intelligence must be human not mechanical.
Secondly, critics were suspicious of the exaggerated primitiveness
of the figure itself and its movements. The face was roughly hewn, but
worse, the manoeuvres were "awkward and rectangular". Critics were sus¬
picious of the motives of the builder, for it was widely believed that
he was a very skilled mechanician indeed and could have made the move¬
ments immeasurably more natural. The only intention he could have had,
to thus underperform, was to suggest the idea of pure unaided mechanism.
Several other features of the performance were considered to be
red herrings ("merely to puzzle" (ihicknesse)). Robert Willis considered
this to be the function of all the machinery which he noted was never
actually seen in action. Attributing to the creator a modicum of pride
in his own achievement, Willis reasoned that he should have been only
too willing for the innards to be seen in their full glory - especially
as the audience could contemplate it as long as they wished whilst it
was. inoperative. There wa.s a "glaring contradiction between eager dis¬
play on the one hand, and studied concealment on the other". Even more
perceptively, he paid attention to the actual winding up of the (alleged)
clockwork and concluded that not only did the key meet too little resis¬
tance to povrer such a lot of machinery, but, more importantly, that there
was gross inconsistency in the frequency of windings. The machine was
variously rewound by the exhibitor after sixty three, seven, three and
on one occasion - presumably inadvertantly - after no moves at all; each
winding consisting' of approximately the same number of rotations. Willis
took this as "positive proof that the axis turned by the key is quite
free and unconnected ... with ... any system of machinery".
The extravagant candelabra too, in the well lit exhibition rooms,
raised suspicions. As Poe observed, they can't have been for the benefit
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of the audience - who could see well enough already, and "if we suppose
the machine a pure machine, there can be no necessity ... for any light
at all". There must, then, have been some ulterior motive. For thea¬
trical effect? This didn't seem to occur to anyone. It was suggested
instead that the strong light was required so that the "inner man" could
peer through the gauze of the Turk's breast, whilst being safe from de¬
tection by the resulting dazzling reflection from the gauze. The actual
reason - to cover up the smell of a candle burning elsewhere - never,
apparently, occurred to anyone.
Other arguments against the possibility of the Chess Playing Auto¬
maton being a "pure machine" were, of course, put forward. These range
from the misinformed via the plain silly to the genuinely original.
Poe, for example, wrongly claimed the Automaton to be a lot larger
than it was, while Bowen, on the other hand, maintained that it was only
three feet high.' Poe also made the astonishing deduction that because
the Turk played withr'its left arm, this "absurdity" must be so that the
inner man could more easily manipulate it with his right hand. However
he also commented on a character called Schlumberger, who was often seen
around Maelzel's (the then owner and exhibitor) suite, whilst the Turk
was not playing, but who was never to be seen when it was; once when
Schlumberger became ill the performance was cancelled at short notice.
Worse though, Schlumberger professed total ignorance of chess, although
all the others in the party could play; an incongruity Poe found diffi¬
cult to accept. In true detective style, Poe finally left the discus¬
sion of the mysterious Schlumberger - with the observation that he "has •
a remarkable stoop". Carroll (1975) informs us however that Schlumberger
who v/as about six feet tall and well proportioned had made his name as
a player and teacher of chess (he taught Pierre St Amant, one of the great
98.
masters of the nineteenth century) at the Cafe de la Regenee, the chess
centre of Europe. Moreover, Maelzel introduced Schlumberger to the
Bostonian chess circles and frequently played with him himself.
Another piece of Poe's deduction was that the opponent sat apart
from the Turk, not in order to give the audience a clear view, hut so
that he would not hear the sound of breathing from inside the cabinet.
Less comprehensible is Poe's reaction to the fact that the machine did
not always win. "Were the machine a pure machine," he says, "it would
always win. The principle being discovered by which a machine can be
made to play a game of chess, an extension of the same principle would
enable it to win all games". This deduction is, no doubt, based on the
"self evident principle" that the "difficulty of making a machine beat
all games, is not in the least degree greater, as regards the principle
of the operations necessary, than that of making it beat a single game".
The A.I. community at Stanford and M.I.T. would surely be glad to know
this.
As a refreshing contrast to Poe's sophism, consider Thicknesse's
realistic psychological argument: the Automaton couldn't be a pure
machine because, if it were, the exhibitors would not exhibit it only
such relatively short and infrequent periods, but would have it almost
permanently on show: "the invisible player could not bear a longer
confinement; for if he could, it cannot be supposed that they would
refuse to receive crowns for admittance from 12 o'clock to 4 instead
of only from 1 to 2". There must be a confederate inside who simply
could not stand it any longer than he did. The serious side of this
point is, of course, the ethical one, that we don't feel a moral, respon¬
sibility towards machines; nor of course do they (in an important sense)
" have a choice about co-operating with us. Remember the term "Robot"
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itself comes from the Czech for "work".
The last major line of scepticism was that stemming from the un-
deviating vra.y the innards of the cabinet and Turk were displayed. Most
commentators mentioned this point. Robert Willis speaks for them all
in his conclusion that the "regular and undeviating mode of disclosing
the interior" must mean that "more (is) intended in the disclosure than
meets the eye". What was intended, it was assumed, was that something
should remain hidden, whilst the impression was given that all was dis¬
played. And that something? - a man, of course.
An interesting feature of commentaries given by the critics is the
way they analysed the Automaton Chess Player into psychological compon¬
ents. Hindenburg (1784) was perhaps the first to suggest that the
Automaton must have two mechanisms: A Gehewerk (motive force) to move
the arm, head, etc., and a Schlagewerk (directing force) to play the
game. Thicknesse is really onto the same point when he remarks, in a
footnote, that the "pretended Automaton ... points both a directed, and
adds to it the human faculties, by playing with judgement". Robert
Willis (1821 ) characterises the problem as explaining the mechanical
functioning, the directing intelligence and the communication between
the two. Surprisingly enough, the perceptual problem - how the Turk
perceived the chess configurations - seldom seems to have concerned the
commentators. Only Brewster really seems to see there is a problem and
resolves the issue by deeming as bogus all three problematic functions
(perception, movement and intelligence) ... a man sees through the waist¬
coat, manipulates the arm and does the thinking I Certainly the essen¬
tial insight that a machine is both a transformer of power and of infor¬
mation went unreceived.
This is the place to make clear - as you will already have guessed -
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that von Kempelen's Automaton Chess Player was not in fact a "pure
machine". It contained, not a midget, nor a child, but a fully grown
man (at one stage in its career Schlumberger). The cabinet was so
skilfully contrived, by means of a telescopic drawer, foreshortened
cupboard and hollow machinery, that a man could, and did, remain undis¬
covered inside. But for more than sixty years, no-one except the exhi¬
bitors and players themselves knew this for certain. For our purposes,
the fact that the machine was in fact not totally a machine is irrele¬
vant - for of main interest was the argument, or rather conviction that
it could not be.
To be fair, neither von Kempelen nor Maelzel ever actually claimed
that the Turk was a pure machine. Indeed, Maelzel's refusal to openly
state that it was, was one of the reasons which convinced Poe that it
was not. Thus, although Thicknesse entitled his essay: "The speaking
figure and the automaton chess player exposed and detected" and admitted
later that it was a "good deception" (as a "good deception" rather than
a bad piece of sincerity, it merited a price of entry but "the price at
least may be reduced"), in fact, according to Brewster, "its ingenious
inventor, who was a gentleman and a man of education, never pretended
that the automaton itself really played the game". In fact, von Kempelen
had openly stated that "the machine was a bagatelle which was not with¬
out merit in point of mechanism but that the effects of it appeared so
marvellous only from the boldness of the conception, and the fortunate
choice of the methods adopted for promoting the illusion". (Brewster).
It is unfortunate then that the slander still continues; even Claude
Shannon, after discussing the Automaton Chess Player, goes on to talk
of L. Torres y Quevedo's chess machine as a "more honest attempt".
We now have the strongest reason to believe that there are no a
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priori reasons against the possibility of chess playing automata - the
existence proof. As Yorick Wilks (1976) has remarked in connection with
Dreyfus' scepticism over whether machines can play chess: "A.I. workers
have contented themselves, with ... Johnsonian refutations - remembering
his treatment of Berkeley ... Dreyfus played a mechanical chess-player
in 1969j was beaten ... and for many A.I. people that settled the ques¬
tion". As mentioned, Torres y Quevedo had, as early as 1890, construc¬
ted a machine capable of an endgame. As for his motives we are told:
"The machine was created as a scientific toy in order to attract atten¬
tion to the feasibility of Torres' theory on automation". (Levy). It
is an interesting question how far von Kempelen himself shared this
motivation. More recently, in August 1974 > Kaissa became the world
computer chess champion in Stockholm. Even so, although machines can
play a "good" game, they do not (yet) come up to grand masterclass. lit
remains true that von Kempelen's Automaton was "almost certainly better
than any computer program that has yet been developed" (Raphael, 1976).
Modern qualms over the possibility of chess machines, are mostly
concerned with the problem of formalisability. Is chess playing the
sort of process "which can be formalised so that it can be represented
as a series of instructions for the manipulation of discrete elements"
(Dreyfus, 1972)? Bronowski (1965) generalises the point: "Is man a
machine ...? (the) answer hinges on possible modes of knowledge ... If
all knowledge can be formalised, then the human self can be matched,,
in principle by a machine". What is to count as formalisable is however
a function of the theory, but in A.I. theory, model and program are very
closely linked - if not identical. Indeed as Weizenbaum comments, many
programmers think of the language they use as being the computer. In
a real sense, programming creates a new machine; or transforms an old
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machine into a new one. A "malfunctioning" machine is miscalled - it
is in fact a well functioning one - although not the one we want. In
this way of thinking "formalisable" (which is often synonymous for many
with "strictly explicable") comes perilously close to meaning "program¬
mable", rendering Bronowski1s point trivially analytic. Anyway, even
Dreyfus doesn't maintain that no computer could play chess (well) -
only that digital ones could not.
Even Joseph Weizenbaum, doing his best to shoot down the man-
machine analogy and with the advantages of the close familiarity of a
professor of A.I., doesn't doubt that computers can be regarded as
organisms or that man is (at least) a machine. His argument is not
that there are human functions which a computer couldn't take over -
but that there are some which, for moral reasons, they shouldn't be
permitted to. McCarthy (1974) comes closest to our own position:
"Processes of problem solving depend on the class of problems being
solved more than on the solver, e.g., playing chess requires lookahead,
whether the apparatus is made of neurons or transistors".
It is these problems with which the (theoretical) cognitive psycho¬
logist, who wishes to avoid an ontology of occult entities, is concer¬
ned. For the brain is not only an intelligent information handling
system - but also a model of one. A brain is as much a model of a
computer as a computer is a model of a brain, in so far as they can
both solve the same classes of problems. Which we take as a model of
which is a pragmatic issue depending upon which we are more familiar
with in a relevant respect. Both are physical entities; both are mach¬
ines. One consists of transistors, etc., the other of cells. Even
cells are sorts of machines: "the thought that the cell is a machine
(wherein occurs) ... conversion of inputs to outputs via a device
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admitting of states invokes a familiar class of objects as cellular
models, while apparently vindicating a very old philosophical perspec¬
tive" (Berlinski, 1972).
By the end of the eighteenth century, genuine automata were by no
means infrequent visitors to the intellectual milieu. There were mech¬
anical theatres, conjurors, musicians and animals galore, amazingly
complex clocks and jackwork of astonishing calibre. What was the par¬
ticular incredulity attached to the idea of a mechanical chess player
due to? The critics, we have discovered, baulked at the notion that
the difference between this and earlier■automata was merely a matter
of sophistication of mechanism, but considered ,that what was required
wias the introduction of a new and qualitatively incompatible element,
that of intelligence. Today we have still not solved the problem of
how organised matter can be endowed with the faculty of thought. This
remains the great challenge to cognitive psychology.
Let us return to the Turing test. We can now see that our mental
attitude, in playing the Turing game, has undergone a great change. For
the audience of the Automaton Chess Player were in fact playing the
game, where the teleprinter was replaced by a wooden doll and the other
room by a wooden cabinet. What was in the box - man or machine? For
the eighteenth century man of letters there could be no doubt - it had
to be a man, a priori. The Fodorian canon would have been senseless
to him. How could a machine successfully simulate the behaviour of a
man, when machinehood entails inanimacy, a man's cardinal feature is
his rationality and rationality entails animacy.
The influence of the Automaton Chess Player spread however beyond
its immediate application. It became a pervasive psychological model
... an example of the (apparent) blatant fraudulence of claims that
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machines could (can) think. In 1879> long after the controversy over
the actual Turk had died down, we find Bowen writing: "Let the physio¬
logist or chemist contrive what mechanism he may, if an indivisible Ego
of consciousness is not allowed to come in, the machine will not work.
The automaton won1t play chess if an Ego be not smuggled into the cup¬





utter nonsense or the psychological history of the chatter-box?
"Kasce igitur penitus voces cum corpore nostro
Exprimimus, rectoque foras emittimus ore,
Mobilis articulat verborum daedala lingua
Formaturaque labrorum pro parte figurat."
Lucretius.
(Vi/hen we force out these utterances from the
depths'Of our body and launch them through
the direct outlet of the mouth, they are cut
up into lengths by the flexible tongue, the
craftsman of words, and moulded in turn by
the configuration of the lips.)
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In 1692, the patron of Jonathan Swift, Sir William Temple, wrote:
"We pretend to give a clear account of how thunder and lightning (that
great Artillery of God Almighty) is produced, and we cannot comprehend
how the voice of man is framed - that poor little noise we make every
time we speak." That "poor little noise", and its method of production
had, however, puzzled and intrigued men from ancient times, through the
middle ages and was to occasion an explosion of experimentation in the
late 18th and early 19th centuries, which would lay the foundations for
a modern psychology of speech perception, production and speech synthe¬
sis .
The subject of speaking machines is of considerable interest in
its own right and, during this chapter, I shall mention and/or discuss
some twenty (alleged) speaking machines. However I shall concentrate
for the most part on those produced by Wolfgang von Kempelen. This is
not only because we have already met him in connection with the Turk,
his Automaton Chess-player, but also because his intentions behind the
construction of his speaking machines are, to my knowledge, in his case
the best documented and most interestingly stated. Indeed, although I
hope to have mentioned in this paper most speaking machines of any note,
and thus provide a useful source of references, my prime aim is not one
of historical description (with its implication of strictly applied min¬
imal standards of#evidence) but an illustrative piece of philosophy of
psychology.
The case of speaking machines is particularly interesting for four
further reasons. Firstly, the readiness with which it lends itself to
support the thesis that many automaton and machine builders, as simula¬
tors and thus explainers of that part of the natural world which is man,
should be considered as a rich and fertilising part of both the history
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and. actuality of psychology.
Modern psycholinguists still consider speaking machines to be
important elements in research. Liberman et al (1959), after stating
their aims with regard to speech synthesis ... "a set of rules, written
down, perfectly explicit in all particulars, so that a person with no
knowledge of speech or spectograms could, by .reference to the rules,
synthesise speech as well as anyone else", suggest: "It may help in
setting the problem to think in terms of a machine that will process
a discrete phonemic input in such a way as to produce a speech output."
Secondly, we there witness a major maturing of the notion and pra¬
ctice of simulation. In the steady development of speaking machines we
see the tacit requirement that the simulation look like the simulated
dropped. As speaking machines stopped looking like human heads and
became more like blacksmith's appurtenances, we see a move from imita¬
tion to truer (functional) simulation; yet, because it was a putative
theory of the human speaker (a bit of cognitive simulation rather than
artificial intelligence, in modern parlance), the requirement that the
machine and person produce equivalent utterances in the same way, was
retained.
Thirdly, the case of speaking machines serves to link together
I
several figures we have already encountered in previous chapters and,
interestingly to show both the interconnections between and cross-
fertilisation among researchers in the field and the intellectual links
both back into antiquity and forwards into modern times. Thus we see
the problem as appreciated, by research workers of the time, in the
terms of debate set by Descartes and La Mettrie, who were responsible
for a focusing of attention on the clock analogy and Jaques de Vaucanson,
who gave the abstract notion of 'automaton' some concrete substance.
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Von Kempelen was creator of both the Chess-Player and some speaking
heads; Maelzel, who exhibited and repaired von Kempelen's Turk, also
made a speaking head, as did Rechsteiner who, after spending years
repairing Vaucanson's duck, had also made a duck himself. Kratzenstein,
another maker of a speaking head, was also the designer in 1751 of an
early self-winding clock.
The fourth reason for special interest in this area is the crucial
nature, to the 17th and 18th century mind, of the question of the possi¬
bility or impossibility of getting a machine (or animal) to speak.
First though, what do I mean by a speaking machine? It is most
important to distinguish the subject of this chapter from phonographs,
graphophones and gramophones, which, in their early days, (around 1880)
were often collectively referred to as 'talking machines' n.b. the
Edison Centenary Exhibition programme (Royal Scottish Museum, Edinburgh)
was entitled: "It talks, it whispers, it sings." These later machines
can serve as (intimate) models of psychological abilities ... witness
the record or tape in theories of memory. Indeed, even a musical box
may serve this function. As Huxley wrote: "A song which has been lear¬
ned has its molecular equivalent which potentially represents it in the
brain just as a musical box wound up potentially represents an overture."
But phonographs etc. are not elucidatory models of speech production.
Partly this is because they are so inflexible (they require so much pre¬
programming) but much more because they are so less obviously structur¬
ally isomorphic .with the human vocal production apparatus. A speaking
machine actually produces and synthesises words rather than merely repro¬
ducing prerecorded ones. As Chapuis and Droz (1952) put it: "The gramo¬
phone is in no sense a machine which talks by forming for itself the
words and phrases which it produces. It is confined to the repetition,
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now almost perfect, of what it has recorded and kept." The converse
is true of speaking machines, which must try to produce the entire
"behavioural repertoire of the organism.
In 1774, Abbe Mical exhibited two speaking heads to the public,
thus confirming the old adage that two heads are better than one.
Compardon, in "Les Spectacles de la Foire", quoting from Journal de
Paris of 1st May, 17785 affirms that, in so doing, Mical "has solved
the problem which has been believed insoluble from Archimedes to
Vaucanson."
What was this problem? In 1748, in L1Homme Machine, Julien de la
Mettrie wrote that: "Vaucanson, who needed more skill for making his
flute player than for making his duck would have needed still more to
make a talking man, a mechanism no longer to be regarded as impossible,
especially in the hands of another'Prometheus." It is important to
realise that the issue of a talking mechanism was a crucial one in La
Mettrie's interpretation of Descartes.
To put it briefly, Descartes proposed two principles for distin¬
guishing men from machines (given that to all outward appearances they
V i
were identical). The main one was that a machine could never use speech
or other signs. As Descartes wrote to Henry More: "For language is the
one certain indication of latent cognition in a body, and all men use it."
La Mettrie accepted that Descartes had proved that animals are
machines, whilst disagreeing with his (alleged) view that men were not
machines as they were- bestowed with an immaterial soul. On the contrary
La Mettrie (1748) believed that there was no essential difference between
animals and ourselves: "The transition from animal to man is not violent."
Indeed, "men are at bottom only animals and machines which though up¬
right go on all fours." La Mettrie thought it possible to teach animals
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to speak. Talking of the lack of speech in the ape he wrote: "What is
the reason for this, except some defect in the organs of speech? But
is this defect so essential to the structure that it could never be
remedied? In a word would it be absolutely impossible to teach the
ape a language? I do not think so."
But anyway, as he is to "conclude boldly that man is a machine"
and manifestly does speak: as animals are machines and manifestly
1 could1 speak; it must follow for La Mettrie that machines could and
can speak. However la Mettrie, who distrusted a priori arguments,
avowing that only "experience and observation should be our only guides",
rejected "idle theories" and appealed for the "stuff of experience" from
those who have "laid bare to us springs of life." Remembering that man
is but "a collection of springs", who better to lay them bare than the
automaton-simulationists? In short, prior to la Mettrie the crucial
difference between men on the one hand and animals and machines on the
other, was the former's ability to use language or produce speech.
(True language use, of course, involves not only speech production but
also symbolic manipulation. The mechanicist's reaction to this was
discussed in the chess-player paper. There is, of course, all the
difference in the world between speaking (which parrots do) and saying
(which, as far as we know, they do not.). If the mechanistic philosophy
was to achieve true generality, it was necessary to demonstrate that
animals and/or machines could speak (this is still true today).
Speaking of the Past.
References to speaking heads and figures reach far back into
antiquity, when there was a dual motive for automata making: that of
the exhilaration of developing a technical skill in simulating human
performance and the more dubious task of usurping the power of the gods
111.
- often associated with interest in necromancy and magic. This is a
suggestion supported ."both by Bulling's study of ancient Chinese mask
and puppet making, which was related to the cult of the dead, and by
Cohen's (1966) researches.
_ Certainly the first speaking machines I
shall mention are connected with religion and the magical art of for-*
te11ing the fu ture.
The statue of Memnon at Thebes, west of the Nile, was referred to
by Strabo, Pliny and Pausanius. It is accredited with different abili¬
ties by different commentators. According to some, it produced lyre¬
like music but for Tacitus it was a vocal sound; still others reported
oracular verses. Philostratus reports that: "when touched by the first
ray of the sun it uttered a sound as soon as the sunbeam reached its
lips." This suggests that, if it really existed, it may well have
operated according to mechanical principles - powered by air or steam
pressure, much as Hero's automata in Alexandria. It may, of course,
have been a natural rather than manufactured machine. Von Humboldt,
in South America, came across a rock which produced musical sounds at
sunrise ... caused by the escape of air, .under pressure due to warmth,
from crevices. Whether or not, in the case of Memnon, an enterprising
artist discovered such a rock and carved it into a statue rather than
quarrying out the ducts etc., is a matter of conjecture.
There were many ancient oracular heads - one of Orpheus at Lesbos
foretold the death of Cyrus. The Egyptians possessed prophetic statues
which replied to questions by nods and associated cries. Some were
operated by steam or fire. An interesting large limestone bust of Re-
Harmakis was discovered in the 1930's. This proved, upon examination,
to contain a cavity in the neck with a narrow canal leading to an aper¬
ture under the right ear ... presumably a priest was hidden behind the
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statue and. made pronouncements on its "behalf. This faking technique
was inevitably used again and again. In the 18th century we read:
"the brains of this wonderful doll is nothing more than the continua¬
tion of a tin tube, which is fixed to its mouth, so as to convey the
Question and Answer to and from an invisible confederate."
Pope Silvester II (alias Gerbert) was an amazing polymath by any
standards. A master of astronomy, astrology, necromancy, music, bird
song and flight, geometry, mathematics; he also introduced Arabic fig¬
ures into Western Europe, took over and developed the abacus from the
Saracens and constructed both a clock and an organ. More germane to
this discussion, he also built a speaking head. According to William
of Malmesbury (12th c.) this head "spake not unless spoken to, but then
pronounced the truth, either in the affirmative or the negative. For
instance, when Gerbert would say, "Shall I be pope?" the statue would
reply "Yes""i Robert Grossteste (1175-1255) is also reputed to have
built a speaking head but little is written of it. We know more about
that of Albertus Magnus. Becherus, in 1680, wrote that Albertus Magnus
spent thirty years making a walking talking automaton which saluted and
spoke to his (A.M.'s) friend Thomas Aquinas, who thereupon immediately
smashed it. We may suspect that Aquinas saw in the automaton evidence
of the intervention of the powers of darkness, but, according to
Brewster in his entry on Androids in the Edinburgh Encyclopaedia,
Aquinas had a less superstitious and more human motive, he "came to see
it, purposely that he might boast how in one minute he had rendered
fruitless the labour of many years." Roger Bacon (1214-1292) too, is
reputed to have built "a brazen figure capable of speaking", a head
commemorated by Samuel Butler in Hudibras where he writes: "My head's
not made of brass as Friar Bacon's noddle was."
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We now start approaching our main focus of interest. In I65O, in
Musurgia Universalis, Athanasius Kircher, a Jesuit scholar of Rome
describes an "automatic organ machine which utters the voices of animals
and birds," and thirteen years later, in Phonurgia Nova, maintained that
it was possible "to produce a head which moved the eyes, lips and tongue,
and, by means of the sounds which it emitted, appeared to be alive."
It appears that he tried to build such a head for Queen Christina, but
failed. Serious work in phonology was now beginning to get under way
and in 1668, John Wilkins D.D., a founder Fellow of the Royal Society,
published "An Essay Towards a Real Character and a Philosophy of Language",
the tenth chapter of which was devoted to "A rational account of all the
simple sounds that are or can be framed by the mouths of men."
There is some evidence that Valentin Murbiz, a rector from Dresden,
devoted energy to the problem of a speaking machine around 1705 > tut
the next concrete landmark was not until 1770> when Friedrich von Knauss
of Vienna made four speaking heads. Friedrich Knauss (b. 1724) and his
brother Johann Philip Ludwig (b. 1715) were both astonishingly skilled
automaton builders. Apprenticed as boys to a clockmaker, Friedrich was
only 21 when they built the Ritterspieluhr, now in the Hofburg Museum,
Vienna, a clock in which two armies of horsemen joust whenever the hour
strikes. By 1781 , however, when they completed the Maria-Theresian Uhr,
a horological tableau representing the coronation of the Empress and
Francis I, Ludwig had specialised in the clock side of the business and
Friedrich in automata. Friedrich went on to become the head mechanician
of the Physicalischen Kabinett, building four writing machines (three
disembodied hands and a Grecian lady) and four speaking heads, one of
which was sent as a gift to the Grand Duke of Austria. In a very rare
book of 1789, Selbstschreibende Wundermaschine auch mehr andre Kunst und
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Meisterstucke, Knauss apparently (Hillier, 1976) expressed the aim of
linking a writing hand to a speaking head, so that one could say out
loud what the other had written, an aim he, hardly surprisingly, never
realised. Although by now it really should not need re-emphasising, it
is perhaps worth noting Mary Hillier's comment that "He (Knauss) had the
sort of mentality now employed by those who invent computer systems."
Evidently, however, Knauss's heads, though stimulating interest,
were not very successful, for sever years later occurred the most impor¬
tant event in the history of talking machines. In 1777 the Imperial
Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburgh, offered a prize for the best en¬
quiry into "the nature of the five vowel sounds A, E, I, 0 and U; and
for the construction of an instrument for artificially imitating them."
There were three entries ... by Mical, Kratzenstein, who received
the prize, and Wolfgang von Kempelen.
Abbe Mical, we have already heard of as the solver of Vaucanson's
problem. Compardon attributed Mical's lack of acclaim less to his
ability than to his temperament. "Since", Compardon writes, (Mical)
"is not a schemer, since he is working on his own without organised
support or without accomplices, since he has not bribed anyone to puff
him and has not secured the goodwill of the newspaper writers, little
has been heard of his machines,which have secured the widespread ad¬
miration of natural philosophers". Indeed Mical did lack a showman's
flair ... when he exhibited his two heads to the public in 1774> his
advertising display read rather modestly: "Problem in mechanics solved."
Mical seems also to have been rather temperamental. Apparently he him¬
self considered the praise lavished on his heads to be excessive, per¬
haps even impious, and himself smashed them.




also the designer in 1751 of a clock which wound itself up by harnessing
variations in temperature, actually won the prize with a set of five
tubes with specially shaped ends, each of which "distinctly produced"
a vowel, when their lower end was blown through. The tubes are illus¬
trated in Figure A.
There are two points of special interest in Kratzenstein's winning
entry. Firstly that these tubes were "suggested by observation of the
form and dimensions of the human mouth when sounding different vowels"
(Paget, 1930) i.e. there was a rudimentary attempt to simulate; but
secondly, although they imitated a man's voice "with tolerable accuracy",
they gave no indication of the underlying acoustic nor psychological
principles.
The third member of the trio was Baron Wolfgang von Kempelen,
Aulic Counselor of the Chamber of the Domain of Empress and Queen Maria
Theresa, who also made the plans for the fabulous fountains at Schonbrunn,
designed the Royal Castle at Buda and organised wool manufacturing in
southern Hungary.
Owing to his book, "Le Mecanisme de la Parole suivi de la descrip¬
tion d'une Machine Parlante" (1791)5 we have a fairly full record both
of the development of von Kempelen's machine and of how he conceived of
what he was doing.
As von Kempelen admits, "at the time when I was working on my
Chess Player, in the year 1769s I started to examine diverse musical
instruments, intending to find the one which came closest to the human
voice"* Initially he thought only of "imitating a few vowels with a
few instruments", it was only "little by little and much later " that
* All translations from von Kempelen by the present author.
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he got the idea of the possibility of constructing a speaking machine
which pronounced anything. At this time he was attracted most by the
woodwind instruments, but already simulation requirements were influen¬
cing him; as he said, the woodwinds resembled the human voice most
because the action of the reed used in them "resembles a little the
functions of the voice box." Indeed, "for a long time," he writes,
"especially in Prance, organs adapted with so-called human voices, had
been composed of large and small clarinet reeds, but they imitated only
very imperfectly the human voice."
On a country excursion, von Kempelen came across an instrument in
the hands of a rustic. Rushing home, he set up an impromptu laboratory
in the kitchen. Kis experiments continued with the aid of a pair of
bellows from the stove and various handy pieces of kitchen apparatus.
When he found an air leak, due to the orifice of the instrument being
too large for the bellows pipe, he availed himself of a "moist bull's
bladder" as muffler. Later he added the lower funnel shaped end of a
clarinet, which he saw as "representing in some manner the open mouth."
He soon had a rudimentary speaking machine in operation. By putting
his hand in or across the 'mouth' , thus effectively opening or shutting
it and acting as a tongue, he obtained "first of all diverse vowels, as
I opened by left hand more or less." If, however, he kept his hand
still, he seemed to hear an 'A'. Prom such observations he "soon drew
the conclusion that the sounds of a word only become distinct through
the proportional relations which exist between them, and that they only
obtain their perfect clarity in liaison with each other in whole words
and phrases." This astonishingly modern sounding realisation is, even
now, not appreciated by all psycholinguists. As Fodor, Bever and
Garrett (1974) have had to spell out, the perceived phonetic value of
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an acoustic signal is heavily dependent on the environment in which the
signal appears.
By coincidence, these kitchen babblings also attained the status
of controlled scientific experiment. As an unwitting participant in a
Turing test, Frau von Kempelen, who with her children had been banned
from the kitchen, and who no doubt was having second (or even third
after the Turk'.) thoughts about her husband's sanity, thought her hus¬
band had a visitor in the kitchen - for she heard a voice "high pitched
and zealous", without being able to distinguish which it was.
Modest as these beginnings were, they were "the first formulation
on which I later constructed my whole edifice."
We now move on to von Kempelen's second speaking machine. That
speech was just a matter of voiced air passing through differing open¬
ings, he was now convinced with a "mathematical certainty". He had
established that the three essential elements were lungs, glottis and
mouth. For months and months he made no progress, kept going only by
the certainty that "speech was imitable." Eventually he went to an
organ builder to', get some organ bellows instead of kitchen ones, and
found there a small ':voice organ' , which he bought at once, took home
and began to adapt.
The most interesting modification from our point of view are the
four spheres projecting from the front (see Figure B). Von Kempelen had
a lathe operator make the hollow spheres as simulated mouths. They were
each bisected into two hemispheres to "represent the two sets of teeth"
and the bottom jaw, attached by a leather hinge-bag, was opened and
shut by a cord operated by an organ key. Note how closely the machine






However, the machine was not very successful. Von Kempelen obtained,
the vowels A, 0, 0U and an imperfect E, but could find no trace of I or
U. He fared even worse with consonants; after two years he managed to
get P, M and L and this enabled him to pronounce words like 'MAMA' and
'PAPA' by merely pressing keys and pumping with his foot. However,
(i) he was obliged to make slight pause between letters otherwise they
merged; (ii) he couldn't eliminate a 1k1 sound before each vowel, and
(iii) he always got an annoying aspiration after each P. Eventually,
reluctantly, he decided he was on the wrong track and abandoned altoge¬
ther his work on the speech organ (sic.). In a heartfelt passage, von
Kempelen, who earlier had said "to invent a speaking machine and to
implement it in a considered v/ay (was) one of the most difficult pro¬
jects which could enter a man's spirit", admitted that a vigorous horse
would have had difficulty in dragging away a cart loaded with all the
bits of machinery he had discarded whilst trying to improve the voice
organ.
The third and final von Kempelen speaking machine is illustrated
in Figure C. This was a lot smaller than the organ, but much more
successful. Its creator "found it necessary to imitate the human organs
of speech by having only one mouth (which was, however, flexible) and
one glottis." The mouth was a "bell-shaped piece of elastic gum, which
approximated, by its physical properties, to the softness and flexibi¬
lity of the human organs." Connecting to the mouth piece was "a nose
made of two tin tubes." Ihen both tubes were open and the mouth piece
closed a perfect M was uttered, whilst when one was open and one shut
there resulted an N. To make the sound of the machine mellower, von
Kempelen lined the canal and inside with dog skin but it was still a




commended it as "not very loquacious but it pronounces certain childish
words very nicely." Nevertheless its output was, according to its
maker, fairly respectable: "I can make it pronounce all Latin, French
and Italian words which are proposed to me, some, its true, better than
others, but at least several hundreds of words clearly and distinctly,
e.g. Marianna, Roma, Maladie, Sante, Astronomie, Chapeau, Racine,
Constantinopolis, Missisipi, Vous etes mon ami, Je vous aime de tout
mon coeur" and much more.
The machine was played somewhat like an Hawaiian bagpipe. It was
laid flat on a table, the right elbow pumping the bellows, whilst the
right hand produced consonants by flaps controlling the stops. The left
hand produced the vowels by distorting the space of the mouth piece.
Yon Kempelen regretted that "the part of my machine which represen¬
ted the mouth" - the most important part - was in fact the most imper- •
feet, lacking teeth, tongue and soft palate ... parts whose importance
he had stressed earlier in the theoretical section of the book. This
shortcoming resulted in an inability in the machine to produce D, G, K
or T. However, interestingly, von Kempelen found that by putting a P
in their place and rather suddenly withdrawing his hand a little from
the mouth piece, he could deceive an audience, who would hear a K or T
i.e. ASPRAPAN would be heard as ASTRAKANl This is again relevant to the
point made earlier by. Fodor, Bever and Garrett - the perceived phonetic
value is context dependent. Von Kempelen seems to have realised this
point (through his simulation studies) in 1791•
He was explicit about the isomorphism, and its limits, between the
machine and man: "the structure of the machine differs from the man's
organ, in this - in the former the nose is blocked from the outside,
and in the latter it closes from inside that is to say the palate veils
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it. But in execution this difference is not remarkable." ... the par¬
ticular machinery is slightly different "but the function is the same.
Von Kempelen is also quite explicit about his aims: "The mechanism
in which all the different intonations form is_ the principle object of
this work. We will consider each intonation or letter individually, we
will examine the structure, the situation and the movements of each
organ which contributes to its formation", and about the means: this
machine "is a question of imitating animal organs." He aspired both
to "establish a complete system of human speech" and to build a simula¬
ting speaking machine, but the two became an integrated concern. He
has proceeded by bootstrapping - as Fodor would say - "my speaking
machine and my theory of speech have made equal progress, the one serv¬
ing as a guide for the other."
Around the period von Kempelen was building his third simulation,
but unknown to him, Erasmus Darwin, Charles' grandfather, was busily
occupied in a similar enterprise. An account of this work was eventually
published in 1806, but, as Erasmus Darwin himself tells us there, the
actual work itself was accomplished "many years" before.
Darv/in's speaking machine was built specifically for the purpose
of enquiring in detail into, and improving, shorthand. However, as--with
so many of the other simulations discussed here, it was intimately con¬
nected with its builder's theory (in this case of language). Darwin
believed that to develop an adequate shorthand it was necessary to iso¬
late and eliminate all redundancy in spoken English. As a result, his
theory of language was designed to analyse the information expressed in
utterances, and his speaking machine was to generate a sort of compre¬
hensible acoustic Dalton's weekleese.
As eccentric in his mode of expression as in his interest, Darwin's
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researches are reported in the form of poetry (The Temple of Nature)
and appended explanatory notes. In his view, language was acquired by
imitation and words got their meaning by association:
"Thus the first LANGUAGE, when we frown'd or smiled
Rose from the cradle, Imitation's child;
Next to each thought associate sound accords,
And forms the dulcet symphony of words;"
For Darwin, all words are nouns ("names of things") because they are
all "names or symbols of ideas"; ideas in turn, "consist of synchronous
motions or configurations of the extremities of the organs of sense;".
In line with his main interests in redundancy, Darwin adopted some
ideas of Mr. Home Tooke, maintaining that language has essentially
only two functions: (l ) "to communicate our thoughts" and (2) "to do so
with despatch". This leads Tooke, and Darwin, to divide all words into
two kinds ... those strictly necessary to express our thoughts, and
abbreviations of these. For example, they argued that the conjunction
"if" was just an abbreviated version of the imperative of the verb "to
give".
With this theory in mind, Darwin undertook (sic) an "attempt to
investigate the number of the articulate sounds, which constitute those
names of ideas by their successions and combinations; and to show by
what parts of the organs of speech they are modulated and articulated;".
Again he repeats his findings in the form of poetry:
"The tongue, the lips articulate; the throat
With soft vibration modulates the note;"
Darwin gives a prosaic expansion in note XV. Vocal sounds are produced
by streams of air passing from the lungs through the larynx, wherein an
aperture is opened and closed by means of a multitude of tiny muscles.
Availing himself of the use of an intimate model, Darwin explains that
this process is "something like the trumpet stop of an organ, as may be
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observed by blowing through the wind pipe of a dead goose."
Darwin's researches on the formation of vowel sounds did not satis¬
fy him. He was concerned to find out in which part of the mouth each
vowel was articulated. To do this he "rolled up some tinfoil into cy¬
linders about the size of my fingers; and speaking the vowels separately
through them, found by the impressions made on them, in what part of the
mouth each ... was formed." The results were, however, inconclusive.
On the articulation of consonants Darwin was more confident,
because he had actually simulated the process on a machine. His account
is worth quoting in detail. He writes that he had: "contrived a wooden
mouth with lips of soft leather, and, with a valve over the back part
of it for the nostrils, both which could be quickly opened or closed by
the pressure of the fingers, the vocality was given by a silk ribbon
about an inch long and a quarter of an inch wide stretched between two
bits of smooth wood a little hollowed; so that when a gentle current of
air from bellows was -"blown on the edge of the ribbon, it gave an agree¬
able tone, as it vibrated between the wooden sides, much like a human
voice."
Both Darwin's theory and his machine had, almost literally, much
to say about the question of redundancy. Many letters are, they say,
redundant, whilst others are wanting. Some simple articulate sounds
have two letters to represent them, in other cases two articulate sounds
are represented by one letter. Darwin maintained that only thirteen,
characters (for the letters P, T, K, F, Th, H, plus marks for anteson-
ance, narisonance, orisonance, sibilance, sonisibilance, less and open
vocality) are required to sound all European languages.
Within certain limits then, von Kempelen and Darwin, with their
speaking machines, extended the mechanisation of the world picture a
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little further into the human domain. As Darwin put it:
"Love, pity, war, the shout, the song,the prayer
Form quick concussions of elastic air."
The St. Petersburg' competition really opened the floodgates. In
1815, a Mr. Robertson was reported to have a "wax working figure of a
child who could pronounce all the letters of the alphabet ... and say
several words." In 1823, Maelzel, who had bought, toured with and
repaired von Kempelen's chess automaton, made his own talking doll,
which could say "Mama" and Papa", as did Rechsteiner, the repairer.of
Yaucanson's, and builder of another, mechanical duck. These, though,
were all regressions to mere imitation. The next real advance fell to
Robert Willis M.A., F.R.S., F.C.S., Fellow of Caius College, Cambridge,
who in 1829 published 'the first systematic investigation of the nature
of vowel sounds - verified by their synthetic production by models' in
the Trans. Camb. Phil. Soc. Willis came to the conclusion that it
was the pitch of the resonant note of the mouth cavity which determined
which vowel sound was produced and that each vowel sound was character¬
ised by a definite resonant note.
The signs by this time were so encouraging that Brewster, in 1832,
felt confident in quoting, in his much read "Letters ...", M. Savant,
who wrote that "no doubt that, before another century is completed, a
talking and a singing machine will be numbered among the conquests of
science."
Indeed about eight years later, a machine which could not only
talk and sing but even whisper was going the rounds. Professor Joseph
Faber, who had retired from the Vienna observatory because of failing
eyesight, had built the Euphonis, worked by bellows and keys. Faber
used a "caoutchouc imitation of the larynx, tongue, nostrils, and was
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able to operate it very skillfully even simulating song" (Chambers
Magazine, 1845).
Faber's speaking machine does not actually seem to have made much
of a material advance on von Kempelen's in terms of its principles of
operation, but it is of interest here, for there is in this case some
documentary evidence of the impact of the simulation work on more con¬
ventional physiology. Thus, in a supplement to the second volume of
Muller's Elements of Physiology (1848), dealing with the mechanism of
speech, entitled Recent Advance in the Physiology of Motion and sense,
generation and development, Baly and Kirkes admit that "very little new
information has been contributed to this department of physiology."
They go on, however, to discuss as relevant the Faber artifact, which
they describe as "by far the most perfect speaking machine yet invented"
and say that by it, the human voice is"very closely imitated."
A fairly full account of the machine, from a physiological point
of view, is given in the Entire Medical Science Weekly (1842) by Dr.
Eduard Schmalz, a Dresden speech and hearing specialist. According to
Schmalz, the machine was misnamed, for, although it spoke Geiman fairly
clearly, it could by no stretch of the imagination be described as
pleasing. The Euphonia, which looked like a small organ with a doll's
torso and head sitting on top of it, had a glottis, mouth, tongue and
nose which were "der Natur nachgebildet" (fashioned after nature) in
rubber. The machine could sing so well that, at least as regards its
German pronunciation, it put some human singers to shame I However, it
is the physiological implications in which we are here interested.
According to Schmalz, the setting up of the machine is "eine der wicht-
igsten Fortschritte der neuern Zeit. Nicht nur die Physiologie der
Stimme und Sprache, ins besondere die Iheorie der Sprachbildung, (wozu
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auch der Unterricht der Taubstummen in Sprechen, und dieser und der
Schwerhorigen im Absehen der Worte vom Munde gehort,) sondern auch die
Pathologie und Therapie der so haiifig bei dem Sprechen vorkommenden
Fehler mechanischer Art (namentlich des Lallens, Schnarrens, Lispelns
u.s.w. konnen hieraus mancherlei Niitzen Ziehen." (Freely translated:
the setting up of the machine is one of the most important advances
of modern times. Useful applications can be drawn from it, for both
the physiology of the voice and speech (regarding the instruction of
deaf mutes and lip reading for the hard of hearing) and fbr the patho¬
logy and therapy of more mechanical disabilities like stammers, lisps,
nasal accents etc.).
However, it was only two years after Brewster's forecast that a
real advance was made'. Professor YYheatstone of King's, London, using
a very slightly improved von Kempelen machine, discovered multiple
resonance: the-fact that you can get two or more resonant notes simul¬
taneously from one resonator because the air inside can resonate not
only as a whole but in sections at the same time.
Both Willis and Yfoeatstone were later (1875) supported by Helmholt
who in his "Sensation of Tone", argued that some vov/els like a (calm),
3 (more), u.(who) are characterised by a single resonant note, but—
others like ae (hat) and e (men) are produced by double resonances,
i.e. two separate notes, one produced behind the tongue and one by a
constriction of the mid tongue and hard palate. Later (1890-1896) R. J
Lloyd was to complete the picture by showing that each vowel had (at
least) two resonances and that the identity of the vowel was not due to
absolute pitch of resonance ... but to their mutual interval. Even
I
Lloyd inherited the simulation methodology, however. He writes: "the
assignment is fairly certain because it can be confirmed by direct
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observations in whisper, b^ the behaviour of imitative cavities, and. by
careful measurement and calculation."
Some of the careful measurement Lloyd did, was by phonographic
technique and it is around this time (actually in 1877) that Edison
began developing the phonograph itself. In fact in 1890, as Lloyd
began his serious v/ork, Edison marketed some talking dolls. - but which
of course, talked by phonographic means. At this stage the phonograph,
graphophone and later gramophone dominated the speaking market and the
commercial days, and thus research funds, were virtually over.
The early attempts at speaking machines were bound to fail, because
apart from horrendous mechanical and technological pro_blems, they were
based on what Podor, Bever and Garrett have called "the most primitive
model of the relation between acoustic events and the phones that repre¬
sent them." This model says that each phone has a list of, speaker and
context independent, criterial acoustic properties. But, as we have
seen, von Kempelen had already realised that this primitive model was
inadequate and was making use of context to dupe his audience. Never¬
theless , his attempt to generate speech was fundamentally based on a
stockpile technique. If this were to have been even moderately success¬
ful, it would have entailed staggering storage problems for early sim¬
ulators. Peterson et al (1958) in a relatively (i.e. not very) success¬
ful speech synthesis, used fragments containing two phones mutually
influencing each other, chopped from the middle of words, ... but they
needed 8,000 segments to synthesise a single idiolect of American EngiishI
Still, from what has been presented, I hope it is at least plaus¬
ible that:
a) In a welter of activity around the late 18th to early 19th cen¬
turies , an empirical start was made on the psychology of speech
130.
production/perception.
b) The main method used v/as that of mechanical simulation, which was
c) "breaking free of the immature requirement that the simulation
superficially imitates as well as isomorphically models the modelled.
Apart from the desire to explain by simulating, were there any
practical applications of speaking machines?
I know of three, if not useful at least interesting cases:
i) Sir Richard Paget, who filed British Patent no. 214281 ... the
general method of producing speechlike sounds, in the heady high-speed
motoring days of 1923 > noticed that pedestrians, who apparently did not
notice a rattling engine and blasting horn, would at once perceive a
shout ... a noise actually lower in volume. He correspondingly designed
a motor car horn which articulated the word "Away1.". The first experi¬
mental hand-manipulated signal horn, with electro-magnetic larynx, was
demonstrated at the British Association meeting at Liverpool on 17th
September, 1923- For some reason it did not catch on.
ii) The second brainwave was the cheirophone. This was a variable
cavity formed by the hands, the middle three fingers of one hand forming
a tongue, the palm of the other hand as the palate and an artificial
larynx to be held between the thumb and first finger. An exterior wind
supply was required. Apparently, with practice, a degree of expertise
can be developed, although N, G and K are impossible to produce. In a
British Association meeting in Toronto in 1924 > Paget is supposed to
have produced by cheirograph the utterances: "Hullo London, are you there
and "Oh, Leila I love you." One practical application Paget suggested
was, when gagged in the dentist's chair, one could, providing one had
one's cannister of compressed air with one I suppose, plead "Easy there,
you're on the nerve."
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iii) The third and final application was that of Casimir Swan, who
tried (with little success) to make a talking clock.
Earlier, I mentioned how the topics of these chapters are connec¬
ting up hut as yet .1 have no reference to a self-winding talking
clock this seems like a good place to wind up this discussion.
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CHAPTER EIGHT.
A MODEM MECHANICAL SIMULATION.
"What Winograd has done - indeed, what all of
artificial intelligence has so far done - is
to build a machine that perforins certain
specific tasks, just .as say, 17th century
artisans built machines that kept time, fired




"There are men who are capable of loving a machine more deeply than
they can love a woman. They are among the happiest men on earth ...
Men who worry themselves to distraction over the perfecting of a machine
are indupitably blessed beyond their kind." (Bennett). As long as there
have been such things, machines have extorted a tithe of respect and
even love from mien. This 'love' is, of course, on a distinctly lofty
plane; as Raphael (1977) has emphasised: "I have no intention of ever
kissing a computer, or of programming one computer to caress another."
It is rather that machinery has an "intellectual, almost spiritual
appeal" whose "curious fascination, more than the wish to build some¬
thing useful or the hope for material rewards ... makes men devote their
lives to machinery" (Kayr, 1976).
The popularity of the opinion that machines are instructively ana¬
logous to human beings has, of course, had its ups and downs, depending
on the relative states of advancement of the sciences of physiology and
machine theory. For example, from the vantage point of fifty years ago,
one pair of psychologists (Sturt and Ogden, 1926) felt justified in
writing: "In the past it was agreed that our body was a beautiful machine
so perfect that it not only ran, but repaired itself, looked out for
jolts on the road. Now scientists are abandoning that hypothesis, and
the more eminent the scientist the more completely he seems to have
abandoned it. The theory was, indeed, the product of partial ignorance.
7/hen physiology knew less of the phenomena it studied, a mechanical
interpretation was fairly easy; now that knowledge is greater, and won¬
der after wonder, fine adaptation after fine adaptation is revealed, it
becomes ever more necessary to postulate some power beyond the machine."
Today, however, some psychologists are hailing the "emergence of a new
(and not yet well understood) notion of mechanism" (Pylyshyn, 1976) in
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the form of the electronic computer, which in its power and. flexibility,
not only makes the earlier machines seem impoverished but makes many of
I :
the traditional problems of philosophy and psychology take on a "renewed
interest and vigour" and provides an alternative language for psycholo¬
gical theories - mechanistic but irreducible to physics and chemistry'.
One sympathiser (Boden, 1977) with this approach is even moved to write,
perhaps rather optimistically: "The new concept of 'machine1 provided
by A.I. is so much more powerful than familiar mechanism that the old
metaphysical puzzle of how mind and body can possibly be related is
largely resolved."
Earlier, we have discussed some 17th,and 18th century machines and
discovered that they were indeed, contra the received impression, very
sophisticated attempts to explain by simulation and, as Diamond (1974)
has noted, "a careful reading of history will show that 20th century
theory is often following 18th century models." What, however, of the
intellectual descendants of these early automaton-simulators? Weizenbaum
(1970), a practitioner-turned-fierce-critic of the A.I. enterprise,
leaves no doubt about his opinion: "Newell, Simon, Schank, and Winograd
simply mistake the nature of the problems they believe themselves to be
'solving' ... as if they were benighted artisans of the 17th century."
As it has been a major burden of the present study to argue that the
'artisans' concerned were anything but'benighted, we cannot but take
exception to Weizenbaum's slander, however, his main assertion - that
Winograd and the 17th century artisans are engaged in essentially the
same enterprise - can be accepted provisionally at least.
I vzrote a little while back that modern electric computers make the
earlier machines seem impoverished. The qualification ("seem") was
necessary because strictly speaking any machine (be it electronic,
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mechanical or hydraulic) which moves through definite discrete states
is a Turing machine ... and in principle any Turing Machine is as power¬
ful as any other (given no limitation of time or space). The advantage
of digital computers is that, via the convenience of programming, they
can mimic any discrete state machine. As Turing (1963) has put it,
digital computers are "universal machines ... considerations of speed
apart, it is unnecessary to design various new machines to do various
computing processes. They can all be done with one digital computer,
suitably programmed for each case."
It surely hardly needs restating that digital computers (despite
the name) are not mere arithmetic wizards. They can crunch numbers -
where the syntax their processes are programmed to instantiate are the
rules of arithmetic and the abstract symbols they manipulate stand for
v/hatever arithmetic primitives (numbers) stand for (say classes of
objects) - but that is a special case. Digital computers operate with
abstract symbols which can stand for anything and with processes which
can mimic any process. "A computer is not merely a number manipulating
device; it is a'symbol manipulating device." (Newell and Simon.) The
extension of this id£a to the functioning of the human being leads dir¬
ectly to the project of simulation by models which preserve symbol mani¬
pulating capacity: "We can postulate that the processes going on inside
the subject's skin - involving sensory organs, neural tissues and mus¬
cular movements controlled by the neural signals - are also symbol mani¬
pulating processes, that is, patterns in various encodings can be
detected, recorded, transmitted, stored, copied, and so on, by the
mechanisms of this system." One A.I. worker even defines A.I. as 'jthe
study of complex information processing problems that often have their
roots in some aspect of biological information processing." (Marr, 1977)-.
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One symbol manipulation task in particular, natural language use,
has concerned psychologists, philosophers, logicians, A.I. workers and
linguists and it has, not infrequently, been posited as that which dis¬
tinguishes people from both 'lower' animals and machines. When the
typical 'lower' animals was taken to be a bee the former part of this
claim seemed fairly strong (von Frisch and J. Bennett), but recent
studies with apes (premack) are less supportive. However, this was
never seriously a logical claim but an empirical one. There was no
question that, a priori, animals could not talk, only that there were
in fact no animals which could talk. As regards machines, philosophers
in particular have been keen to ridicule the idea of a machine which
could understand natural language.
There have been several attempts by A.I. workers to program compu¬
ters to 'understand natural language e.g. Colby's PARRY and Weizenbaum's
ELIZA, but these are mere linguistic imbeciles compared to the relatively
Joycean stature of Winograd's (1972) SHRDLU. In the remainder of this
chapter we shall look at SHRDLU's good points and failings, as simula¬
ting psychologists rather than technologists, and see to what extent
SHRDLU is, or is not, an adequate simulation.
To begin with we should, if not answer at least rule out of court,
one objection - that what such a program does can by no stretch of the
imagination be called language understanding but, at best, language
receipt and response. The point of such objections is not entirely
clear. The objection cannot be that what SHRDLU does, does not count
as understanding because it does not do what people do in the same way,
because what it is that people do is precisely what the model was built
to find out i.e. how people do understand is a mystery, so it cannot be
through comparing this with the way SHRDLU works that objectors reach
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their conclusion. In any case, most such objectors are prepared to deny
that what SHRDLU does is understanding before, or even without, knowing
at all how it works.
It has been said that up to the advent of locomotives, people tended
to speak of men as machines (machinomorphism), whereas, since that advent
they have tended to speak of machines as men (anthropomorphism). Some
claim that the attribution to a machine of understanding is a bad case
of anthropomorphism. Gauld and Shotter (1977)> for example, claim, that
"the issue of whether or not machines ... could possess and exhibit ...
understanding ... resolves itself into the issue of whether or not it is
in principle possible to design a machine with concepts as opposed to
blindly following some algorithmic routine, on which someone else could
put an interpretation." However, apart from some vague phenomenological
intuitions and introspections, it is not clear what having a concept is,
even for people - certainly not so clear that we could categorically deny
the attribution of concepts to machines. One useful way to think of
concepts is as functional components of a-conceptual processing system,
and this clearly makes the question of concepts secondary to the ques¬
tion of the attribution of understanding. Moreover, a particular advan¬
tage of Winograd's approach is that by using procedural rather than ass-
ertional representation of knowledge, it offers an alternative concep¬
tion of what is going on to the wholesale reification typical of main¬
stream psychology, which insists on postulating entities (concept, idea,
mind, thought, intention etc.). Just as many apparent 'entities' in
the physical sciences have turned out to be processes e.g. a 'desk' is
a continually changing fluctuation of molecules, many concepts of psy¬
chology may turn out to refer to processes or procedures, rather than
things.
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It is frequently extremely useful to attribute propositional atti¬
tudes to programs. As Dennett (1976) has remarked, it may be very
"useful and predictive" to say of a particular program: "It thinks it
should get its Queen out early", where we are describing "features of
the program that are, in an entirely innocent way, emergent properties
of the computational processes that have engineering reality." More¬
over, as Boden points out, "it is not clear that what programs do could
be expressed as well - or even at all - without borrowing from everyday
psychological language. And the more complex and flexible the program,
the more this is so." (providing "the term chosen is carefully selec¬
ted with the precise functional details of the program in mind"), nor,
one might add, is it clear what would be achieved by refusing to so
borrow.
Instead of continuing this wrangle, let us pass it by to consider
how SHRDLU does what it does. But first, I will give the briefest of
outlines of just what it is it does do.
Basically, SHRDLU is a simulated robot who lives, with a single
hand, in a world of toy blocks (cubes, pyramids, boxes etc.). The
system accepts information and executes commands which are typed into
it in natural English. It manipulates the toy bricks according to the
commands (this is simultaneously simulated visually on an accompanying
display package) and answers questions in natural English, again of
course via the teletyper, taking between five and twenty seconds to
analyse and answer questions or obey commands. SHRDLU also has a model
of its own 'mentality' and, in addition to merely carrying out its plans,
can discuss what it has done and intends to do.
Example of dialogue: ,
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Find a block which is taller than the one you are holding
and put it into the box.
The system has to figure out what is meant by "one" and "it", as well
as using deduction to decide which block it,is holding.
BY "IT", I ASSUME YOU MEM THE BLOCK WHICH IS TALLER
THAN THE ONE I AM HOLDING.
Printed out to keep us informed.
OK.
The hand has to set down the red block to pick up the taller blue one.
What does the box contain?
THE BLUE PYRAMID AND THE BLUE BLOCK.
What is the pyramid supported by?
Earlier the system responded to "the pyramid" by saying "I don't under¬
stand which pyramid you mean." Now, it assumes that we mean the one
just mentioned.
THE BOX.
SHRDLU can fruitfully be seen as a collection of separate but inter¬
acting programs, the main ones of which may briefly be described as
follows: INPUT which takes an English sentence and by using a diction¬
ary and carrying out morphemic analyses feeds an acceptable string to
the GRAMMAR and SEMMTICS which work together with PLANNER (a deductive
system which both directs the parser and deduces facts about the world
of blocks) to interpret sentences; PROGRAMMER is a parsing system which
builds and explores parsing trees; BLOCKS a collection of theorems con¬
taining knowledge of the properties of the blocks world. In addition,
there is a DICTIONARY containing syntactic and semantic definitions (in
the form of mini-programs), a network of SEMANTIC FEATURES and a store
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of DATA. The whole system is called by a MONITOR but then functions
autonomously until the understanding process is complete, when the
MONITOR is called again. In between time, communication and control
passes between the various subprograms as necessary to achieve under¬
standing.
To give a very approximate flavour of how SHRDLU would procede ,
consider the command: "put the blue pyramid on the block in the box."
When this is typed in, the MONITOR calls INPUT which, by using the
DICTIONARY and SEMANTIC FEATURES starts to send into GRAMMAR an accept¬
able string ('put' is in the infinitive, so does not need morphemic
change, whereas e.g. 'putting* would be sent in as put + ing (infini¬
tive + present participle)). The GRAMMAR and SEMANTICS directed by
PLANNER would interpret this as an imperative and start looking for a
noun group and a preposition group. But how is SHRDLU to procede?
There are two possible parsings by PROGRAMMER: Put (the blue pyramid
on the block) in the box + Put the blue pyramid on (the block in the
box) ... both yielding noun group and prepositional group. SHRDLU con¬
tinues by bringing in BLOCKS and PLANNER, which say that in the current
state of the world there is_ no. blue pyramid on a block ... consequently
this interpretation is ruled out.
It is important to realise that the knowledge of the world, of
grammar and of semantics interact and co-operate continuously in order
to bring about an understanding ... the results of semantic interpreta¬
tion guiding parsing and vice versa. As Winograd points out, linguists
have suggested (and this seems intuitively plausible) that people make
use of both general and specific knowledge in understanding language.
It is surely our knowledge of the world which prevents us from inter¬
preting "he gave the boy plants to water" in the same way as we would
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"he gave the house plants to charity" i.e. our knowledge that there are
no such things as 'boy plants'.
There are three facts to note in particular. Firstly, the fact
that SHHDLU has a world at all to talk about and against which to check
possible interpretations, is in fact a major advance beyond other nat¬
ural language programs. Weizenbaum (1966) for example, chose to simu¬
late non-directive therapy discourse precisely because it is "one of
the few examples of natural language conversation in which one of the
participating pair is free to assume the pose of knowing almost nothing
of the real world."
Secondly, the control of SHKDLU is distributed and passes through¬
out the system (it is heterarchical) rather than being rigidly imposed
from above (hierarchical). It is not the case that all the syntactic
analysis is done, then the semantic, then the deductive rather the pro¬
cess of interpretation is heuristic ... only as much computation is
done as is necessary and in the direction necessary. As Winograd -puts
it: "the way of treating ambiguity is not through listing all possible
interpretations of a sentence, but in being intelligent in looking for
the first one, and being even more intelligent in looking for the next
one if that fails."
Thirdly, the form of representation is procedural rather than
assertional. Theorems and definitions are actually written as mini
programs. The assertion that all dogs bark ((x)(dog x —> bark x)) would
be written instead of putting two procedural items into the program's
knowledge base:
1. If trying to show something barks, search data base for informa¬
tion that it is a dog.
2. If you add to data base an item that something is a dog, also add
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an item that it barks.
This innovation, taken from Hewitt, has important implications for
implementation - if a theorem is written in the form of a procedure,
steps of the procedure can actually be internal actions of the robot
(or person). Incidentally, this may be an important way of character¬
ising Fodor's (1975) ' language of thought'; procedural representation,
which he doesn't discuss, is a natural way to "devise some mapping which
pairs physical states of the device (computer, brain) with formulae in
a computing language in such a way as to preserve desired semantic rela¬
tions among the formulae." In Winograd's SHRDLU "knowledge is expressed
as procedures written in special languages ... These languages have
the control structure of a programming language, with the statements of
the language explicitly controlling the process. The steps the system
takes in understanding a sentence can be determined directly by special
knowledge."
Winograd obviously feels that the type of representation used in
SHRDLU is relevant to the question of how people understand. As he
admits: "in some theoretical sense predicate calculus sentences could
express all our knowledge, but in a practical sense there is something
missing. A person would also have knowledge about how to go about doing
the deduction." Some psychologists too, are coming round to the view
that what we need are "the appropriate concepts to summarise blocks of
similar operations conducted by (the brain) and an appropriate language."
(Sutherland, 1974)* As Mackay (1974) puts it there is "much better hope
of spotting correlates (of subjective experience) if we focus on terms
for events and activities not static states." Certainly, as mentioned
earlier, the tendency for psychologists to reify (thoughts, minds, inten-
*
tions, meanings) has done little but petrify the field of enquiry.
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This said in eulogy of SHRDLU, it has, of course, many failings.
Firstly, its capacity to understand English is far greater than its
capacity to 'talk' - but then it does only set out to be a natural
language understander. However, even within its range of application,
due to its intrinsic (reasoning and linguistic) limitations, it is un¬
able to deal with hypotheticals, paraphrase or handle garbled grammar
or logic (where a person would extract some sense). In view of SHRDLU's
massive achievements, it perhaps seems a little ungenerous to carp at
these limitations, but they do raise the real problem of whether these
limitations are ones of the particular program, which could be extended
without any difficulty of principle, or whether they are intrinsic to
the very way of going about solving the problems.
This is well brought out by consideration of the implications of
the limited domain (world) in which SHRDLU lives. Whilst it is true,
as Winograd says, that "the language programs do not depend on apy spe¬
cial subject matter" - any 'world' could be substituted for the blocks
world - they do depend on some limited domain of subject matter in each
case. In particular, SHRDLU must live in a closed world, in which every¬
thing which is the case is entailed by the known data,
e.g. can a pyramid by supported by a block?
The deductive system finds an actual example, so it knows
this is possible .
YES.
(indeed, all SHRDLU's processes are rigidly logical - it even has to
prove its own hand is not already holding anything before it can pick
something up).
This consideration lends some plausibility to the claims of critics
that "Winograd's work is not directed to finding out how human languages
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are organised, by theories of explanatory power - but rather how language
might be organised for the purposes of a machine performing particular
tasks in a limited domain." (Drescher and Hornstein, 1976).
These critics argue that, contrary to Winograd's claim that what
he aims for is a "better understanding of what language is", "the true
goals for this work are primarily technological rather than scientific."
To be more brutally precise; "his interest remains to design a model
which will work reasonably efficiently for the domain he has chosen
without going into any of the theoretical or empirical considerations
which are of primary interest for a scientific theory of language' or
intelligence."
What are the conditions on scientific adequacy which SHRDLU alle¬
gedly does not meet? There are three levels of adequacy: (i) a model
is observationally adequate if it can "reproduce observed facts about
human processing" e.g. can process the set of sentences processable by
people (many different processes may satisfy this level); (ii) a model
is descriptively adequate if it "incorporates just those principles of
processing that speakers use"; and (iii) a model is theoretically adequate
if it providesexplanatory principles from which such a model will neces¬
sarily follow, i.e. it must possess some theoretical structure which
prohibits purely ad hoc adjustments to bring about observational adequacy.
Obviously if you are motivated purely by a "practical desire to have
a usable language-understanding system", descriptive and explanatory
adequacy are not your concern ... though presumably observational ade¬
quacy is still required (Pylyshyn (1976) claims that "any A.I. system
is at some level a psychological theory simply because the description
of the intelligent task to which it is addressed already is essentially
a description of some psychological process.") Equally obviously, the
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satisfaction of observational adequacy does not guarantee the satisfac¬
tion of either of the other levels. Consequently in a weak sense of
'simulate': "the existence of a machine that can simulate certain aspects
of human intelligence will not necessarily contribute to the development
of a theory of human thinking." (Drescher and Hornstein). Some A.I.
researchers do indeed disregard the higher levels of adequacy. Thus
Raphael has written that "being able to solve a problem, even though no
one may understand precisely how it works" is a more important aspect
of a program than its being "explainable in terms of some deep under¬
lying theory" (Boden'"19776); and Wilks denies A.I. is theoretical or
scientific work at all, but rather an engineering activity. But then
Raphael and Wilks. do not see A.I. as any sort of simulation! Researchers
who do, including Winograd, are bound to strive for higher levels of
adequacy.
There are two particularly strong lines of argument against SHRDLU
being theoretically adequate: the apparent lack of general principles
and allegedly arbitrary 'patching'. In order to do more than "mimic in
an unenlightening way some small aspect of human performance" (Marr,
1977) a theorist must foimulate principles which underlie each of the
components and their interaction. Drescher and Hornstein again are the
least compromising: most purported computer simulations of natural lan¬
guage performance are "of virtually no psychological - as opposed to
technological - interest because it is totally devoid of any principles
I
which could serve as even a basis for a serious scientific theory of
human linguistic behaviour" (Drescher and Hornstein). Weizenbaum (1976)
reiterates this criticism of Winograd and (of course) extends it to our
earlier automaton builders: (Winograd's) heuristics express no interest¬
ing general principles ..."such principles cannot be discovered merely
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"by expanding the range of a system ... Even the most clever clock builder
of the 17th century would never have discovered Newton's laws simply by
building ever fancier and more intricate clocks."
This criticism is partly deserved. I am not convinced that SHKDLU
does express general principles relevant to all natural language under¬
standing; partly because of its being designed for operating in a limited
domain and, as we shall see, certain aspects are open to the charge of
arbitrariness. However, Weizenbaum's wider point is not well taken, as
he chooses to ignore the analogical aspect of simulation. Of course,
due to referential opacity, it might be true that a 17th century clock
builder in constructing a timepiece is actually constructing a model of
the planetary system, whilst he might not know he is building one. He
might understand the way the clock works but not understand the way the
planetary system works ... though they work in the same way. This is
because 'understanding' does, but 'constructing' does not, set up a
referentially opaque context. (Similarly, the police may be looking for
the murderer, but not looking for Joe Bloggs, although Joe Bloggs is the
murderer). This brings out that which is undeniable in Weizenbaum's
assertion that we couldn't discover the laws of planetary motion just
by building clocks, although clocks may instantiate those very laws.
However, as has been argued elsewhere, truth of a system as a model of
another system is not a "local" property of the model, but a global pro¬
perty of the pair of systems. It is by using the clock as a model of
the planetary system (or the brain) that we discover laws of the modelled.
Of oourse, just building "fancier and more intricate clocks" in itself
will not help us understand the world, but using the clocks to develop
"fancier and more intricate" hypotheses about the world might well! Of
course, not every 17th century clock builder was a simulator of the
147-
natural world, but it is merely committing the sin of affirmation of
the consequent to infer that every simulator was not a clock builder,
and it is just false to say that one could not discover laws (which
govern the movement of the planets) by simulating the planetary system
by a clock.
Another major problem for Winograd is the accusation of patching.
The basic notion behind this is easy to grasp. Suppose one orders a
suit from the tailor, but instead of a well-fitting carefully-made gar¬
ment with neat joints, a roughly cut approximation arrives, which the
tailor takes in and patches in an arbitrary way to accommodate one's
shape. By application of enough patches, he may actually keep the wind
out - but you would hardly be satisfied with the end result. It may
even be that the structure of the finished suit is governed by the size
and shape of the patches available; certainly it will be responsive to
a desired endstate (a practical result) rather than guided by 'principles
of tailoring'.
It has been said of Winograd that his approach is to "arbitrarily
stipulate what are in reality matters than can only be decided by empi¬
rical research and what can only be explained on the basis of theoreti¬
cal work" (Drescher and Hornstein). In his semantic component, Winograd
uses Katz-Fodor type semantic markers, but rather than deciding in a
principled way which features are basic, and because SHRDLU lives in a
closed world, he simply stipulates all the features necessary to con-
!
v^rse about "the world of blocks. As another example, Winograd writes
that his parser is one which operates top-down-left-to-right, but that
it "modifies these properties when it is advantageous to do so" (Winograd);
this latter qualification smacks of mere ad hocery and anyway, Winograd
gives no reasons why his parser should be top-down-left-to-right, again
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this is merely stipulated without any explanation or justification -
one- is tempted to believe that its only justification "is that it works.'
What was Winograd's aim in building SHEDLU? Was it merely to get
a 'natural language understanding system' which works, or to simulate
the human psychological process?
Winograd states three goals of his research: a practical, desire
for a natural language understanding system; a better understanding of
language and a better understanding of intelligence. The first two of
these aims may obviously be pursued with virtually no regard for the
psychological reality of the processes postulated, but, expanding on
the last aim, Winograd expresses the conviction that understanding lan¬
guage "may lead to a better theory of how our mind works." But, is the
way he chooses to gain this better theory of our mind, that of simula¬
ting psychologically real processes? In the text, Winograd seems to
support this interpretation. Thus he writes: "When a person sees or
hears a sentence he ... To model this language understanding in a-com¬
puter, we need a program which ... ", where the blank in each case is
filled in by the same requirements. Elsewhere, he writes: "our nota¬
tion ... is intentionally general, so that our system can deal with
concepts as people do." However the'editorial, in the edition of
Cognitive Psychology in which U.N.L. first appeared, is quite explicit
that "Winograd's system is not a 'simulation' but it incorporates impor¬
tant ideas about human syntactic, semantic and problem solving abilities,
and, in particular, about their interactions in understanding natural
language". 'When we look closely at U.N.L., we can see that, whilst
Winograd seems to be strongly simulating psychological processes, often
/
he retreats from that task. Thus on page 26 he writes: "language is a
process of communication between people ... (and it) ... is enmeshed in
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knowledge of the world." This knowledge is, we are told, "a collection
of concepts designed to manipulate ideas." Thus far, then, it seems
that insofar as people communicate linguistically, they make use of
concepts. This seems to be confirmed by the claim further down the
page that the "meaning of words is represented by ... meanings of 1 con¬
cepts1 which exist in speaker's and hearer's minds." However, even
further down the page, we are told "the 'concept' representation of
meaning is not intended as a direct picture of something which exists
in a person's mind. It is a function that gives us a way to make sense
of data, and to predict actual behaviour." Thus we have been led gently
from process as psychologically real simulation to process as explana¬
tory construct to systematise data. Winograd's claim that "The justi¬
fication for our particular use of concepts in this system is that it
is thereby enabled to engage in dialogs that simulate in many ways the
behaviour of a human language user", then, can only be taken as seriously
claiming observational adequacy for his simulation, despite an earlier
apparently stronger claim.
It is my opinion that Winograd does.not really hope for more than
this. Elsewhere he writes: "It is not yet clear what connections (our
models) have with the processes going on in the human mind. Yet they
give us a clear framework for thinking about what it is we do when we
understand and respond to natural language." This 'clear framework' is
the "formal metaphor", given by computers and computer language, "within
which we can model the processes and test implications of our theories;"
"to write a program we need to make all of our knowledge explicit ...
this provides a rigorous test for linguistic theories, and leads us into
making new theories to fill the places where the old ones are lacking."
Winograd, then does aim to make SHKDLTJ observationally adequate and he
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has certain views about the language understanding process, which he
attempts to make more formal through the discipline of computer modell¬
ing. It is, as Wilks has described other A.I. work, a particularly-
brilliant "expression in some more or less agreeable semi-formalism of
intuitive common sense knowledge revealed by introspection", supplemen¬
ted in Winograd's case by extensive linguistic research.
Weizenbaum criticised both the '17th century artisans' and Winograd
for letting "their successes lead them to the conclusion that they had
begun to approach a general theoretical understanding of the universe,
or even to the conclusion that, because their machines worked, they had
validated the idea that the laws of the universe are formalisable in
mathematical terms." However, failings and limitations admitted, it is
my conviction that these automata do indeed point a way to a new kind
of explanation, mechanistic in principle but irreducible to physics and
chemistry. The", demonstration that processes usually considered essen¬
tially and inalienably human in nature can be imitated by a machine,
must cast doubt on the conviction that the human brain is a totally
\
unique and even magical entity.
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CHAPTER NINE
SHALL I COMPARE THEE TO A SUMMER'S DAY?
"The general design of the following sheets
is to inlist Imagination under the banner
of Science; and to lead her votaries from
the looser analogies, which dress out the
imagery of poetry, to the stricter ones,
which form the ratiocination of philosophy.
Erasmus Darwin (1806).
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In the four chapters immediately preceding this one, we have dis¬
cussed various formal models (ones intentionally constructed to match,
in some relevant respect, the structure and/or function of some system
the modeller wants to understand). In this chapter, and the following
two, we will discuss some intimate models which, the reader will remem¬
ber, are pre-existing entities which are seen by the modeller to be
similar, in some relevant respect, to something he or she wishes to
understand.
As a rough approximation, it is true to say that no entity or phen¬
omenon is so lowly or ludicrous that it cannot be used - or indeed that
has not been used - as a psychological model.
For example, consider the following short storys
"Bill woke up one Sunday to the sound of the church bell and decided to
spend the day in the country. He telephoned the station to find out the
time of the next train and soon he was in the countryside admiring the
scenery, flowers and animals. He returned home that evening, intending
to go to the cinema, but found a telegram inviting him to a concert.
He cooked and ate, whilst listening to records, and went out. When he
returned it was late. He lit a lamp, covering the budgie's cage with a
\
cloth, and read for an hour before seeing to his toilet and retiring to
bed."
Most psychologists, if asked to pick out from the story phenomena
which have actually been used by psychologists to help understand/
explain psychological processes, would have little difficulty in picking
*
out three or four, but it may come as a surprise to hear that there are
in fact (at least) fourteen such models directly mentioned above.
In this chapter, I intend to draw out and discuss some of these
models at some length (and I will mention the others) in partial support
(
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of the claim that;
"The mind, of a Newton, a Bach or a Michelangelo, it was
said, differed, only in complexity from a printing press,
a whistle or a steam engine." (jeans,, 1937).
Church Bell.
"The bells of St. Maiy's over the way always ring for a quarter of
an hour before the University sermon; yet the ringing of the bells is
not the cause of the sermon." (Romanes, 1885). Unlikely as it may seem
at first, Romanes i£ indulging here in (philosophico-psychological
theorising. That it is theory in which he is interested is shown by
his admitting that "although, as long as the association remains con¬
stant, there would be no harm in assuming, for any practical purposes,
that it is so", we might in fact be wrong. What parallel is Romanes
drawing here between the vibration of the bells in St. Mary's church
and the sermon, though, in the psychological case? Well, he is leaving
the sermon constant, but reading "vibration of a number of little nerve-
cells in the brain" for that of the bells. Inference? "We may be sim¬
ilarly wrong if we were definitely to conclude that the sermon is pro¬
duced by the vibration of a number of little nerve cells in the brain
of the preacher."
To what interesting psychological question is this model relevant?
... That of materialism. Romanes admits; "materialism ... is ... at
once the simplest physiological explanation of facts already known and
the best working hypothesis to guide us in our further researches.
But it does not follow from this that the theory of materialism is true."
This, then, is one typical scenario (one leading to a negative
conclusion) for a piece of intrinsic model use. There is an interesting
theoretical problem; some analogy of structure or function is drawn
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between a phenomenon one wishes to understand and one one understands
relatively better (we might have believed that the bells caused the
sermon "if we did not happen to know so much about the matter (sic) as
we do"); then a line of argument rehearsed with the understood system
(the model) is extended to the previously not-understood one and con¬
clusions drawn.
Telephone.
The model of the brain as a telephone exchange or switchboard is,
of course, an old favourite. Craik (No. 27, 1966) wrote that "... a
system of neural pathways in which the number of fibres, rather than
the particular identity of a single fibre is important ... has its ana¬
logy in a ... telephone system" and, slightly more recently, Miller
(1956) pursues the same analogy. The classic statement of the metaphor,
though, is that of Pearson (1892):
We must compare "the brain to the central office of a telephone
exchange, from which wires radiate to the subscribers A, B, C, D, E, F,
etc. who are senders, and to W, X, Y, Z, etc. who are receivers of mes¬
sages." Which psychological function is Pearson modelling?...The connec¬
tion between sensory and motor nerves and the measure of consciousness
of impulses. Lines from A etc. model sensory nerves, lines from Z etc.
model motor nerves and consciousness is modelled by the operator or
'clerk'. Certain analogies are manifest at once, wired into the model,
so to speak. Take, for example, "instinctive exertion following uncon¬
sciously on a sense impression." Well, this can be understood by com¬
paring it to the situation where A has previously notified the company
that he will only ever want to speak to W, so that A's wire is joined
permanently to that of W and "the clerk remains unconscious of the
arrival of the message from A and its despatch to W, although it passes
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through his office." Only slightly more complex is "habitual exertion
following unconsciously on a sense impression." Here the operator
J i'"finds by experience that B invariably desires to correspond with X,
and consequently, whenever .he hears B's call-bell he links him mechani¬
cally to X." "An exertion following consciously on the receipt of a '
sense impression" is modelled thus: C, D, etc. "set their bells ringing
for a variety of purposes," the operator has to listen to their "special
communications" and perhaps employ additional resources (directories
etc.) before he "shunts their wires so as to bring them into circuit
with those of Y and Z, ... to best suit the nature of the demands."
There is no denying the attractiveness of this model. There is
even a (gross) physical resemblance between nerves and telephone wires
and both function in systems of communication, (in a more technolo¬
gically naive world, Descartes (1755) had pictured the afferent nerves
as hollow tubes, like the bell ropes used to summon servants). More
particularly, both motor and sensory nerves and caller and receiver are .
(intuitively) distinguishable by the direction of travel of the rele¬
vant impulse. Moreover, "in all cases the activity of the exchange
arises from the receipt of a message from one of a possibly great but
*
still finite number of senders" and "the originality of the clerk is
confined to immediately following their behests or to satisfying their
demands to the best of his ability by the information stored in his
office."
Once the model is stated, it is possible to extend it; for example,
in the case of instinctive unconscious exertion after a sense impression,
we supposed the message to pass through the clerk's office. However, as
was well known even in Pearson's day, certain instinctive exertion fol¬
lowing sensory stimulation still occurs even though the central telephone
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exchange has been demolished (as in the case of a frog whose has
been removed, but which will still remove an irritant from its body).
Extension of the model ... "If these wires were connected outside the
office, we should have an analogy to certain possibilities of reflex
action, which arises from sensory and motor nerves being linked before
reaching the brain" (for example in the spinal cord).
Nevertheless, of course, the brain is not a central telephone ex¬
change; as Pearson saw ... "the analogy must not be pushed too far."
The reality is far more complex than the model suggests. Pearson was
only too aware of (some of) the failings, for example, "senders and
receivers must be considered distinct, for sensory and motor nerves* do
not appear to interchange functions."
The eclipse of the telephone exchange as a model of the brain pro¬
vides another interesting object lesson. (intrinsic) models fall from
favour when they have been superseded by other models, usually suggested
by some technological advance, rather than by their own intrinsic limi¬
tations, which are anyway often patched by ad hoc augmentations. Tech-
i I
nlological advance is as least as important as intrinsic developments of
psychological theory in the determination of which models are adopted.
Thus Beloff (1973) was correct both in stating that "man has a brain
and ... this brain is more than a switchboard ... What exactly that
something is, forms the real point of departure for the cognitive psy¬
chologist.", and in pointing to the (approximation towards an) answer
cognitive modellers are giving: "the brain should not be conceived
either as a vast telephone exchange of reflex arcs or as a vaguely
defined field of interacting forces ... it must be thought of as a com¬
puter receiving inputs from many sources and combining them to produce
an output which is unique to each particular occasion though lawful"
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(Welford on Craik in Beloff). In time, of course, the computer itself
will he superseded by some other model suggested by the developing tech¬
nology.
Trains.
Railway systems and trains themselves have also been popular models
with psychologists virtually as long as there have been such things
(trains that is'.), but, of course, the analogy can be read in many ways
... and often is, even by the same author in the same book. William
James (1891 ) at the end of chapter 5 °f the Principles, uses the train
model to illustrate the deterministic action of a machine which, unlike
a person (for James), "acts fatally in one way", "knows nothing of wrong
or right" and "has not ideals to pursue." The style of the argument
goes as follows ... concede a point to the opposition for the sake of
argument, ... suppose we were machines, then we would be, in relevant
respects, just like a train, but "a locomotive will carry its train
through an open drawbridge.as cheerfully as to any other destination",
but we would not do that, therefore we are not trains, and therefore a
fort, not machines.
James' other use of the model is in connection with the identity
I
theory of mind: "however numerous and delicately differentiated the
train of ideas may be, the train of brain events that runs alongside
of it must in both respects be exactly its match." The definitive
statement of the use of this model must be that of Clifford (in James),
whose presentation would seem like a parody were it not so earnestly
put: "The train of physical facts between the stimulus sent into the
eye ... and the exertion which follows it, and the train of physical
facts which goes on in the brain ... these are perfectly complete phy¬
sical trains ... the two things are on utterly different platforms -
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the physical facts go along by themselves, and the mental facts go
along by themselves. There is a parallelism between them, but there is
no interference of one with the other." "If anybody says that the will
influences matter, the statement is not untrue, but it is nonsense"
says Clifford positivistically. In support of this he again uses the
locomotive analogy and, as a thought experiment, asks us to "imagine a
train, the forepart of which is an engine and three carriages linked
with iron couplings, and the hind part three other carriages linked
with iron couplings: the bond between the two parts being made up out
of the sentiments of amity subsisting between the stoker and the guard."
In the case of both organic bodies and iron carriages "the only thing
which influences matter is the position (or motion) of surrounding mat¬
ter." Huxley (1898) , in a famous passage, was really illustrating the
same point (non-action of mind on matter), though from an epiphenomen-
alist standpoint: "The consciousness of brutes would appear to be rela¬
ted to the mechanism of their body simply as a collateral product of its
working, and to be completely without any power of modifying that work¬
ing as the steam-whistle which accompanies the work of a locomotive
engine is without influence on its machinery."
Craik, on the other hand, uses the analogy in two quite different
ways. Firstly, he is concerned to understand (in the context of the
localisation of function controversy) how it can be that injury to a
particular region of the brain does not necessarily destroy a particular
function. To Craik "this suggests a system of neural pathways in which
the number of fibres, rather than the particular identity of a single
fibre, is important." This, plus the fact that his theorising was done
during the second World War, led Craik to compare the effect of damaging
the neural system of the brain with that of bombing a railway system;
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where, that is, railway lines model neural pathways and trains nervous
impulses. Now the problem ... how would a railway system have to be
organised, so that minimal disruption to the system as a whole occurred
upon specific damage? ..."If there is only one railway ... to a parti¬
cular place, a bomb on it will have a definite, localised effect - it
will completely hold up communication with a particular place; but it
will be otherwise if there are many alternative routes ...(then there
will be) only a slight decrease in general efficiency and rapidity of
communication."
Craik (1945) also uses the railway system as a model to help under¬
stand how it could be that we could conceive of the brain as a "neural
calculating machine", which consists of "interconnecting parts and the
continuous transmission of motion from one part to another", and yet
maintain that there are some objects or events with "a greater degree
of 'thinghood'" than others, and which are, for example, the physical
counterpart of the (psychological) image.
Again railway lines model neurones and trains impulses, but now the
focus is not on the pathways themselves but on their confluences: "Just
as a railway system consists of communicating lines on which trains are
in continuous motion and stations where they stop and where definite
events - such as the growth of factories - tend to occur, so there may
be patterns of excitation or moments in a series of impulses at which
there is some kind of demarcation which issues into consciousness as an
image. Some parts of the process of neural transmission from sensory
receptor to motor orgp.n may have a physiological definiteness which is
correlated with their psychological definiteness or emergence into con¬
sciousness as images."
So far, our poor psychologising hero (or perhaps victim?) has hardly
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started the day - having merely been rudely awakened and phoned the
station. Let us let him get out into the countryside ... surely there
he is safe from models. I'm afraid not...
Landscape.
"In the brain we find mountains and valleys, bridges and water
courses, beams and arches, pins and hooks, claws and ramshorns, trees
and sheaves, harps and trumpets ... No one knows the significance of
these wonderful shapes" wrote Husche (Buchner, 1870), betraying the
bewilderment felt by early neuro-psychologists at the complex, yet highly
structured nature of that which they were trying to understand. ("The
brain is not a simple organ, but is in the highest degree composite,
rich in structure and delicately formed"s Buchner.) In a less 'scienti¬
fic' context, Gepard Manley Hopkins harped on the notion of a mental
landscape, stressing its dramatic nature:
"Oh the mind, mind has mountains; cliffs of fall
Frightful, sheer, no-man fathomed. Hold them cheap
May who ne'er hung there."
Mercier (1885) in an attempt to classify feelings, again used the land¬
scape as a model, but for him the important notion was that of one thing
underlying another. He drew an analogy between "physiological craving"
and soil or earth, and between the 'higher' emotion love and the growth
of verdure. Then, by discussing the relationship between verdure and
earth, he was able to suggest a similar one between love and craving:
"The emotion of love ... Underlying all its varieties there is the fun¬
damental substructure of physiological craving, just as underlying every
landscape there is the bare earth; and just as in some landscapes there
is nought but bare or lichen-crusted rock, so in some natures there is
nothing or little besides this craving. In other natures this substruc-
*
ture is covered and hidden by a luxuriant growth of higher forms of
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feeling «.. (love) must in any classification be included under the same
title with the simple physiological craving - a feeling from which it
differs as the tropical luxuriance of a Brazilian forest differs from
the lichen-covered rocks of Spitzbergen."
One major factor contributing to tropical luxuriance is, of course,
water and we may expect our 'hero' to have encountered at least one
stream. The flow of water has been associated with cognitive theory
at least since the hydraulic automata of Hero of Alexandria and achieved
notoriety in Descartes' thinking automata, which were to a great extent
inspired by the hydraulic androids built by Thomas de Francine in the
gardens at St. Germain en Laye. Actual brooks and rivulets are, how¬
ever, also sometimes mentioned in psychological theories, as for example
here by Francis Bowen (1877)s "••• we change the whole current of
thought at will. We arrest the flow when we please, and thus force the
river into a different channel. No one allows his thoughts always to
drift at random, as they often do in aimless reverie or a dream. But
the action of the Unconscious, which is the fountain that keeps the
river always full and generally determines whether its waters shall be
bitter or sweet, and which way they shall run, is often checked and
controlled by the conscious Ego ..." A real stream of consciousness
model I
Variations on the landscape analogy are no respecter of decade or
century. La Mettrie wrote in 1748 that "if the brain is at the same
time well organised and well educated, it is a fertile soil, well sown,
that brings forth a hundredfold what it has received" - perhaps he
should have added that a wealthy patron and a liberal atmosphere make
good growing conditions. Nearer our own times, in 1974? Gardner (sic.)
writes of brain injury as an "Avenue to the Mind", talks of the
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phrenologist's diagram of mental faculties as "road maps" and suggests
that "locations and juxtapositions of parts of the nervous system some¬
times offer ... additional guideposts to the relations among (or dis¬
tances between) various psychological functions."
As you will recall, our victim admired the flora ("the brain that
highest and fairest blossom of all terrestrial organisation": Buchner)
and stalked the fauna ("the course of ideas in a given train of thought
will admit of having its footsteps tracked in the corresponding path¬
ways of the brain": Romanes; "the brain has its muscles for think¬
ing as the legs have muscles for walking": La Mettrie).
If he was lucky, the tracks our hero followed may even have led
him to a ferret. Incredible as it may seem, even the humble ferret has
served as a model of the mind. In a brilliantly extended analogy,
Charron (1801) exploits every aspect of his model. First he identifies
the mind with the ferret, though stressing from the beginning the lat¬
ter* s (alleged) bad points: "the mind ... is a dangerous instrument
both to itself and others, a little troublemaker, a ferret which is to
be feared, an annoying and importunate parasite, which, like a juggler
playing at sleight of- hand, under the guise of some gentle motion,
subtle and smiling, forges, invents, and causes all the mischief in
the world; for without it there would be none." Then Charron consoli¬
dates the analogy: "... the mind is perpetually active; it cannot be
without action."; "if it is not occupied with some action, it will run
tiot in imagination". "The action of the mind is to search, ferret,
and endlessly twist about, like one that is famished for want of know¬
ledge, to seek and enquire ... There is no end to our enquiries; the
pursuits of the human mind are without form or end; its food is doubt
and ambiguity; it is perpetually in movement, without rest or bound;
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the world is a school of investigation; the chase and its excitement
are our proper meat, but whether we catch the prey or miss it is another
matter ..." The model established, Charron starts to draw out the (for
him) unpleasant and worriesome aspects of it; "It is also universal
meddling in everything, ... subjects vain and of no account as well as
those noble and weighty, those we can understand as well as those we
cannot."; "how rash and dangerous the mind of man may be, especially
when it is lively and vigorous; for being so eager, so free and univer¬
sal, so unrestrained in its movements, using its liberty so boldly in
all things, without bowing to any, it may easily shake off common opin¬
ions, and all the rules by which one tries to bind and restrain it, as
being an unjust tyranny." There are of course certain 'dangers' in
this freedom, for example, "it is to be feared that it will wander and
lose its way, and in fact we see that those who have extra-ordinary
vivacity and rare excellence (of mind) are usually disordered in their
opinions and in their conduct." I After having followed the model
through, Charron uses it to justify a reactionary and restrictive poli¬
tics: "That is why there is good reason to give the mind strict limits,
to bridle and bind it with religions, laws, customs, sciences, percepts,
threats, promises mortal and immortal, yet still we see that in its
unruly manner it escapes and makes itself free of all restrictions, for
it is by nature stubborn, fierce and proud, and if it is to be led it
must be by deception", and not by force."
It is at this stage our hero returns home intending to go to the...
Cinema.
As long ago as 1748s La Mettrie had written: "all the faculties of
the soul can be correctly reduced to pure imagination in which they all
consist. Thus judgement, reason, and memory are not absolute parts
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of the soul, but merely modifications of this kind of medullary screen
upon which images of the objects painted in the eye are projected as by
a magic lantern."
The 'cinema model' has proved to be one of the most popular, and
perhaps ultimately one of the most problematic, models in cognitive
psychology, neatly exemplifying a notion of representation but simul¬
taneously raising the reduction threat of the homunculus who is appar¬
ently required as audience. The most charming example of the use of
this model is, perhaps, that of Erasmus Darwin (1806):
"But as each mass the solar ray reflects,
The eye's clear glass the transient beam collects;
Bends to their focal point the rays that swerve,
And paints the living image on the nerve.
So in some village-barn, or festive hall
The spheric lens illumes the whiten'd wall;
O'er the bright field successive figures fleet,
And motley shadows dance along the sheet -
Symbol of solid forms is colour'd light,
And the mute language of the touch is sight."
We must not imagine, however, that the cinema model is one entirely of
the past. As recently as 1976, Arbib et al. have used a "metaphor drawn
from the making of movie cartoons." Arbib is really concerned with a
model within a model. He accepts that an organism models the salient
features of its environment, but the problem then is how we shall model
the organism's model. Arbib's particular problem has two roots; firstly
it seems over-whelmingly likely that the brain is a precise computational
network which, while functionally unitary, is spatially distributed.
The hypothesis, then, is that computation in the brain "may involve the
co-operation of many subroutines that work simultaneously and in parallel
(and wherein) a computation may be effected by a subset of the routines,
(and where) for some tasks some subroutines may be irrelevant" (and thus be
ablated without relevant function loss).
165-
Nov/, apparently in the making of cartoons, it is too inefficient
(and therefore costly) to draw each frame individually in its entirety
before they are photographed and strung together as the animation.
Instead, a "layering technique" is employed. In this technique, the
final photograph is taken looking down a "slide box" which contains
many different layers; each layer will have depicted upon it a differ¬
ent aspect of the total picture e.g. background, foreground, midground,
figures, limbs, etc. Now, for any one frame, only some minor change
may be required, for example, the background and a tree in the fore¬
ground may remain the same, but some aspect of the figure ... the'posi¬
tion of the legs ... may change. Thus only one layer need be altered
and the work of duplicating all the unaltered information in the slide
is rendered unnecessary. All slides not at present in use would be
kept in a slide file. This is enough by way of background to understand
Arbib's use of the models "a similar strategy for obtaining a very
economical description of what happens over a long period of time may
be used in the brain with a long term memory (L.T.M.) corresponding to
the slide file and a short term memory (S.T.M.) to the slide box. The
act of perception might then be compared to using sensory information
to retrieve appropriate slides from the file to replace or augment those
already in the slide box, experimenting to decide whether a newly re¬
trieved slide fits sensory input 'better' than one currently in the
slide box. Also, part of the action of the organism in changing its
relationship with the environment might be viewed as designed to obtain
input that will help to update the S.T.M. by deciding between 'competing'




Arbib's model, then, helps us make sense of the notion of distri¬
buted computation. But isn't it unlikely (physiologically) that we '
have a neural cartoon-making-mechanism between our ears? (This objec¬
tion is made to all models, but especially the more outlandish). The
(
fact is that psychological theories constrain physiological theories
even more than vice versa ... the only physiological constraint on a
psychological theory is that the latter must somehow be physiologically
realisable; but the psychological theory tells the physiologist what
must be realised. If the psychological theory dictates a distributed
computational system, the fact that we have "little feeling for how to
'wire up''a neural 'slide box system' is a measure of how much further
we have to go if we are to understand the neural mechanisms."
Telegraph.
Whilst Samuel Morse was travelling from Le Havre to New York on
S.S. Sully, he is reputed to have seen, in October 1852, Br. Jackson
demonstrate an electro-magnet and allegedly said: "If the presence of
electricity can be made visible in any part of an electrical circuit
closed by an electro-magnet, I see no reason why intelligence may not
be transmitted instantaneously by electricity" (Larsen, i960).
I
Like the telephone system (but of course earlier) the telegraph
system foims a natural model of neural pathways, where nerve fibres are
modelled by wires and ganglions by the electrical apparatus (Buchner).
The most thorough explanation of the analogy is found in Shelly and
Stenhouse (1911) and it is worth quoting fairly fully.
After telling us that "in the spinal cord and the brain are certain
very remarkable cells, called nerve cells which are able to communicate
with each other, as well as with the sense organs muscles, glands, and
other tissues, by means of fine threads called nerve fibres"; they go
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on to says "It may simplify our ideas of these things to think of them
as the telegraph system of a countiy. The country is the human body,
the telegraph wires are the nerve fibres, and the electric batteries
are the nerve cells. We shall also picture to ourselves the batteries
as being nearly all collected in certain definite parts of the country
- the spinal cord and the brain, which are together referred to as the
central nervous system.
"Further, we can suppose the organs of touch, sight, hearing, smell
and taste to be so many sets of telegraph instruments at certain offices
along the frontier of the country, receiving and transmitting informa¬
tion concerning foreign affairs."
Once the model is set up, it can be used to make predictions which
can be empirically verified. Thus just as "many telegraph wires may be
bound up together to form one cable ... on what may be called main lines,
many nerve fibres are bound up together to form one nerve." Moreover,
just as telegraph wires are protected from interference from each other
and from losing their currents "by the sheaths of india rubber or silk
... nerve fibres in use are kept from touching each other - and their
messages therefore kept from going astray - by sheaths of fatty substance."
Perhaps you will remember that the telegram our victim received was
to invite him to a ...
Concert.
Music has provided many analogies for understanding man. Many of
these are based upon a supposed analogy between the vibration of musical
(e.g. violin) and nerve strings. Thus La Mettrie wrote: "As a violin
string or a harpsichord key vibrates and gives forth sound, so the cere¬
bral fibres, struck by waves of sound, are stimulated to render or re¬
peat the words that strike them.", apparently as a straightforwardly
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physical account of what happens. Romanes seizes on the same phenomenon
(vibration) to explain a way of achieving a 'higher synthesis' of
"spiritualism and materialism." Romanes wants to demonstrate that the
antithesis between mind and motion is only phenomenal not real, (or
that this is at least a possibility). Accordingly, he needs to find a
parallel system, in which another phenomenological antithesis is not
actual, to use as a model. Thus he writes : "When a violin is played
upon we hear a musical sound, and at the same time we see a vibration
of the strings. Relatively to our consciousness, therefore, we have
two sets of changes, which appear to be very different in kind; yet we
know that in an absolute sense they are one and the same: we know that
the diversity in consciousness is created only by the difference in our
modes of perceiving the same event - whether we see or whether we hear
the vibrations of the strings. Similarly, we may suppose that a vibra¬
tion of nerve-strings and a process of thought are really one and the
same event, which is dual or diverse only in relation to our modes of
perceiving it." The same argument, based on vibration, is also rehear¬
sed by Huschke (see Buchner), substituting, or rather augmenting with,
colour for music: "As colour is to the vibrations of li^it, as sound is
to the vibrations of elastic fluids, so is thought related to the neuro
electrical vibrations of the brain fibres." William James' (189*1 ) famous
dictum: "the melody floats from the harp string, but neither checks nor
quickens its vibrations" though meant to illustrate an epiphenomenalist
rather than identity theory, makes the same point.
An interesting development of this metaphor is employed elsewhere
by Romanes. Nerve strings and violin strings Jiave this in common ...
they both vibrate; they are both accessible through different senses.
But note that a vibrating violin string may be either in or out of tune
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and hence harmonious or discordant with the rest of the orchestra.
Accordingly, Romanes extends the model: "What we know on the side of
mind as logical sequence, is on the side of the nervous system nothing
more than the passage of nervous energy through one series of cells and
fibres rather than through another: what we recognise as the truth is
merely the fact of the brain vibrating in tune with nature."
Cookery.
It may be surprising to be given by a psychologist literally food
for thought, but it not uncommonly happens. William James talks of
"the brain ... (as) ... a sort of vat in which feelings and emotions
somehow go on stewing together" and La Mettrie, in stressing the shared
heritage of man and beast, likens them to types of bread: "Man is not
moulded from a costlier clay; nature has used but one dough and has
merely varied the leaven ... (man and animal) must necessarily be in
the same condition." Later, he develops the notion of difference in
leaven to say: "animals, composed of the same matter, lacking perhaps
only one degree of fermentation to make it exactly like man's, must
share the same prerogatives of animal nature." Jung (1955)> too, favoured
carbohydrate models. In an interesting interview with Stephen Black he
said: "In those days one talked of psychiatric illness as a sort of by¬
product of the brain. Joking with my pupils, I told them of an old
text book for the Medical Corps in the Swiss Army which gave a descrip¬
tion of the brain, saying it looked like a dish of macaroni, and the
steam from the macaroni was the psyche." Here Jung uses a crude model
of epiphenomenalism, t.o ridicule the concept modelled purposely and
effectively (but of course to ridicule is not to show false).
(Slightly) more serious use of food and cookery as models has
however been made, e.g. by Craik. \
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Craik was intrigued, by how we could make sense in a mechanical way
of our apparent ability to generalise on abstract properties of objects.
It struck him that we were perhaps not taking something extra in (a
difficult abstract property) but leaving much out ... everything which
was irrelevant in that respect ... in virtue of the way we are construc¬
ted. Thus it might be "that in genuine generalisations apparently ab¬
stract properties of objects are really recognised as the same because,
acting on the brain mechanisms of the animal, they produce the same
effect, just as a pound of butter and a pound of bacon both produce the
same deflection on a balance ... Thus, a balance "recognises1 a weight
of one grm., whether it be the weight of a piece of brass or of lead.
In the same way, we can recognise colours apart from the nature of the
coloured objects."
This kitchen-scales model underlies much theorising on cross-sensory
comparison. How do we confirm what we see by what we hear? How do we
confirm what we smell by what we taste? How do we confiim what we are
told by what we touch? One obvious way would be to translate all per¬
ceptual inputs into a common code and then define a confirmation matrix
for the code, but thi's is really no more than a notational variant on
the set of cognitive kitchen scales discussed above (and probably deser¬
ves the epithet 'mental chemistry approach' more than Savin's own). It
is interesting to note that one bold answer to the scales approach denies
the premise that we do have to translate inputs into a common code.
Bower's 'unity of the senses' hypothesis seems to suggest that a child
starts with such a common code unspecified as to particular senses. It
is however tempting to point out that this is not the first time the
concept appears in the literature. In a work of speculative mechanistic
psychology of 1818, significantly subtitled 'The Modern Prometheus',
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Mary Shelley (1818) makes her famous creation say: "It is with consid¬
erable difficulty that I remember the original era of my being: all the
events of that period appear confused and indistinct. A strange multi¬
plicity of sensations seized me, and I saw, felt, heard and smelt, at
the same time; and it was indeed, a long time before I learned to dis¬
tinguish between the operations of my various senses."
We can spare our victim from much more anguish, and allow the
evening to pass quickly by.
Suffice it' to say that he listened for a while to records
(Delboeuf's and Guyau's models of auditory memory) ... and went out.
He returned later to light the lamp ("In an Edison lamp the light which
is emitted from the burner may be said indifferently to be caused by
the number of vibrations per second going on in the carbon, or by the
temperature of the carbon ... Similarly a train of thought may be said
indifferently to be caused by brain-action or by mind-action; for ex
hypothesi, the one could not take place without the other." Romanes),
taking care to cover the caged budgie (Plato's birdcage model of memory
... "now let us make in each soul a kind of aviary"), whilst reading
a book (for copious illustrations see next chapter).
It only remains then to our victim to ablute himself before retir¬
ing. Unfortunately, he is not even safe from the prying modelling mind
of the psychologist even as he pulls the bath-plug. It was Francis
Galton who devised a model of the mind where the unconscious was model-
I
]^ed by the sewage system and power lines beneath our homes: "Introspec¬
tion", he wrote, "gave me an interesting and unexpected view of the
number of operations of the mind, and of the obscure depths in which
they took place, of which I had been little conscious before. The
general impression they have left upon me is like that which many of us
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have experienced, when the basement of our house happens to be under
thorough sanitary repairs, and we realise for the first time the com¬
plex system of drains and gas and water pipes, flues, bell wires and so
forth, upon which our comfort depends, but which are usually hidden out
of sight, and with whose existence, as long as they acted well, we had
never troubled ourselves."
This surely must be the end ... you cannot go any lower than the
foundations. Well ... yes you can. We will finish off with perhaps
the most backhanded of compliments to the psychologist in terms of what
he studies ... that of Karl Vogt (1845-9)» who wrote: "Thought stands
in the same relation to the brain, as ... urine does to the kidneys."
This remark, made in a letter, was widely circulated and raised a
furore of horrified criticism. Vogt himself admitted his aphorism was
expressed "a bit crudely", as would have been realised had he been fully
quoted, but stuck to his main point, that "all those capacities that we
understand by the phrase 'psychic activities' are but functions of the
brain substance"; this point was, of course, frequently missed in the
uproar.
If, as Longuet Higgins (1968) has written in a different connection,
I
there is a "lurking thought that machines which imitate our brains are
for some reason to be taken more seriously than machines which imitate
our arms or even our kidneys", how are we to react to the suggestion
that the brain itself is a machine which imitates our bodily functions?
The answer is, historically at least, very seriously indeed.
Biichner (1870) talked of the soul as "a special way of expressing
the force of life, determined by the characteristic construction of the
brain", and asserted that the "same force that digests by means of the
stomach, thinks through the brain."
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Slightly earlier (1824) however, the most explicit use of the
secretion model of thought had been made by Cabanis.
Cabanis argued that "In order to form a correct idea of the oper¬
ations which give rise to thought, one must look upon the brain, as a
special organ, which is particularly designed to produce it, in the
same way that the stomach and the intestines are designed for perform¬
ing digestion, the liver for filtering the bile ..." He compared impres¬
sions reaching the brain to foods reaching the stomach ... both stimu¬
late their respective organs to activity, and "the organic movements"
by which the functions of each organ are perfoiroed, are equally unknown.
"We see the foods drop into this viscus, having certain qualities
of their own; we see them emerge from it with new qualities, and we
conclude that it has in fact changed them in this manner. We see
equally that impressions reach the brain by the intermediary of the
nerves, they are at that time, isolated, disorganised., The viscus enters
into action; it acts on them, and soon they reappear metamorphosed into
ideas which the language of facial expression and of gesture, or the
signs of speech and writing, manifest outwardly. We conclude with the
same certainty that the brain in some sense digests the impressions;
that it organically produces the secretion of thought."
In 1856, Adolf Harless published a play - a satire on the whole
materialist neuro-psychological enterprise. The play, Goethe im Fegfeuer,
was subtitled, mockingly, Eine materialisch-poetische Gehirnssekretion
(a materialistico-poetical brain-secretion) I I hope the reader will
not conclude that all I have been doing in this chapter is, like Harless,
taking the thinking out of psychological models.
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CHAPTER TEN
THE STOREHOUSE OF PAST IMPRESSIONS.
"I consider that a man's brain originally is like
a little empty attic and you have to stock it with
such functions as you choose. A fool takes in all
the lumber of every sort that he comes across ...
now the skilled workman is very careful indeed as
to what he takes into his brain-attic. He will
have nothing but the tools which may help him in
doing his work, but of these he has a large assort¬
ment, and all in the most perfect order. It is a
mistake to think that the little room has elastic
walls and can distend to any extent. Depend upon
it that there comes a time when for every addition
of knowledge you forget something that you knew




Philosophers have been known to assert that 'normal' psychological
phenomena need, no explanation; only the unusual, the unexpected - that
is, departures from the norm - can be called to give an account of them¬
selves (Hamlyn, 1957). As remarks about the scope of theories in science
such claims are, of course, preposterous (see Grice, 1961, and Fodor,
1968, for rather more elaborate dismissals); but reconstrued as an ob¬
servation about the historical development of scientific interest in
human behaviour the position acquires considerable validity. As Chomsky
(1968) has noted 'One difficulty in the psychological sciences lies in
the familiarity of the phenomena with which they deal. A certain intel¬
lectual effort is required to see how such phenomena can pose serious
problems or call for intricate explanatory theories. One is inclined
to take them for granted as necessary or somehow "natural".' But this
complacency is more difficult to maintain when our attention is drawn
to extreme cases of a 'natural' human ability. Whilst it is by no means
always true that "the psychologist who desires to analyse a faculty of
the mind has his wish answered if he meets a creature who possesses this
faculty to an eminent degree" (Duhem, 1914)> 0UT curiosity _is_ aroused by
individuals whose capabilities seem to be far greater, or far smaller,
than our own.
Aspects of memory - Historic studies of remembering and forgetting.
So it is when, in his Natural History, the elder Pliny (23-79 A.D.)
reviews the data on memory, that 'boon most necessary for life' . First,
those men who excel are mentioned: "King Syrus could give their names
to all the soldiers in his army, Lucius Scipio knew the names of the
whole Roman people ... Charmadas recited the contents of any volumes in
libraries that anyone asked him to quote, just as if he were reading them,
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Next are described those cases where 'diseases and accident' have resul¬
ted in a striking diminuition of ability: "One who fell from a very high
roof forgot his mother and his relatives and friends, another when ill
forgot his servants also; the orator Messala Corvinus forgot his own
name." Having recounted these differences between individuals, Pliny
concludes by observing that analogous variation exists within an indi¬
vidual and is dependent upon the psychological and physiological state
of the persons "Similarly tentative and hesitating lapses of memory often
occur when the body even when uninjured is in repose; also the gradual
approach of sleep curtails the memory and makes the unoccupied mind won¬
der where it is."
Such variations in the power to recall have no doubt been noticed
and remarked upon by men ever since there were men. But noticing and
theorizing are rather different occupations. Psychological theory in
the modern sense of the teim was created when, in the aftermath of the
Ionian enlightenment, the Atomists and the school of Hippocrates made
the psyche, its sensations and cognitions into a physical object. This
was achieved by turning man's technology into a metaphor for the struc¬
ture of the universe and eventually of man himself. As Hippocrates (46O-
t
375 B.C.) puts it: "Men do not understand how to observe the invisible
by means of the visible. Their techniques resemble the physiological
processes of man but men do not know this. (T)hough men understand the
technical processes, they fail to understand the natural processes imi¬
tated by the techniques." (The translation is from Farrington, 1947) •
A panoramic impression of psychological theory as a set of 'machines of
the mind' is given in Marshall (1977)5 here we will concentrate on but




The construction of the dominant models.
The foundations of the theory of memory were laid, somewhat fortu¬
itously, when in 477 B.C. the poet Simonides identified the mangled bo¬
dies at Scopas' banquet by recalling the places at which the guests had
been sitting. It was in this highly unfortunate fashion that the Ars
memorie artificiali began. Later poets and orators borrowed from
Simonides this technique of training the faculty of remembrance by pla¬
cing on an orderly sequence of prelearnt architectural locales the images
they wished to commit to memory (Yates, 1966). One should realize, how¬
ever, that for Simonides his discovery was merely the lucky invention of
a technique, a method. And as a technique it has proved remarkably effi¬
cient to this very day; Patten (1972), for example, has reported how the
ancient mnemonic system can be used to help patients with memory defects
consequent upon cerebral lesions. But the crucial step from a theoreti¬
cal point of view occurred when, in the afteimath of Hippocrates' 'physi-
calization' of psychology, a variety of structural models were elaborated
from Simonides' accidental discovery. It had become possible to think of
memories as 'objects', objects having a size and a place. In order to
count as memories, events, though past, must be stored, and hence be po-
tentially available - by being taken out of store - at dates later than
the time of original occurrence - when they were 'laid down'. The way
to a general theory of storage was prepared by Empedocles (495-435 B.C.),
who conjectured that sight is merely an extended version of touch, and
by Democritus (46O-36O B.C.), who guessed that the images of objects
'moulded' the air through which they travelled en route to the eyes.
(An excellent discussion of this background will be found in Beare1906).
Thus it was that Plato (427-347 B.C.), in the Theaetetus, and his gra¬
duate student Aristotle (584-322 B.C.), in De Memoria et Reminiscentia
I
178.
could extend and develop the Atomists' notions by suggesting that sen¬
sory images may impress themselves upon the mind as a signet ring may
leave its impression in a block of wax.
Plato's metaphor - "Suppose, then, I beg, for the sake of argument,
that we have in our souls a waxen tablet ..." - allows for the possibi¬
lity of quantitative measurements of memory along a number of (qualita¬
tively distinct) dimensions. The tablet in one mind may be larger or
smaller than that in another, it may be more or less pliable, and it
may be more or less pure (that is, contain few or many imperfections
which will distort the impression of the seal). Plato summarizes his
position as followss "... whatever is imprinted, this we remember and
know, as long as its image remains; but when it is effaced, or can be
no longer imprinted, we forget and do not know it." The operation of
)
the system is fairly crude, consisting merely of template matching.
When we try to recognize or remember 'things that we have seen or heard,
or have ourselves thought of' we simply place the previously impressed
block 'under our perceptions and thoughts'. If a match can be found,
then the object is recognized. False positives arise when an approxi¬
mately matching stimulus is taken as a perfectly fitting one, an error
I
Plato likens to putting one's shoes on the wrong feet.
Plato then proceeds to explain individual differences in terms of
his model. If the block is small, then images will fall on top of each
other and the templates will become confused with each other; similar
distortions will arise when the wax is 'stony or full of earth or mixed
mud'. The variable of hardness is particularly interesting because it
enables Plato to draw the distinction between learning and memory. If
the wax is hard, the subject will find learning difficult; many trials
* will be necessary to make an impression on the wax. But once the
179.
impression is stamped in it will persist with relatively little loss of
definition over time. If, on the contrary, the wax is soft, the person
can be easily taught, but he will also forget quickly as the pliable
image become indistinct. Aristotle was later to argue that the short¬
ness of memory in children is due to the soft, moist nature of their
brains; by contrast, he claimed that the inability of the old to learn
new facts is due to the rigidity and hardness of the elderly brain.
Later still, Gratoroli (1562) was to propose that yet other individual
differences could be interpreted in terms of the models "There be fewe
founde that are indewed with a good witte and an excellent Memorie of
Nature; for because that witte betokeneth a subtile and softe substance
of the braine, and Memorie a permanent substance."
This dimension of the theory was neatly captured by Alexander Pope
when he wrote in his best male chauvinist pig style;
"Nothing so true as what you once let fall,
Most Women have no Character at all.
Matter too soft a lasting mark to bear,
And best distinguished by black, brown, or fair."
And a little later, James Harris (1751) added a further temporal or devel¬
opmental component to the model. Harris notes that the consistency of
the wax is the crucial part of Plato's theory - "... the Wax would not
be adequate to its business of Signature, had it not a Power to retain,
as well as to receive." The receptive power Harris calls sense, and the
retentive power imagination. He then broaches the interesting question:
What would it be like to have sense without imagination? And, the answer
borrowed from Aristotle's De Memoria, is that it would be like making
impressions on water, "where tho' all impressions may be instantly made,
yet as soon as made they are as instantly lost". (Some more recent
speculations on this form of iconic and echoic memory of very brief
duration will be found in Sperling, "i960, arid Crowder and Morton, 1969.)
Harris accordingly calls sense "a kind of transient Imagination" and
imagination "a kind of permanent Sense". The imagination, then, has
the power to convert a transient state into a permanent one. Harris
continues: "Now as our Feet in vain venture to walk upon the River, till
the Frost bind the Current, and harden the yielding Surface; so does
the Soul in vain seek to exert its higher Powers, the Powers I mean of
Reason and Intellect, till Imagination first fix the fluency of Sense,
and thus provide a proper Basis for the support of its higher Energies."
(Later versions of 'consolidation* theory, as Harris' metaphor is' now
called, will be found in Muller and Pilzecker, 1900, and in Deutsch,
1973.)
Plato's first model, the wax block, provides us with a superb con¬
ceptualization of one aspect of memory - recognition memory. It expres¬
ses one way in which a stimulus seen for the second time can be recog¬
nized as the same stimulus as that presented the first time. The model
is less suggestive as a way of approaching the ideas of storage and re¬
call. Plato accordingly develops a second metaphor - the birdcage model;
this is the notion of memory as an aviary: "... now let us make in each
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soul a kind of aviary of all sorts of birds, some being in flocks, apart
from others, and others few together, and others alone ..."
This enables Plato to speak of knowledge as "possessing them (them =
birds = ideas) in that aviary", to call learning the process of receiv¬
ing birds into the'(previously empty) aviary, and to call teaching trans¬
ferring the birds from one cage ( = mind) to another. For the later
development of psychology, however, it is more crucial to note that the
model enables one to draw a firm distinction between storage and retrieval.
As Plato puts it, the bird can be in the cage without one necessarily
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being able to catch it instantaneously and at will; that is to say,
"catching is of two kinds, one before possessing for the sake of poss¬
essing, the other when one already obtained possession for the purpose
of having in the hands what was already possessed." This second type
of 'catching' is critical, of course, for it shows how errors might
arise in the retrieval process, "as it were taking a pigeon that he
possessed instead of a dove."
The concept of a memory store emerges, then, fully fledged in Plato, " .
and continues in an unbroken line to the present day. Cicero (106-43
B.C.), in his Be Oratore, remarks that "Memory is the treasurehouse of
all things"; John Locke (16^2-1704), in his Essay Concerning Human
Understanding, is rather more frugal when he writes that memory"is as
it were the storehouse of our ideas", and Henry Head (1920) specifies
the location of memorial capacitys "The sensory cortex is the storehouse
of past impressions."
By flipping backwards and forwards between Plato's two models the
full range of modern answers to the question "Why does memory sometimes
fail?" is generated; memory may fail because the percept or idea never
got into the store in the first place (Treisman, 1964); it did get in
but then disappeared, either through spontaneous decay or natural wear
and tear (Brown, 1958); it got in but was then destroyed by some other
object being dumped on top of it (Sperling, i960); it got in but was
pushed out by some later arriving stimulus (Cermak, 1976); it got in
and is still there but the storeman cannot find it amidst the rest of
the junk (Underwood,;..1957) •
Thomas Reid (1719-96), in his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of
Man, notes that it is "very natural to express the operations of the mind
by images taken from things material". Indeed it is, but Reid
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unfortunately fails to note the value of so doing, namely, that it ena¬
bles one to conceive of making quantitative measurements of the powers
of the mind. The Greeks did not themselves wish to indulge in anything
quite so vulgar as this, of course, but they did provide the models £
which enabled later scholars to do so. In a similar fashion to Reid,
Ebbinghaus (1885) has remarked that in order "to express our ideas con¬
cerning the physical basis of memory we use different metaphors -
stored up ideas, engraved images, well-beaten paths". And again like
Reid, he is sceptical of these models: "there is only one thing certain
about all these figures of speech and that is that they are not suitable."
The scepticism may be justified, but it is difficult to see why
Ebbinghaus conducted the particular experiments that he did if it was
not to put quantitative flesh on the bones of Plato's 'stamping in' model.
Certainly, Ebbinghaus' contemporaries took him to be proposing a
new branch of psychometry, not a new theory. As Joseph Jacobs (1885)
commented at the time, Ebbinghaus' experiments were "remarkable .
more for their methods than their results". The results, said Jacobs,
"... scarcely seemed calculated to set the Spree on fire".
Ebbinghaus' primary concern, then, was with measurement and control;
he was one of the first scholars to demonstrate that associative learn¬
ing processes could be captured and quantified in a laboratory setting.
Ebbinghaus' more general aim - "to get a foothold for the application
of the method of .the natural sciences" - involved him with all the fam¬
iliar paraphernalia of the modern laboratory of experimental psychology.
He was careful to establish stable, controlled experimental conditions,
learning his stimulus items to the beat of a metronome; he attempted to
standardize both procedure (by his invention of the 'anticipation' method)
and material (by the use of nonsense syllables). The intent of this
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latter innovation was to ensure that subjects did not bring differing
degrees of familiarity with the experimental material to the learning
task. However, the contribution was not, and is not, appreciated by
all psychologists, many of whom consider that asking subjects to repeat
such syllables _is utter nonsense. The basic problem of course, is that
all subjects (with the possible exception of Ebbinghaus himself) bring
to the task the ability to import meaning into nonsense by crafty
mnemonic devices. Subjects may well differ in this ability more than
they differ in familiarity with ordinary language material.
The nature of Ebbinghaus' results; that the number of trials re¬
quired to learn increases veiy rapidly as the material increases in
length; that the curve of forgetting falls rapidly at first, then more
slowly; that overlearning is proportionally related to extent of remem¬
bering; and that repetitions separated in time ('spaced') are more
effective than when crammed together ('massed') is, as Jacobs remarked,
unexciting. The precise, numerical parameters of these effects are,
however, of paramount importance for the construction of finely detailed,
fully explicit models. (Murray, 1976, provides a superb review of this
aspect of Ebbinghaus' work.)
None the less, Ebbinghaus' contributions were almost entirely quan¬
titative and methodological. In terms of technique, his introduction
of the relearning method, and the associated use of saving scores to
infer 'below threshold' retention are major innovations. When learnt
material had been totally lost to conscious recall, Ebbinghaus was able
to demonstrate 'unconscious' retention by showing that the information
could be reacquired in fewer trials than were originally needed for
learning. But in terms of conceptual advance, he took not a step beyond
the Platonic tablet. As Ebbinghaus writes in section 31> "If the
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relearning is performed, a second, third, or.a greater number of times,
the series are more deeply engraved and fade out less easily"!
It is a curious fact about both the wax block and the storehouse
metaphors that they have a mysteriously seductive power for those scho¬
lars who deny their usefulness. Thus Bartlett (1932) objected to Henry
Head's use of the latter metaphor. Bartlett claimed that "a storehouse
is a place where things are put in the hope that they may be found again
when they are wanted exactly as they were when first stored away". That
this 'hope' is not always fulfilled can be easily verified by anyone who
leaves chopped liver in a warm cupboard for a few days. Bartlett'did,
of course, try to break out of the storehouse by revitalizing (and re¬
interpreting) Kant and Head's notion of 'schema'. A schema for Bartlett
purported to be a "living ... constantly developing ... active organiza¬
tion of past reactions or of past experiences" and he believed that "the
storehouse notion is as far removed from this as it well could be". Yet
as Mary Northway (1940) points out, "although Bartlett states that he
is considering remembering as an active reorganizing process, in many
of the cases he gives, the idea of memory as a 'storehouse' seeps in only
too easily." Currently, Bartlett is often cited in support of the notion
that 'much of what is remembered is reconstructed from stored fragments'
(Podor, 1975). Just so ... but this is not to impugn the storehouse
metaphor at all, it is merely to offer a variation on its contents.
A non-random walk through the great library.
Meditation upon the consequences of the storehouse view of memory
led directly to the emergence of the major conceptual model that has
guided modern studies. We have seen how Plato distinguished storage
and retrieval, and was then able to imagine the possibility of retrieval
failure to error. Such retrieval miscalculations are presumably dependent,
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in part at least, upon the nature of what is stored and the manner in
which it is stored. If all the birds are black, then it will be all too
easy to retrieve the wrong bird; if some are white, others gray, red,
blue and so forth, then such mistakes should be less likely. If a bird
is close to the entrance then it should be easy to grab it; if the bird
is far away then one may fail to reach it. If all birds of one type tend
to cluster together in one particular part of the aviary, then one knows
'where to look' for them; if the birds are randomly distributed, then no
such reduction of the 'search' space will be possible. We see, then,
how the idea of pro- and retroactive inhibition arises, and with it the
notion that 'recollecting is, as it were, a kind of search' (Aristotle,
De Memoria). Once this position is reached the concept of organization
becomes critical for all later theorizing. The key questions are now:
"According to what principles are memories stacked in the store?" (throw¬
ing the goods into the warehouse at random can only lead to chaos); and
"According to what principles do we search through the store?" (search¬
ing in a haphazard fashion is likely to be grossly inefficient).
At this point, the metaphors of the storehouse and the wax tablet
on which the scholar can draw or write finally merge into one; Cicero
(De Oratore) complete the link with the original technique of memory
improvement by equating Simonides' places with the wax tablet and the
images with the letters written upon it.
Such written documents both preserve past ideas and events and are
themselves preserved in the great libraries of the Hellenic world
(Parsons, 1952). Once a collection reaches a critical size it must be
organized in a principled fashion if it is to fulfil its scholarly or
bureaucratic functions. Aristotle - who must have catalogued his own
large private collection (Norris, 1959) - took over the terminology of
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the place (topoi) theory of memory to refer to general patterns of
argument, subject headings (or topics) under which a variety of instances
fall (Sorabji, 1972). This new theory - that memory is a well laid-out
and well indexed library - was ably summarized by Kant (1798): "Most of
all, the use of topics - that is, of a framework for universal concepts,
called general headings (loci topici) - makes remembering easier, by
dividing the material into classes, as when we arrange the books in a
library on shelves with different labels." (The translation is by Gregor,
1974).
The most elaborate version of the library hypothesis was produced
by Bowen (1877)? most modern accounts of 'semantic memory' build upon
one or more aspects of this model, and it is therefore worth quoting
Bowen at some length:
"Many educated persons ... know enough of at least four
languages, Latin, French, German or Italian, and English
to be able to read any common book in either of them with
about equal facility. The whole number of English words,
not including purely technical terms or mere derivatives,
is at least 40,000; and that portion of the vocabulary of
either of the other three languages, which is at the com¬
mand of a well-educated foreigner, is probably half as large.
Among the treasures of memory in such a mind, therefore,
must be reckoned at least 100,000 mere words, all of which,
with some trifling exceptions for onomatopoeia, are symbols
as arbitrary as the signs in algebra. What a countless
multitude of individual facts and familiar truths in science
and ordinary life are either wrapped up in these words, or
exist side by side with them, in any well-informed mindl
Certainly such a mind is far more richly stocked with words
< and ideas than the British Museum is with books. That ad¬
mirably managed institution,suffering from an embarrassment
of riches, maintains a full staff of well-trained librarians;
and each of them, after rummaging the catalogue and the shelves
for perhaps ten minutes, will triumphantly produce any volume
that may be called for. But the single invisible librarian,
who awaits our orders in the crowded chambers of Memory, is
far more speedy and skilful in his service. A student reads
a page of French or German in a minute, and for each of the
two or three hundred groups of hieroglyphics printed on it,
'the Unconscious' instantly furnishes us whatever we call for,
either its meaning, or its etymology, or its English equiv¬
alent, or its grammatical relations to other groups in the
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same sentence, or any of the associated ideas in a little
world of knowledge of which this one word forms the centre.
We have no conscious clew with which to direct ourselves in
the search; it is enough that we have an interest in the
point to be remembered, that we need it for the work which
is at hand, and instantly it is produced out of the vast
repository."
A wax tablet obviously allows either drawings or writings to be inscri¬
bed on it, and these two forms of notation are taken over into the lib¬
rary model. We thus find both a verbal lexicon (Morton, 1970) and a
visual eidolikon (Seymour, 1973) co-existing, albeit not always peaceably
(Pylyshyn, 1973), within the 'great library'. St. Augustine (in his
Confessions) remarks that only some thoughts (or 'internal representa¬
tions' , to use the currently fashionable euphemism) are stored in the
form of visual images whilst others are stored in propositional form.
A considerable proportion of nineteenth and twentieth century work on
the library model has been devoted to arguing that different types of
stacking arrangements are used for the two types of material, verbal and
visuo-spatial, that make up the contents of the library. One of the more
breathtaking hypotheses of recent times has been the claim that the left
wing of the library contains verbal images and the right wing visuo-
spatial ones (Eughlings Jackson, 1874)°
It has usually been conjectured that the most prevalent form of
organization for (meaningful) verbal items is a tree structure which
branches from general to more and more special terms (see Ramus, 1578?
for discussion). The internal architecture of the library thus becomes an
n-dimensional pyramid stretching from superordinate categories on the top
floor to subordinate categories on progressively lower and lower floors.
The structure of the store has always been deduced from retrieval errors,
on the assumption that erroneous responses will be items that are stored
close to the objects that should have been retrieved. It is widely held
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that cerebral damage may lead to local perturbations of stacking. Thus
Thomson (1907) writes; "... after some brain shock. < person may be able
to speak, but the wrong word often vexatiously comes to his lips, just
as if his Broca shelves had been jumbled." A strictly spatial interpre¬
tation of the theory was, however, sometimes felt to be mildly problem¬
atic on physiological grounds; it was somewhat puzzling to imagine how
the brain could achieve such an orderly addressing system. Thus Gesner
(1770) noted the prevalance of semantic paraphasias in some of his pa¬
tients (they, for instance, say "Good evening" when they mean "Good morn¬
ing") and he also .observed that certain classes of words (for instance,
abstract nouns) were more liable to be lost than others. The spatial
theory did not appeal to him, however, on the grounds that "The vessels
of the brain are surely not arranged in accordance with categories of
physical ideas and therefore it is incomprehensible that these categories
should correspond to areas of destruction."
Such neurological qualms have, of course, never inhibited the experi¬
mentalist, who could see a way of converting space in the model to time
that he could directly measure. And in any case, even stranger things
are known to occur in the endothelium of the cornea (Bard et al., 1975)5
I
and in the optic tectum (Keating et al., 1975)*
The reasoning of the experimentalists (Cattell, 1887; Cattell and
Bryant, 1889; Colling and Quillian, 19^9) builds upon Aristotle's idea
of search and runs as follows: Imagine that places are marked in the
library and that the relationships (pathways) between places are also
marked. If we give a starting point and a (two-place) relationship to
the subject we ought to be able to measure how long it takes him to tra¬
verse the pathway to the item(s) which is (are) linked to it. For
example, given the relationship 'is a' and the term 'dog', we can measure
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the time taken to complete the proposition "A dog is a ..." with the
term "animal". Alternatively, we can give examples of true ("A canary
is a bird") and false ("A duck is a plant") propositions and measure
the time taken to evaluate the truth-function of such statements. The
assumption is that we can work out the Euclidian and/or city block metrics
of the library's internal structure by taking reaction times in the
above fashion. As Aristotle put its "There is no need to consider how
we remember what is distant, but only what is neighbouring, for clearly
the method is the same." Much of the geometry and topology of the lib¬
rary was worked out in this fashion by Wilhelm Wundt and his colleagues
at Leipzig (see Marshall, 1970, for discussion and references), and the
method has recently become popular again (see, for example, Loftus et
al., 1970? Meyer and"'Schvaneveldt, 1976). It is customary today to
think of the library as incorporating a set of sub-geometries appropri¬
ate to different-conceptual domains. This idea works particularly well
for so called 'semantic memory'. For example, a tree structure seems
appropriate for many of the set and superset relationships involved in
the hierarchical classifications used in animal and plant taxonomies;
•f" +
on the other hand, a cube with the faces marked by - sex, - co-lineal,
and - descendant has often been regarded as the appropriate structure
for classifying the eight basic kinship terms of English (Wood and Shotter,
1973, have provided a very neat reaction-time justification for this
latter claim.)
Another beautiful example of the relationship between space and
time has recently arisen in the study of immediate memory. Recall that
many scholars have postulated that the library has a small entrance
wjiich can hokd a limited number, 7 - 2 on average (Miller, 1956a), of
recent acquisitions for a limited period of time. This number, the so
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called 'span' of immediate memory (Jacobs, 1887), varies slightly as a
function of the type of information which is put into store. Digit span
is a little higher than letter span which is in turn higher than word
span which is in turn higher than nonsense syllable span. Nonsense syl¬
lables, then, take up more space in the anteroom than do digits. From
studies which utilize Sternberg's memory scanning technique, Cavanagh
(1972) has discovered a linear relation between scanning rate (milli¬
seconds per item) for these classes and the reciprocals of their memory
span values. One can imagine no more elegant a demonstration of the
power of the storehouse metaphor.
But let us leave the anteroom and return to the main body of the
library. We are now in a position to see the paradigm as a whole. The
notion of a library as a general framework must be supplemented by the
details of storage-arrangements and retrieval strategies. The classical
laws of association theory were intended to provide precisely those de¬
tails; associationism formulated the principles which determined the
distribution of elements which entered the system, and hence the princi¬
ples of effective search. A sequence of associations is thus a path
through the great library. Harris (1751) writes: "... the Road, which
leads to Memory thro' a series of Ideas, however connected whether ra¬
tionally or'casually, this is RECOLLECTION."
Three classes of associative principles are usually recognized.
In the terminology of Abercrombie (1857) these ares
I Natural or philosophical association
II Local or incidental association
III Arbitrary or fictitious association.
In the first class, items are connected rationally; proximity of elements
is a function of logical or semantic structure.
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In the second class, items are connected by accident of time or
place; elements are entered together by virtue of their temporal or
spatial contiguity in the flow of events. In the third class are to
be found those artificial transformations or mnemonics whereby associa¬
tions are produced by "... a voluntary effort of the mind". Abercrombie
reports that Feinagle managed to remember the birthdate of Henry IV
(1566) by changing it into letters (mff) and then transforming that
string into the word 'muff I
Aristotle drew a sharp dividing line between class I (logical or
thesauric arrangements) and the other classes; these latter fortuitous
connections were the only ones that he referred to as associations. It
is of course, pleasing to observe that this fundamental distinction is
once again coming to be honoured even in experimental investigations
(Fischler, 1977)»
Expansion, contraction and coding within the library.
We have stressed in the previous section the notion of efficient
storage and search, in which the strategies used in the latter process
should match the principles employed in the former. Many scholars have
argued that rational structures are preferable to fortuitous ones and
Singer (1976) has drawn attention to Locke's claim that "association
was a process which interfered with rational thought and in excess could
lead to madness".
Efficient search procedures are, of course, of supreme importance
in the case where there resides in an ancient and extensive library the
only 'copy' of a precious manuscript. (Recall Bowen's remark about the
efficiency of the staff of the British Museum.) This unique object
can be in only one place at one time, although it may be transferred
from one place to another.
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In a similar fashion, searchers for the 'engrain' (Semon, 1923;
Lashley, 1950), or neural locus of learnt information have conjectured
that particular experiences or knowledge are stored in a unique locale
in the central nervous system. Lashley (1950) remarks that many inves¬
tigators, including Henschen (1920-22), had proposed " ... the loca¬
tion of single ideas or memories in single cells". (Searching for such
an idea is presumably analogous to looking for a needle in a haystack.)
If the lateral aspects of the temporal lobes are stimulated with the
fine tip of an electrode it is found that recall of complex sequences
of past events may be elicited from discrete points (Penfield, 1968).
And some scholars believe that skills and concepts may become transfer¬
red to other parts of the brain consequent upon damage to their prior
and proper locale. The general validity of the notion of "... shifting
and changing place in the Repository or Organ of Memoiy ..." (Hooke,
1682) is still debated, however.
Considerable interest has always been aroused by the varied possi¬
bilities of transferring information within and even between brains.
In the original experiments on this latter topic, mathematical knowledge
was transferred in the following manner: "The proposition and demonstra¬
tion were fairly written on a thin paper, with ink composed of a cepha-
lick tincture. This the student was to swallow upon a fasting stomach,
and for three days following eat nothing but bread and water. As the
water digested, the tincture mounted to his brain, bearing the proposi¬
tion along with it" (Swift, 1755)°
It has been reported that advances in technique now permit "fear of
the dark", "left-right discrimination", "suppression of the startle
response", "black-white discrimination" and many other simple concepts
*
or behaviours to be moved from one brain to another by means related to
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Swift's proposal. A complex nucleic acid or protein is extracted from
the brain of a donor animal (which, for example, already fears the dark)
and injected into the brain of a recipient, which as a consequence is
itself now afraid of the dark. (A calm appraisal of some of this work
will be found in Gurowitz, 1969.) To some extent, such fancies have
been rendered more plausible by Hering's hypothesis (1870) that "...
the phenomena of memory and of heredity have a common source" (Butler,
1880).
Finding a single nerve cell or molecule in the brain presupposes
that the search strategies employed are highly efficient. There is,
0
however, one situation where clever searches may, as it were, not be
worth the effort. The situation is where there are many identical
objects of search, multiple copies, any one of which will meet the
requirements of the seeker. Theories of memory can accordingly 'trade
off' the efficiency of search against the number of replicas that are
stored, and so preserve on the right-hand side of the equation a con¬
stant, empirically determined time for retrieving a certain piece of
information.
The notion of verbal facsimiles arises when (conscientious) scribes
copy a manuscript; the notion of pictorial replicas arises when artists
take a series of prints from a woodcut or an etched plate. More modern
methods of mass reproduction which have resulted in the printed book,
photographs and gramophone discs serve to weaken yet further the idea
that a stored record must be a unique object. These new cultural objects
were incorporated into psychological theory in the nineteenth century.
Delboeuf (1880) suggested that 'L'ame est un cahier de feuilles phono-
graphiques' and Guyau (1880) elaborated an extensive theory of auditory
memory from this metaphor; Bumham (1888) summarized a range of models
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for visual memory based upon an analogy with photography.
It was Freud (1896) who then seized upon the idea of multiple copies
that was so important in the commercial possibilities of the new techno¬
logy . He writes to Fliess that " ... what is essentially new about my
theory is the thesis that memory is present not once but several times
over ... ".
This attractive concept does, however, have drawbacks of its own.
Recall that for Freud the memories in question are physical objects -
configurations of neural nets - and that the brain is finite in size.
(Earlier notions to the effect that the soul was infinitely extended in
space and time held little attraction for nineteenth-century materialists.)
The disadvantage, then, is that if very many copies are made there may
be too little space in which to store them whilst yet allowing room for
the registration and storage of new information. The problems of over¬
printing are already explicit in Plato's wax block; proponents of mnem¬
onic techniques similarly warned against the dangers of overcrowding:
"We must take heed that we overcharge not our memory ... the number of
things that may be committed at once unto a man's memory by this Art,
are six and thirty, which are abundantly sufficient for the memory, to
be charged withaii at once" (Willis, 1621).
Hooke's lectures to the Royal Society in 1682 contained some elab¬
orate calculations on the number of impressions that the organ of memory
might contain (Waller, 1705). Hooke postulates a generative centre for
concepts, and around it "... a certain Sphere of Capacity fill'd with
adapted Matter, for the Formation, Reception, and containing of all the
Ideas which shall be emitted from the said Center." He continues:
"These Ideas I will suppose to be material and bulky, that is, to be
certain Bodies of determinate bigness, and impregnated with determinate
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Motions, and to be in themselves distinct; and therefore that no two
of them can be in the same space ...".
Hooke computes an upper bound on the number of thoughts and impre¬
ssions that "... a Man of ordinary Constitution" may form and "store up
in his Repository". The figure he arrives at is "a thousand Millions
of distinct Ideas"; but this is based on a life span of a century and
the formation of 2.25 ideas a second throughout that time. A more rea¬
listic lower bound is needed. Hobbes considers what proportion of time
is lost through Sleep, Infancy, Old Age, Sickness, and Inadvertency,
and what proportion of the ideas that are formed nevertheless fail to
obtain a permanent place in the repository. His final conclusion is
that the number of ideas stored is somewhere between 3>652,500 and
10,957»500, smaller admittedly thanihe original estimate but still a
formidable library to house in one little brain.
Hooke mentions the fact of individual differences in memory capa¬
city, but it was left to Gall (1791) to suggest the most straightforward
explanation. Gall hypothesized that the size of the cortical organ res¬
ponsible for the faculty was directly correlated with the individual's
talent for remembering. Inferences from the size of a cortical area in
a particular person to his relative psychological ability have recently
become popular again (see Geschwind, 1972).
But a more interesting solution to the problem of limited space
may be found in the notion of coding. Whenever space, time, or money
is at a premium it is usually possible to find a more compact version
of a message - a short code - which nonetheless enables all the infor¬
mation in the original to be retrieved. One of the first short codes
was intended to be deployed on the wax tablets that inspired Plato's
first model of memoiy. We-have already mentioned that in an attempt to
\
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merge Simonid.es1 technique with Plato's theory, Cicero suggested that
the places could he regarded as a writing tablet and the images as the
letters inscribed thereon. The inscription of full forms is, however,
rather inefficient when time and space are limited; Cicero therefore
introduced to Rome the new technique of writing shorthand symbols or
notes (notae), and he took this innovation over into the theory and
practice of remembering.
Tachygraphy accordingly became the first model of a short code
that both speeded the intake of information and economized on the stor¬
age capacity required in the organ of memory (Milne, 1954? Yates, 1966).
Cicero was also involved in the development of the other great
class of techniques that led to modern concepts of infoimation-transmission
and storage; the methods deployed in the art of cryptography (Pratt,
1959)« Transposition ciphers were known to the Greeks and the substi¬
tution cipher was invented in the time of the late Roman Republic.
Ciphers, however, do not economize upon either transmission-time or
storage-space| the history of warfare, diplomacy, and espionage has
accordingly seen the rapid rise of special purpose codes which "...
express more in less space" (Pratt, 1959)• example, a single letter
or digit in a code may represent a word, phrase, sentence, or even lon¬
ger message. In order to avoid the arbitrariness of simple substitution
codes, it was necessary (as it was in the evolution of shorthand) to
develop the notion of redundancy, and to devise procedures whereby fre¬
quently occurring words or letters can be expressed by short sequences
of symbols. (The code developed, for other purposes, by Samuel Morse
is a good example of the principle involved.) As Oldfield (1954) puts
it, ".o. recording with consequent economy is only possible if there are
some recurrences, uniformities or common patterns in the incoming messages."
197 •
Subsequent advances were made by telephone engineers (Shannon, 1949) and
quickly incoiporated-into the main stream of psychological theory (Miller,
I i!
1956b).
In the period between .Cicero and the advent of modern telecommuni¬
cation systems, the idea of encoding was also kept alive by the mnemoh-
ists (Grey,.1750) in an amusing inversion of the original idea. Typi¬
cally in cryptography, a sequence of words is encoded into a digit
string; but the mnemonists, of course, reversed this process, encoding
random strings of digits into meaningful words and phrases in order to
display their virtuosity in memorial power.
Once the metaphors of shorthand and cryptography had taken root
(sic), we see that recall may be construed as a 'reconstructive' pro¬
cess rather than the literal retrieval of an exact copy of the original
impression (Bartlett, 1952). Thus, for Bartlett, the rememberer (as
opposed to the memorizer) "... has an over-mastering tendency simply to
get a general impression of the whole and, on the basis of this, he con¬
structs the probable detail". This notion has recently been rediscovered
by members of the Artificial Intelligence, community who have renamed
Bartlett's schema 'frames'.
In practice, all messages are liable to error in encoding, trans¬
mission or decoding; messages that are recalled by 'imaginative recon¬
struction' (Bartlett, 1952) are presumably more prone than others to
such error. In order to obtain data on message distortion Bartlett
introduced two variations on the theme of presenting subjects with a
stoiy or picture for recall. In the first variation - repeated repro¬
duction - a subject would be asked to recall the same event over and
over again at varying time intervals; in the second variation - serial
reproduction - a chain of subjects would pass a message from one to
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another at varying time intervals. With the foimer procedure, Bartlett
found that frequent recollections at short time intervals would rapidly
become fixed in form; recollections more widely spaced in time under¬
went a process of transformation, however. The material would, for
example, become simplified and familiar detail would be substituted for
unfamiliar. Similar distortions were also found with the second pro¬
cedure; stories would become shorter, more coherent, and appeared to
retain only those characteristics readily assimilable into the back¬
ground of past experience and culture held in common by ail members of
the chain. Bartlett's work thus provides an elegant commentary on the
old story in which the message from the front line - "Send reinforce¬
ments, we're going to advance" - arrives at General Headquarters as
"Send three and fourpence, we're going to a dance".
The ubiquity of errors leads to the notion of error-detecting and
correcting codes (Hamming, 1950)? and. the proposal that one solution
to the problem of coding errors is to have the 'clear' in a number of
(uncorrelated or only partially correlated) encoded forms; the ease with
which simple codes can be broken (and must hence be changed by the sen¬
der) leads likewise to the idea of multiple representations in which the
I
same clear can be expressed in a variety of codes.
In the years between 1891 and 1896, Freud studied in considerable
detail the implications of thinking of the peripheral and central ner¬
vous system as a vast ciphering and coding machine (Marshall, 1974)•
In his monograph on aphasia, Freud (1891) characterizes the mapping of
peripheral nerve tracts to higher cortical representations by saying
that the cortex contains "... the body periphery ... as a poem contains
the alphabet, i.e. in a completely different arrangement serving other
purposes, in manifold association of the individual elements, whereby
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some may be represented several times, others not at all." He further
notes that language is "overdetermined" in the sense that the system
is represented by a variety of codes that safeguard speech against
error caused by "... loss of one or the other element".
In his studies of hemiplegia, Freud (1893) distinguishes expli¬
citly between projection paralysis in which there is a "... point by
point and element by element" mapping between the periphery and the
spinal cord (i.e. a simple cipher), and representation paralysis in
which the mapping between spinal cord and cortex is many-to-one or
one-to-many (i.e. the final set of representations can be thought of
as context-sensitive codes). In letter 52 to Fliess (Freud, 1896), he
proposes that memory-traces are "... subjected from time to time to a
re-arrangement in accordance with fresh circumstances - to a re-
transcription" .
Freud refers to these successive transcriptions of psychical mat¬
erial as "translations", and he calls the phenomenon of repression "a
failure of translation" from an unconscious memory-trace to conscious
verbal recall. The memory-model outlined in the Project (Freud, 1895)
is one of qualitatively distinct levels of representation which are
differentially available to other levels and to consciousness, and
differentially affected by error.
A record of the past is no use if it cannot be 'read'. (Recall
Freud's interest in the decipherment of unknown scripts and unidentified
languages.) A record is worse than useless if it has been falsified or
incorrectly deciphered. (Recall the evil which resulted from the trea- .
chery of Captain Esterhazy and Colonel Henry.)
Conclusions and preface.
T/Vhilst it is obvious that we have now collected far more facts about
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memory than were available to the Greeks, it is less clear that any new
theories have been put forward in recent years. Experimental research,
both psychological and physiological, in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries has been primarily devoted to working out and quantifying the
empirical consequences of a small number of metaphors that were formu¬
lated at the birth of foimal psychology. At times it has seemed that
various aspects of the models have been forgotten only to reappear again
in a flurry of data-gathering. The idea of dual-coding - verbal and vis¬
ual - is a good example of such reemergence (Paivio, 1974)» aa is the
notion of 'levels of processing' (Craik and Lockhart, 1972). New deduc¬
tions are constantly drawn from the old models. That objects which are
particularly important to on-going reasoning can be placed in an easily
accessible reading room leads to the construct of 'working memory'
(Hitch and Baddeley, 1976); likewise, the enterprise of making precies
of documents immediately they are received leads to the hypothesis that
changes in form may result not only from reconstruction at retrieval but
also from abstracting at input (Gomulicki, 1956; Zangwill, 1972).
The' possibility of combining the different models has provided some
entertaining mixed metaphors. For example, in the mid-1960s a combina¬
tion of the architectural and the coding model was briefly considered.
The theory consisted of a large anteroom, a very small corridor, and an
exceptionally large storehouse; as objects were passed from front to
back, raw sensory impressions were transmuted into a phonological code,
recycled through the corridor a few times whence they finally emerged
into the storehouse in semantic form. (Belief in this solera-system
for the making of long-term memories is no longer widespread.)
As is usual in psychology, particular aspects of memory models have
often been given a new lease of life by advances in technology. Thus
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the notion of multiple copies has recently come to the fore-front again
as a consequence of developments in optical holography. The virtues of
holograms as memory devices are transparent. Chopping (1968) lists
three: "(1) Many patterns in the storage area can be superimposed and
decoded independently. (2) Ablation of large portions of the storage
area will not drastically impair function. (5) Part of the input pattern
will serve as the code for extracting the remainder of the input pattern."
Holographic models of memory thus provide one solution to the problem
of storing multiple representations in a limited space; their current
popularity vindicates the fruitfulness of Lashley's conjecture (1929)
that neural interference patterns are a basic form of memory coding' in
the brain.
Insofar as theoretical advances have been made,they seem then to
have taken place in the area of coding theory (Von Neumann, 1958)- Of
particular importance are those aspects of coding theory that are con¬
cerned with content-addressable memories (Bigelow, 19^5» Miller, 1968),
and with the attempted specification of holographic processes realizable
l
i(n the neural realm (Westlake, 1970; Cavanagh, 1975) •
Throughout the modern period, philosophers from Plotinus (205-270
I
A.D.) to Malcolm (1977) have tried to undermine Plato's metaphors, with¬
out any great success even within the terms of their own discipline
(Rosen, 1975)- The stature of Plato's work is amply attested by its
power to have sustained empirical research for two millennia. Psychol¬
ogy is not a young science; it is merely a difficult one. Yet one may
hope that eventually someone will hit upon a radically fresh idea about




THREE CONTEMPORARY DOMESTIC MODELS.
"Against Solemnity, the best weapon is wit.
Most other weapons produce only another
dogmatic sectarian solemnity. I have tried
to avoid this danger, though I must confess




As far as theoretical cognitive psychology is concerned, then, the
organism, being a computational system, is fundamentally a machine; and
to explain it is to give the principles underlying those aspects of its
functioning construed as handling information.
■ This, it is herein suggested, is the commonly held conception of
explanation which unifies the work of all cognitive simulators, whether
they worked in 18th century France or 20th century America.
Another, inverted but equally valid, way of putting it is to say
that all machines are computational systems.
This is not an outrageously modern view. In 1887, Peirce wrote:
"eveiy machine is a reasoning machine, in as much as there are certain
relations between its parts, which relations involve other relations
that were not expressly intended ...it does not depend on the laws of
the human mind, but on the objective reason embodied in the laws of
nature." Fodor (1975) has submitted this type of view to close scrutiny
and he too concludes that any complex system which changes physical state
in some way determined by physical' laws is a computer "just insofar as
it is possible to devise some mapping which pairs physical states of
the device with formulae in a computing language in such a fashion as
to preserve desired semantic relations among the formulae."
The view under consideration suggests, then, that at the core of
the cognitive process lies a machine. Which machine? Any machine?
As Fodor & Block (unpublished ms.) have written: "if we were will¬
ing to tolerate very complicated and unnatural functions of sentences
onto physical states, practically any middle sized physical object ...
could, in principle, be employed to compute any of indefinitely many
proofs; but ... in such cases designing the semantic function would be
the real work in designing the computer."
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In this chapter, we take a passing glimpse at three everyday-
middle sized objects with an eye to their suitability as mechanical
models of cognitive capacities.
1. A Finite Chain Reasoning Machine.
A simple machine which we each use many times each day is the
lavatory cistern. How much reasoning is it possible to persuade such
a machine to perform?
Imagine an idealised cistern:-
\
Now we can label:
'A' ... 'The handle is pulled.'
'B' ... 'The dome rises.'
'C' ..
'H' ... 'The float lowers.'
'J' ... 'Valve w releases water.'
The pressure at y decreases.' 'K' ... 'The float rises.'
'D' ... 'The air pressure on surface 'L* ... 'Valve w stops releasing
is constant.'
'E' ... 'Water is forced into x.'
'F' ... 'Siphon .action commences.'
'G' ... 'Water level .drops below x.'
water.'
'M' ... 'Pressure rises in y.'
'N' ... 'Siphon action stops.'
etc.
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We are now in a position to give (an approximation towards) the (an)
underlying or logical form of the flushing loo.
i.e.
'(A-frB)
, (B —> C)















Also to he found in the system is:*
(Jv iJ) [(H & J) v (K & L)J etc.
(As can be seen, the ontology can be somewhat reduced by using negatives
*
e.g. K = iH. etc. )
Notice, we can now illustrate in the loo cistern
1) The logical operators ... &,v ~i .
2) Propositional signs A....N.
n.b. Wittgenstein (1921) wrote: "The essence of a propositional sign
is very clearly seen if we imagine one composed of spatial objects
(such as tables, chairs and books) instead of written signs.
Then the spatial arrangement of these things will express the
sense of the proposition."
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A New Cistern of Thought.
The machine is now ready to reason. All we have to do is feed in
the propositions relevant to the matter in hand, flush the cistern cal¬
culus and see what it churns out.
In a sense, of course, it is limited, for there is only one well
formed sequence of events (operations) through which it can pass. In
another sense, though, this is its strong point, for insofar as we are
certain of the physics of the machine, we are certain of its reasoning
ability.
The well formedness of its strings are guaranteed by plumbing!
Illoostration of Functioning.
It is by no means easy to find a reasoning task for which this
unique computer is (in its entirety) suited, but we can do so for frag¬
ments of its process, with the aid of a little story-telling.
Suppose we were visitors from Mars ... entirely naive as to terres¬
trial characteristics: gravity, climate, horticulture etc. ... but wan¬
ted to take up gardening! Luckily, along with all the implements, seeds
etc., we find five illustrations torn from a gardening book but in ran¬
dom order. We might conclude that there are five essential elements in
terrestrial horticulture (corresponding to the pictures):- —
i) Sunshine etc. obtains.
ii) The ground gets wet.
iii) The plant grows.
iv) The water soaks down to the roots.
v) We water the garden.
Our reasoning (logic) being Martian is totally inappropriate (on Mars
wp water the! plants after the harvest I), our experience of terrestrial
growing nil, our supply of seeds too meagre to allow trying all permutations
207.
what shall we do? ,
Happily, but as always with fairy stories, a kindly Percy Thrower
has left behind in his potting shed a cistern reasoning machine and a
translation manual. Now by means of translation functions
Ae—>5 C f—>4 E<—>3
B 4—± 2 DH1
we can work out (or rather the machine can) what to do. We simply pull
the chain and watch.
One further point to note, Part IV instantiates the logical form
of many self regulating systems e.g. a thermostatic immersion heater,
wheres- P = Water is cool; H = Heater is on; J = Water,is warm;
K = ("i H); L = (-iJ).
Notice (cf. Fodor.)
1) The conceptual power of the machine is (in principle) limited.
It is as impossible to illustrate a piece of predicate calculus on a
propositional lavatory cistern, as it is to represent predicate calculus
in propositional calculus.
To belabour the point; imagine that we are all born with an innate
lavatory cistern cunningly disguised as cerebral hemispheres; and that
learning a language is a matter of hypothesising (and confiiming) states
of the cistern as metalinguistic truth-conditional translation functions
of the object language; then, manifestly, we cannot learn any language
which transcends in conceptual power (i.e. can't be represented in) our
cistern.
2) It is possible to change the logic (underlying form) of our
system not by concept learning (which uses the old logic) but by using
a spanner or hammer.
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Concluding Remarks.
It would not do to get too bogged down in this analogy. It may
seem to some that the suggestion that we are born with a siphon action
lavatory cistern in our heads is too potty for words. But notice, strai¬
ned as it may seem to suppose we learn propositional calculus by mapping
it onto machine states of a flushing loo, we do, of course, more mun¬
danely, learn how flushing lavatory cisterns work ... at least I hope
we have just done sol Naturally, if we can come to learn how they work
(and we surely do), we must have an internal language for representing
those very hypotheses that have been confirmed.
Still, my hopes for a cisternmatic account of thought are, I con¬
fess, low; for, even should other problems be solved, someone is bound
to come up with Wittgenstein's conclusive refutation ... the privy lan¬
guage argument.
2, A modern Soap Qpera(tion).
I have argued earlier that the prevailing technology of the day and
the psychology of that day are closely linked ... that is to say that
I
technological and psychological theory go hand in hand. But who is to
say which leads which? Mere chronological precedence, even if conclu-
I
sively demonstrable, cannot convince those prepared to entertain the
possibility of backwards causation (Beloff, 1977)*
To come clean from the outset, the possibility has suggested itself
to me that psychological theory dictates technological advance.
If this is so, we may be indebted to William James (1890) for that
lyrical instrument, the harp. Long contemplation of the phenomenon of
dualism, led him to speculate that, if his theories were correct, a ■
string should vibrate releasing a non-interactive melody:
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"The mind-history would run alongside of
the body-history of each man, and each
point in the one would correspond to,
but not react upon, a point in the other.
So the melody floats from the harp-string,
but neither checks nor quickens its vibrations."
Similarly, we may be indebted to Plato for the invention of writing.
Consideration of memoiy; its psychological problems - the way our ideas
melt into and become confused with each other when the brain is over¬
heated by fever - and physical instantiation - the evidence of impres¬
sions led Plato, in The Theaetetus, to postulate that if we could find
something in the outside world sufficiently similar to brain matter, we
might have an 'external memory'. Thus he hit upon wax tablets and the
notion of recording by making impressions upon them (and of erasing by
melting.) C.f. in this connection the notion of imprinting.
However we need not delve far into the past to prove the thesis,
but may consider an everyday object, which embodies the influence of
psychological theory on technology.
The object in question is a cuboid of dimensions (approximately)
4' by 5' by 2'. It is constructed of rubber, plastic and steel, scan¬
tily covered in white enamel, and stands on castors. The bulk of the
model consists of two compartments with hinged lids, complicated mach¬
inery (in line with current mechanistic views of brain function) and
pipes for conveying fluids (hydraulic models last attained popularity
with Lorenz' model of motivation) complete the gross picture.
Some little wit is needed to decide just which aspect of psycho¬
logical theory has influenced this artefact. The connection is revealed
in an enigmatic, not to say cabbalistic, fashion in the phrase "Machine
Eliminating Mud OR Yellowness." As can be seen, the initial letters
form the words "MEMORY".
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Confirmation is supplied by other clues often stored near the
model ... cartons containing biological washing powder.
In what sense is the machine a simulation of memory? The twin tubs
are obviously illustration of the two hemispheres and the fact that the
machine works as an electro-chemical process alludes to the current be¬
liefs about the brain's mode of functioning. The brain model also ins¬
tantiates a relatively sophisticated simulation of the homeostatic prin¬
ciple in its thexroostatic heating control.
The more interesting part of the analogy, though, is that specifi¬
cally relating to memory. Obviously, as with ideas, one puts objects
(in this case, articles of clothing) into the machine, processes them,
temporarilystores and then retrieves them. Just like ideas remembered,
the clothes tend to shrink and become faded. Moreover, just as in a
fever memory is more likely to be impaired, if the water in the machine
gets too hot, articles of clothing are even more likely to shrink, become
distorted or even destroyed. The colours of clothes of different hues
put in together run, thus simulating the confusions amongst memories as
a result of association. Partly for this reason, some semantic grouping
of clothing is required ... whites, linen and woollens, for example, be¬
ing grouped together and kept to some extent separate ... just as ideas,
or more strictly those structures which represent them, are semantically
grouped in the brain.
When the cycle of operations is over, the machine switches itself
off and sounds an alarm ... thus explaining that mystifying phrase from
memory folklore: "it rings a bell."
There are always those who will refuse to be convinced by any num¬
ber of examples however clean cut those examples are. These sceptics
" will refuse to be dazzled by these few sheets, preferring to swim against
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the tide and will cling to the more conservative view that it is the
technology which influences the psychological theory ... for these this
brief note will be a wash-out.
It is true, I own, that argument by analogy is not foolproof (some
might say that is the only thing this author demonstrates) but we may
do worse than note Samuel Butler, who wrote:
"Though analogy is often misleading,
it is the least misleading thing we have."
3• Are Computer-Programmers Knit-wits?
Arguments against the possibility of machine intelligence are often
woolly and emotive, but occasionally an apparently more formal argument
is offered. For example, it is frequently said of computers, as if to
prove they cannot transcend the capabilities of their makers, that they
can only do what, and as much as, they are told or programmed. This
pearl of wisdom can be expanded thus: to solve a problem, a computer
must be programmed; and to write a successful program a programmer must
(barring lucky accidents) not only understand the principles of solu¬
tion, but understand them in some explicit way and be able to formalise
them so that they can be represented as a series of instructions.
Plainly, the role of the machine is, then, limited to mere brute force
and blind following of some algorithmic routine.
The news that computers are completely slavish and obedient to
their desires and intentions often comes as a surprise to, and usually
needles, novice programmers, whose experience of computers and the diffi¬
culties of debugging invariably suggests that the programmed machine
will do anything but what they intend it to. However, there is only a
trivial point at issue here - of course the machine will only do what
it is programmed to do, the difficulty lies in translating your inten¬
tions and desires into a program.
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The more substantive point is that it is not strictly true that a
computer can only do what its programmer tells it to do, rather it can
only do what its program tells it to do. Admittedly, in our experience,
programs are usually written by programmers, so these two assertions
are often contingently true - but this is not necessarily so! Realising
this, leads one to allow the possibility of a naturally occurring pro¬
grammed computer - due to accident or natural process e.g. evolution
(the human brain), or of a naturally occurring program which transcends
the power of the human programming. The assertion that the human brain
is a computer, then, does not entail the existence of some great program¬
mer in the sky (although? presumably, it must be initially - biologically
- programmed, and in view of its flexibility, must be initially program¬
med to subsequently program itself!)
How though, more precisely, are we to understand the activity of
programming?
The essence is to take a complicated task and to show how it- can
be accomplished by performing simple tasks in a specified order. Many
analogies can be, and are, drawn. Recipes, for example, are programs.
Given a complicated task like the making of a souffle, the effective
cookery book reduces it to a series of simple operations (beating of
eggs etc.) in a specified order. Of course, what counts as a simple or
complicated operation varies according to the expertise and aims of the
trainee - we may need to consult another egg-beating program, or on the
other hand, may count making the souffle as only one operation in a
five-course-dinner-preparation program.
In her recent book, Margaret Boden (1977) chooses an interesting
alternative analogy ... the knitting pattern as a program. Typically,
a knitting program takes a complex task, e.g. the knitting of a baby's
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boottee, and reduces it to a well-formed string of simple operations
or primitives; typical primitives are "st", "S1", "k", "wlfwd". Any¬
one unfamiliar with these primitives must consult a beginners manual
for still simpler programs explaining e.g. "k" (knit) in terms of yet
simpler operations e.g. finger/needle manipulations. For further elab¬
oration of this metaphor, see Boden '77.
Note, in both of these analogies, and in programming itself, "the
exercise of a complex capacity is analysed as the organised exercise of
relatively less problematic capacities"(Cummins, 1977). However, what
is of particular interest here is the extent to which the manufacturing
of knitwear and textiles occurs as an analogy of the mental process.
During the Second World War, work, still today officially secret,
was done on early electronic digital computers at Bletchley Park, where
the core of the British Government code breaking effort was also cent¬
red. Refusing to have the wool pulled totally over his eyes, Randell
(1976) has pieced together available fragments of infoimation to reveal
that, at Bletchley Park, there were built "machines called bombes which
were prototype computers" (Calvocoressi, 1974). A.C. Brown (1976) also
refers to a machine called "The Bomb" designed by Turing?"a copper
I
coloured cabinet some 8ft. tall and perhaps 8ft. wide at its base,
shaped like an old fashioned keyhole. And inside the cabinet was a
piece of engineering which defied description." This machine, still
shrouded in secrecy, is an enigma as regards its functioning and purpose,
but significantly, as its Chief Engineer, Harold Keen, said: "It's ini¬
tial performance was uncertain, and its sound was strange; it made a
noise like a battery of knitting needles as it worked ..." (in Brown).
Sherrington (1940) refers to the brain as an "enchanted loom" and
* in a similar vein Bennett talks of "the facts of today" as "so much raw
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material from which my brain has to weave a tissue of life that is
comely." Analogously, Longuet-Higgins (1968) says "the computer is
like a loom" and takes us back to the issue of programming! "a loom
will weave nothing until the weaver comes along and supplies it with
the pattern of the carpet his client has ordered."
In his Gifford Lecture of 10th March, 1978 ('Learning and Memoiy'),
J. C. Eccles compared the parts of the hippocampus concerned with mem¬
ory with antique oriental rugs, which his wife collects. "We live
with patterns", he said, and proceeded to draw the analogy between
patterns on rugs and patterns in cells, even being so specific as to
p
compare the estimated two million knots on an antique oriental rug with
the estimated four million functional units of the hippocampal area.'
The link between looms and computers (artificial and natural) is
again stressed by Peirce (1897) • "The study of how to pass from (a hand
loom simulation of logical reasoning) to one corresponding to a Jaquard
loom would be likely to do very much for the improvement of logic."
Actually, as has been pointed out earlier, the attribution of the inven¬
tion of the automated loom to Jaquard is quite spurious - the actual
inventor was, of course, Vaucanson (Bedini 1964). Early computers and
automated looms actually shared some of their technology. The former
made use of punched tape which allowed (or hindered) crucial pins to
pass through and the latter, of course, also used punched tape but re¬
placed the pins by pulses of light. (Vaucanson's apparatus for the
automatic weaving of brocade of around 1750 was not even the first use
of such methods - records exist of punched tape being used as a memory
store as early as the 16th century in Augsburg hodometers.)
As can be appreciated from this brief note, it does not take a
warped mind to see links between textile manufacture and intelligent
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functioning. However, no attempts are made here to stretch this meta¬
phor beyond its bounds and lead the reader surreptitiously into too
close an identification of looms and brains. This would., no doubt, be
foolhardy. As Scott hcu3 pointed out: "0, what a tangled web we weave,
When first we practise to deceive."
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CHAPTER TWELVE
SOME MODELS WHICH GET ON ONE'S NERVES.
"The history of ... (the) nervous
impulse reflects the history of the
most fundamental stages of medicine,
if not of human thought and knowledge
in general, passing from metaphysics
and speculation to physics, observa¬
tion, and experimentation."
Walter Riese (1959)•
"There was no burst of good work in
scientific physiology ri^it after
Harvey nor in fact in the 18th century."
Edwin Boring (1950).
I
In the immediately preceding seven chapters, we have examined
first some formal, and then some intimate, models in some detail. For
the purposes of exposition and ordered discussion, it has been useful
to divorce these models somewhat from their respective research areas,
and to discuss them in relative isolation. Naturally however, in the
course of actual research on particular phenomena, simulators do not
rigidly adhere to the use of either an intimate or a formal model -
typically both sorts of model are used by different modellers at the
same time; the same modeller at different times; different modellers
at different times etc., etc.
In this chapter, we deal with models ... from the point of view of
the phenomenon under study, rather than from that of the model.
We take a look at the influence of models on the accounts given
in a domain of particular interest to physio-psychological theory ...
that of how impulses are conducted along nerves and, indeed, of how we
are to conceive of nerve impulses at all. Concerning this topic, it
is natural to start with Rene Descartes - not because he was the first
to propose a machine model of man, others had already beaten him to
that e.g. Aristotle (De Mota Animalium): "The movements of animals may
be compared with those of automatic puppets ... or with the toy wagon."
- but rather for two other reasons. Firstly, because it was only from
the time of Descartes that the question of how nerves conduct began to
be asked in isolation from the question of how muscles contract ...
earlier these two questions were dealt with as one (further details
later);. secondly, because of the almost incredibly powerful influence
that Descartes' direct contact model of causality has had in neuro-
physiological theories of nerve conduction.
In this chapter, then, after a brief exposition of the foundations
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of Descartes' influence, we discuss some interesting models of nerve
impulse conduction during the century and a half commenced by Descartes'
seminal Treatise of Man.
As Huxley (1874) has observed "the fundamental proposition of the
whole doctrine of scientific Physiology", "the idea that the physical
processes of life are capable of being explained in the same way as
other physical phenomena", is owed to Rene Descartes, that "great and
original physiologist", who did for the mechanical theory of motion
and sensation what Harvey did for the blood.
The Cartesian influence has indeed been profound and far-reaching;
the basic model he proposed has had universal appeal and has virtually
dictated the subsequent J>00 years of physiological research. Let us be
rather more explicits Descartes' works are not a series of isolated if
brilliant forays into disparate intellectual fields. Although it is
true that he made advances of genius in mathematics, physics, meta¬
physics and physiology, one profitably views Descartes' efforts as
expressing a coherent vision of the nature of man ana the universe, a
vision based mainly on his theory of optics, which, for Descartes, had
replaced the classical conception of celestial mechanics as the key to
I
nature (Caton, 1973)•
As is now well recognised, Descartes (1733) conceived of the body
as a thinking machine, all of whose "functions occur naturally ...
solely by the dispositions of its organs, not less than the movements
of a clock or other automaton." A central problem of this thinking-
machine account was that of how the mediation between sensation and
movement was to be explained.
It is crucial to realise that in his theorising Descartes was
starting with a completely clean slate. His theory was intended to
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explain the interaction between two apparently quite different spheres
... the psychobiological one of neuro-mental events and the natural
scientific one of optical physics, and, although Descartes owes some¬
thing to Ibn al-Haytham's (1039) visual optics (as did Witelo and
Kepler), he was able to let his optical and psychobiological theories
mutually constrain each other's development. (Since Descartes the sit¬
uation has been much different, as Young and Burtt lament, for psycho¬
logists have been compelled - and in the main been content - to let a
pre-established physics decide their ontology, leaving themselves the
task of labouring merely on epistemological issues. The position'is
now beginning to change with the Gibsonian challenge - for elaboration
see Reed, 1978.)
It is interesting that both Traite de l'homme and Traite de la
lumiere were completed in 1633> as parts of Traite du monde, sharing
the same gestation period and fertilised by common sources.
Caton has persuasively argued that Descartes' theory of optics was
his foundation stone - that having once fixed his theory of physics ...
concerning the nature of li^it ... Descartes had to tailor his theory
of man to fit in with this ontology i.e. Cartesian man had to be the
t
sort of entity who, when struck by single rays of light composed of par¬
ticles in motion (a percussive view of light with its accompanying con¬
tact model of causality), could behave (move) appropriately.
However, it is at least conceivable, and the possibility is inter¬
esting to consider, that in fact the influence worked the other way,
i.e. that Descartes' theory of man as a machine influenced his optics.
As early as 1619 (Cogitationes Privatae) Descartes proposed the con¬
struction of a man-machine worked by magnets and according to Pere
Poisson, he actually drew blue prints for automata in an attempt to
* CV^_
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verify his theories. We know (Additions A.T.XI 669) he was fascinated
by the hydraulic statues at St. Germain en Laye and in L'homme he •
refers to such automata frequently. For example: "truly one can well
compare the nerves of the machine that I am describing to the tubes of
the mechanisms of these fountains, its muscles and tendons to divers
other engines and springs which serve to move these mechanisms, its
animal spirits to the water which drives them, of which the heart is
the source and the brain's cavities the water main." It is at least
conceivable, then, that it was at least partly the influence of the
hydraulic machine model of man which led Descartes to propose a theory
of the environment (optics) commensurate with such a model ... and that
the only way of which he could conceive to affect a (hydraulic) automa¬
ton was by the involvement of direct contact causality ... hence his
percussive optics and its direct metaphysical consequence - that exten¬
sion is the only property of matter.
Be that as it may, from this point on the priority of optics-can
hardly be disputed. On the organismic level, optics certainly become
the model for the other senses, while Descartes'entire physics is plau¬
sibly seen as an attempt to generalise his theory of optics i.e. gen¬
eral physical laws become rules describing the motion of percussing
rigid bodies. Finally, on a metaphysical level, Descartes forges the
bond between thinking (ideas) and being (the world) by the conception
of corporeal ideas which occur at the interception of the principles of
nature with the principles of knowledge ... thus identifying sensation
and cognition.
For Descartes, the brain consisted of a cortex surrounding a 5
cavity in which was situated the pineal gland. The cavity could expand
or contract according to the influx of animal spirits - reaching its
greatest dimensions during our periods of greatest awareness, contrac¬
ting during sleep and closing altogether on death. (This explains why-
Descartes was unconcerned at never having discovered such a cavity. He
spent several years dissecting - but never, of course, live animals.)
The cortex itself was a 'tissue' of nerve fibres, pores and tubes which
led to and from receptors and effectors to the inner surface of the
pineal cavity. Some terminated, however, in the fibrous cortex where
they could cause 'memories' by distending fibres to leave an impression.
The pineal gland itself was maintained in its central position in
the cavity by being buoyed up on a fresh supply of animal spirits'which
were fed in by special pipes ... just as balls were buoyed up on jets
of water in the hydraulic pleasure gardens which Descartes visited and
by which he was so intrigued. The core of the model lies in the fact
that there are orifices on the glad itself from which the spirits could
gush (again like jets of water under pressure) and, crossing the cavity,
enter into the tubes of the cortex and so eventually find their way to
the effectors. In the case of perception, as opposed to action, the
impulse caused by the percussion of optic particles on the retina is
conducted to the inner surface of the cavity by a 'filament' composing
the marrow of the nerve and surrounded by animal spirits. This fila¬
ment is attached at one end to an 'organ of sense' such that it is
"very easily moved by the objects of that sense" (e.g. bombarding light
particles) and at the other to valves on the tubes surfacing on the
inside surface of the cavity, such that the slightest sensation opens
a valve allowing the animal spirits to flow. This then, results in a
pattern of open tubes isomorphic to the pattern of retinal impact (it¬
self isomorphic to the perceived object). This pattern is communicated
intact across the void to the pineal gland and there results in a
"figure ... which is traced in the spirits on the surface of the gland."
(A.T. XI 176-7). This pattern is, transitively, isomorphic to the ob¬
ject, which allows Descartes the title of realist. Also in this way
Descartes makes either a sensation or an imagination count as an idea,
which he identified unambiguously with a brain process (it is truly
corporeal).
The problems still remain, though, as to what "the conduction via
the animal spirits" amounts to and of the relation between animal spirits
and effectors (muscles). As Descartes (1649) puts it (P.S. Art VII);
"We know ... that all these movements of the muscles, as also all the
senses, depend on the nerves, which resemble small filaments, or little
tubes, which all proceed from the brain, and thus contain like a certain
very subtle air or wind which is called the animal spirits", but what
we now need to know is "what is the corporeal principle which causes
them to act" and "in what way (do) these animal spirits and these nerves
contribute to the movements and to the senses.?" (P.S.VIIl). As Harmon
and Lewis (1966), amongst countless other commentators, have observed,
Descartes "relied on previously existing hydraulic automata as models
of his system to settle the issue." Descartes is quite explicit about
this % "... spirits enter the cavities of the brain they also leave them
and enter the pores (or conduits) in its substance, and from these con¬
duits they proceed to the nerves. And depending on their entering (or
their mere tendency to enter) some nerves rather than others, they were
able to change the shapes of the muscles into which these nerves are
inserted and in this way to move all the members. Similarly you may
have observed in the grottoes and fountains in the gardens of our kings
that the force that makes the water leap from its source is able of it¬
self to move divers machines and even to make them play certain instruments
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or pronounce certain words according to the various arrangements of
the tubes through which the water is conducted." (T.M. 21).
However, whilst both hydraulic automaton and man are, at an inter¬
esting level, isomorphic, they were not instantiated, of course, in the
same material substance. The animal spirits and the automaton's water
were both fluids, its true, but, to be more specific, the animal spirits
were "the most animated and subtle portions of the blood which the heat
has rarified in the heart" (P.S.X.) - i.e. it is worth stressing
"nothing but material bodies ... of extreme minuteness" (P.S.X).
(This notion of animal spirits as the product of the application of
heat to blood perhaps reached its culmination in the 'explosion' model
of Thomas Willis (1672). Willis, who actually coined the word "neurology"
and who taught John Locke medicine at Oxford, observed that rectified
oil of Vitreol mixed gently with Alcohol Vini produced a sudden effer¬
vescence releasing sufficient force to explode the vessel in which the
mixing took place and conjectured accordingly that it was a mixture of
acid animal spirits with oily blood which produced sufficient explosion
to 'inflate' a muscle.)
As mentioned at.'.-the beginning, at least from the Ptolemaic period
up to Descartes, the problem of the action of the nerve and that of
muscle action were counted as a single issue. Even by the time of
Eristratus (more than 1400 years before Descartes) the idea was well
established that contraction of muscle was due to a swelling in its
volume, an account even favoured by Galen, ... we can call this a
'balloon' model (possibly drawn from some natural balloon like a bladder
or intestine?). Descartes: "these spirits ... although they are very
mobile and subtle, they lack not the strength to inflate and tighten
the muscles in which they are enclosed, even as the air in a ball
I
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hardens it and stretches the skin that contains it." (T.M.28).
The central conception is of the muscle as an inflatable flexible
balloon filled with animal spirits which "distend and shorten it".
The main point for us to notice is that in the traditional model the
role of the animal spirits as inflatory and of the muscle as inflated
are indissolubly linked. However, a seldom commented upon, but impor¬
tant facet of Descartes' theory is that he was beginning to move away
from this indissoluble link towards separating the question of how the
nerve conducted from that of how the muscle contracted. He did this
by making the muscle more autonomous than it had ever before been ...
and thus paved the way for a notion of irritability.
He did this by insisting that the inflation of the muscles was not
totally accomplished by the 'pumping' of the nerves; "Not that the
spirits which proceed immediately from the brain" - of which there are
"but very few" - "suffice in themselves to move the muscles," rather
they bring about the movement of the muscle by affecting "the other
spirits which are already in the two muscles." (1643). In other words,
the animal spirits from the brain are transferring information rather
than power and, in a sense, are telling the animal spirits in the mus-
I
cle what to do.
Muscles are arranged in pairs such that; "when the spirits that
come from the brain to one of them have ever so little more strength
than those that proceed to the other, they open all the entrances by
which the spirits of the other muscle can pass into this one, and at
the same time close all those by which the spirits of this last can
pass into the other" (1645)• The main role of the brain animal spirits,
then, is to open and close valves, i.e. to pass on a message rather
•• than actually themselves pump up the muscles. This departure from the
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traditional balloon account, with its suggestion of the active self-
contained nature of the muscle rather than a passive recipient of in¬
flation, smoothed the path for a notion of intrinsic irritability.
Passions of the soul was published in ,1649- In 1680, Borelli,
leader of the so-called iatro-mathematicians, published his De Motu
Animalium in Rome, supporting Descartes' view. Borelli's support took
two forms. Formally, he offered some mathematico-mechanical models of
muscle based on the rhombohedron, in which he demonstrated that if the
edges of a rhombohedron are fixed in length, as the volume is increased,
the distance between the opposite vertices decreases. On the more prac¬
tical side he offered an alternative suggestion as to the nature of the
animal spirits ... an alternative which can perhaps be best described
to the modern mind as a 'toothpaste' model, (in fact, Borelli was
thinking of the soft marrow which can be squeezed out of the sumach twig).
As Borelli remarked; "nervous fibres ... may be hollow (but) appear to
be solid and full to the simple vision ... therefore it is not imposs¬
ible that the nerves are hollow fistulas ... tubes which are filled
with some moist and spongy substance like the marrow of sumach twigs.
We may suppose that the spongy hollows of the nerve fibres are always
moist and filled to swelling with a juice or spirit which is received
from the brain. And just as we see in an intestine, when it is filled
with water and closed at both ends, that if one end is compressed and
lightly struck, the motion is quickly communicated through the turgid
intestine to the other end; so it would seem that a light compression
or irritation made at one end of the canal, where it ends in the brain
itself would cause the discharge of a small amount of that spongy sub¬
stance or juice into the meat of the muscle itself." In this way, pre¬
sumably, the 'toothpaste' became the signal.
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The great Boerhaave (1744)» too, added his support to the notion
of both a "fluid body, very easily or quickly moved ... forcibly thrust
into or applied to the muscle" (i.e. animal spirits) and to that of
the dilation of muscle fibres "to reduce them from an oblong to a roun¬
der figure, increasing their diameter and diminishing their length, so
as to bring the tendons nearer to each other."
Even as late as 1897 > McDougall was arguing that the contraction
of the wing muscles of insects was caused by an increase in their vol¬
ume due to their absorbtion of some of the fluid sarcoplasm which sur¬
rounds them. Meigs (1905) valiantly defended McDougall by offering,
in answer to the question of how an increase in the volume of the con¬
tents of the fibril could cause it to become shorter, a model of a
\
model - or more correctly the original model itself.
Meigs constructed a model of the fibril. It consisted of a thin
rubber tube encircled by wire rings. Along this tube were inelastic
cotton threads firmly attached to each of the rings. To the single
open end of the tube Meigs applied an air pump - the air intended to
model the sarcoplasmic fluid (but it was just as good a model of animal
spirits or sumach marrow). When air was forced into the tube, each of
I
the rubber sections between the rings changed shape from an approxima¬
tion to a cylinder to an approximation to a sphere. As the cotton
threads would not stretch, but were forced into curves, the overall
length of the model perceptible shortened. Meigs proclaims triumphantly
that: "A good deal of McDougall's argument is based on the fact that
the form of contracted fibrils is somewhat like that of the contracted
model" and then goes on to give histological evidence that fluid does
pass from the periphery towards the centre of voluntary muscle fibres
of frogs during contraction.
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It is a tribute to the power of the balloon model that it has
exhibited such a persistent and universal appeal ... and this in spite
of the fact that, even by Descartes' time, it had been conclusively
shown that muscle volume simply does not increase during contraction
- as any Archimedean flexing his/her toes in the bath could have dem¬
onstrated. Francis Glisson (1677) actually did experiments which showed
that, rather than inflating, muscle, actually decreases in volume when
flexed. Glisson also commented on the 'absurdity' of the idea of spirits
running backwards and forwards in a system of tubes. Later critics ten¬
ded however to ignore the former devastating point and concentrated on
the latter technique of ridicule. Cheyne (1733) mocked the very idea
of basing a theory of man on the model of an automatons "The Similitude
of a Machine put into Action and Motion by the Force of Water convey'd
in Pipes, was the readiest Resemblance the Lazy could find to explain
Muscular Motion by. It was easy, from this Resemblance to forge a thin,
imperceptible Fluid, passing and repassing through the Nerves, to blow
up the Muscles, and thereby to lengthen them one of their dimensions,
in order to shorten the other. On such a slender and imaginary Simili¬
tude, the precarious Hypothesis of Animal Spirits seems to be built."
A year later, another critic appealed to the more noteworthy experimental
evidence. Robinson (1734)s "But it does not appear from any Experiments
that the Nerves are Pipes 5 or that such a Fluid as they conceive Animal
Spirits to be is separated from the Blood of the Brain; and therefore
these Opinions are without any just Foundations. The Nerves are not
only impervious to th,e smallest Stylus, but when viewed with a Micro¬
scope, evidently appear to have no Cavity." This final point was echoed
by Bertrand (1756.) together with the further experimental finding that
affixing a ligature to a nerve produces no swelling either above or
below the ligature (to be expected on the animal spirits or toothpaste
model).
The survival of the inflation theory of muscle action, despite
all thb contrary evidence, can only be attributed to the power of the
motivating model - the balloon. The attraction of this model, and the
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way it suggested a single problem of nerve and muscle rather than two,
even obscured Descartes' attempts to tease the two apart. However,
Glisson did seize on the idea that the muscle was not purely passive *
and dependent on an inflating fluid, but contained within itself the
wherewithal to actively contract (irritability) and therefore needed
only stimulation to be set in action. This realisation in itself
raised the further problem - of how the stimulus was to be transmitted
by the nerves. It is worth making clear, however, that the concept of
irritability in no way goes against the man-machine thesis. As Lups
put its "Irritability is the principle of movement in the human body,
as the pendulum is in the clock." It is interesting to note that Lups'
book De irritabilitate was published in the same year (1748), by "the
same publisher (Luzac), as La Mettrie's L'Homme Machine, and is dedi¬
cated to Haller, traditionally the originator of the concept of irri-
I
tability, as, again, was La Mettrie's book - in the latter's case with¬
out Haller's permission. This may go some way towards explaining why
Haller, unjustifiably, accused La Mettrie of having himself claimed the
authorship of the concept. Meanwhile, Haller had his own thecry about
the passage of the nerve stimulus - a theory based on what Harmon and
Lewis described as a croquet model! To be more precise, Haller (1768)
compared the nerve itself to a row of small rigid balls, each in contact
with the next on either side, and the passage of a nerve impulse is
compared to that of a physical impact such as occurs when the first of
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a series of balls is struck and the last of the series flies off
1 instantly'.
The models of nerve action as inflation, carrying of exploded
gases, toothpaste of croquet are clearly what, towards the beginning
of this paper, I called contact models of causality. It was part of
the function of that earlier section to suggest that the contact model
of causality was not just an aspect of Cartesian psychobiology, but,
via his optics, a fundamental principle of his entire world picture.
The antithesis of the contact principle is, of course, that of action
at a distance. As a principle of physics, this was most importantly
put forward by Newton, against his own inclinations for he was far~from
happy about it, in his concept of gravity. As for his views on psycho-
biology, however, Newton was fully if somewhat eccentrically within
the Cartesian fold. Thus, Newton accepts the basic terms of the
Cartesian argument; he postulates a "most subtle Spirit" (M.P.N.P.)
and asks (Opticks Qu. 23): "Is not Vision perform'd chiefly by the
Vibrations of this Medium, excited in the bottom of the Eye by the
, |
E|ays of! Light, and propogated through the solid, pellucid and uniform
Capillamenta of the optick Nerves into the place of Sensation?" Then,
I
in true Cartesian fashion, he gives an identical analysis to Hearing
and finally generalises the account completely ... "And so of the
other Senses." Moreover, these "Vibrations" travel along the nerves
to the "Muscles, for contracting and dilating them." (Qu. 24).
However, although the basic design of the Newtonian nerve-muscle
system is Cartesian, his notion of "Spirit" is rather different.. It
was this aspect that appealed e.g. to Robinson (1754) who, quite apart
from his empirical researches, was unsatisfied as to the suitability
of animal spirits to do the job required of them ("such a Fluid is
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altogether unfit for this Work") in the Cartesian sense of "spirit".
Newton's conception of "Spirit", at least as expounded in Opticks ,
appears to analogise nerve impulses to waves of light travelling
along transparent rods, reminiscent of modern fibre optics. Thus the
'Capillamenta of the Nerves and the Muscles" are "solid pellucid and
uniform" so that "the vibrating Motion of the aetherial Medium may be
)C propc%ated along them from one end to the other uniformly and without
interruption." Newton explains that nerves may not look transparent
only because a nerve is actually a bundle of capillamenta whose
"cylindrical Surfaces may make the whole Nerve ... appear opake and
white." (Qu. 24). There is, however, a fascinating, if enigmatic,
reference to the "subtle Spirit" which suggests that the notion of
• action at a distance was playing some part in Newton's thought about
nerve conduction. In M.P.N.P. (1729)» where Newton talks of "this
electric and elastic Spirit" (Galvani didn't publish until 1791) "by
the force and action of which", he writes, "the particles of bodi-es
mutually attract one another at near distances, as well repelling as
attracting the neighbouring corpuscles; and light is emitted .. and
all sensation is excited, and the members of animal bodies move .. by
the vibrations of this Spirit, mutually propqghated along the solid
filaments of the nerves." Unfortunately, Newton declines on grounds
of lack of space and adequate experimentation, to discuss this tantal¬
ising reference to action at a distance further. Certainly this was
not the aspect which was seized upon and echoed by other neuroscien-
tists who were typically captivated by the notion of vibration.
An example is Cheyne (1733): "May not the infinite Windings, »
Convolutions, and Complications of the Beginnings of the Nerves which
constitute the Brain, serve to determine their particular Tone, Tension,
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and consequently the Intestine Vibrations of their Parts? ... May not
these Vibrations be propogated through their lengths, by a subtle, spi-
ritus, and infinitely elastick Fluid, which is the Medium of the Intel¬
ligent Principle?"
Newton's reference to electricity need not evidence such a degree of
prescience as may initially be supposed. Electricity, as a phenomenon in
which a piece of amber when rubbed attracts objects to itself, had been
reasonably familiar since Sir Thomas Browne described it the previous cen¬
tury, and it was, no doubt, of this attraction that Newton was thinking.
However, the role of electricity in neural functioning was near recogni¬
tion - and models play an interesting part in bringing that recognition about.
The ability of the fish, the Torpedo, nowadays better known as the
electric ray, to impart an unpleasant sensation has been known at least
since Aristotle. In the 18th century, however, the question of how the
torpedo achieved this was a matter of contention. Lorenzini (1678) for ex¬
ample, thought the assault was due to corpuscles (or "effluvia") which the
toipedo gave off and which entered the body. Reaumer (1714) on "the other
hand, thought the assault due to a mechanical blow which the torpedo gave
by sharply contracting its relevant muscles. The debate warmed up. and eve¬
ntually in 1772 sparks started to fly when, after several independent sug¬
gestions that the phenomenon was due to electricity, Walsh in some experi¬
mental work claimed to demonstrate that the shock was indeed conducted
through electrical conductors in the organism. Scientists were generally
happy with the basic notion that the phenomenon was due to electricity but
two oddities raised grave doubts: i) no electrostatic repulsion or attrac¬
tion could be detected; ii) no sparks could be observed across gaps in the
circuits.
Four years later Cavendish (1776) set out to prove there was
"nothing in the phenomenon of the Torpedo at all incompatible with ,
Cavendish'sArtificialTorpedoMKI(notsc le).
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electricity," by conducting a fascinating series of simulation experi¬
ments: "In order to examine more accurately, how far the phenomena of
the torpedo would agree with electricity, I endeavoured to imitate
them ... "
To be even more precise; he actually built a couple of artificial
torpedos. To make his first model torpedo he cut, out of a piece of
wood, an approximately torpedo-shaped 'body' (see Figure D) with an
additional handle. On each side of the body he fixed a simulated
"electric organ" of pewter, wires from which passed up the handle in¬
sulated in glass tubes. The whole body was then covered in "sheep
skin leather" and soaked thoroughly in a saline solution of one part
of salt in thirty parts of water, intended to simulate sea water ("It
appeared to conduct electricity not sensibly better or worse than some
sea water procured from a mineral water warehouse.") The artificial
torpedo was then placed in its habitat, a trough 19" by 14" by 13"? an(i
the wires were connected to a battery consisting of 49 Leyden jars.
The logic of the experiment is clear; the circuit can only be completed
if the electricity finds a way through/across the body of the torpedo
or through the water. The intrepid Cavendish placed his hand on the
'fish' and received the expected shock. By varying the charges on, and
number of, jars in the battery, Cavendish was able to produce some con¬
clusive results. He found the shock was greater from a large number of
weakly charged jars than from a small number of strongly charged ones
(i.e. the phenomenon was due to static rather than voltage); he also
showed that, if enough jars were used, you could receive a torpedo-like
shock even though there was not enough voltage to produce a spark
across even a small gap.
However Cavendish was not satisfied. In particular, he could not
■understand why, when "the shock, when received in air, was as strong
as ... that of the real torpedo commonly is" it was "just perceptible
when received under water." (By increasing the charge he could get an
equivalent shock under water but this then produced a massive shock
in air).
To resolve the problem, he decided to build a second improved
version of the artificial torpedo. Reasoning that the difference in
strength of shock in and out of water might be due to the conductivity
of the torpedo's body, he decided to build the second torpedo exactly
the same as the first except that the body was to be made of "several
pieces of thick leather, such as is used for soles of.-shoes", again
thoroughly soaked with sea water. This alteration had the added appeal
of making the artificial resemble the real torpedo even more, for
Cavendish saw "no reason to think, that the real torpedo is a worse
conductor of electricity than other animal bodies." Success attended
the completion and trial of this Torpedo Mk. II; "The event answered
my expectation ... the difference between its strength when received
under water and out of it, was much less than before, and perhaps not
greater than in the real torpedo."
It is quite clear that Cavendish was indeed simulating ... and not
just indulging in a fanciful pastime. We find plenty of completed
instances of the following sentence schema; "Mr. Walsh found ... I
accordingly tried the same experiment with the artificial torpedo ...
I got the same results." As a general conclusion "all the foregoing
experiments ... seem to agree very well with Mr. Walsh's experiments."
Cavendish conducted yet another simulation experiment with the
artificial torpedo which is too charming to fail to relate. Referring
to stories of people who were allegedly knocked from their feet by
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stepping on a torpedo which had semi-buried itself in the sand of a
beach, Cavendish "filled a box, 32" long and 22'.'broad, with sand,
thorou^ily soaked with salt water to the depth of 4" and placed the
torpedo in it, intirely covered with the sand, except the upper part
of its convex surface."
Cavendish, perhaps not quite so dauntless after all, decided it
was "too troublesome" to actually tread on this loathsome lurking
artificial fish and, instead, cut some saline-impregnated leather
"intended to represent shoes" (especially "the shoes of persons who
walk much on the wet sand"), which he placed on the torpedo and then
touched with his hands. All in all, Cavendish concluded it "likely"
that a person treading with wet shoes (or even more without shoes at
all) on a semi-submerged torpedo would "be thrown down" ... especially
as the effect of the animal "would be aided by the surprize"!
Apart from some minor inconsistencies, possibly due to the battery
used being underpowered ("a compleat imitation ... would require a
battery much larger than mine"), Cavendish showed by his models (which
"agree very well with the natural one") that there is "nothing in the
phenomenon of the torpedo at all incompatible with electricity". (He
also turns, in his report to the Royal Society, to a consideration of
the instantiation of such an electrical system, maintaining that al¬
though "it is not necessary that there should be anything analogous
to a battery within it", in fact, there is "room in the fish for a
battery of a sufficient size".
By this solid experimental work Cavendish directly prepared the
way for an electric account of the animal spirits, and so brings us
into the era of modern neurophysiology. This influence can clearly
be seen in the work of Fontana (1781): "The pretended very great velocity
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of the nervous fluid seems to be contradicted by that inert, viscous
fluid or matter with which the primitive nervous cylinders appear filled.
The considerable size of the nervous cylinders ... when compared with
the primitive fleshy threads, leads me to suspect that these threads
are not put in motion in any immediate way however ... by the nerves
... we are not only ignorant of muscular motion, but we cannot even
imagine any way to explain it, and we shall apparently be driven to
have recourse to some other principle ... if it be not common electri¬
city, may be something however very analogous to it. The electrical
gymnotus and torpedo if they do not render the thing very probable,
make it at least possible."
Alexander Monro (1783), too, was on the same track; "Most authors
have supposed that the nerves are tubes or ducts conveying a fluid
0
secreted in the brain, cerebellum, and spinal marrow. But, of late
years, several ingenious physiologists have contended, that a secreted
fluid was too inert for serving the offices performed by the nerves,
and, therefore, supposed that they conducted a fluid the same as, or
similar to the electrical fluid."
From here on, the story is well known, or at least well documented.
Galvani's classic experiments of 1791 > showing that electricity could
induce contraction in muscles, met with some opposition from Volta.
(incidentally both Galvani and Volta discussed analogies between living
tissues and electric devices.) The controversy culminated eventually
in du Bois Reymond's triumphant declaration of 1848-9? "If I do not
greatly deceive myself I have succeeded in realising in full actuality
... the 100 years dream of physicists and physiologists, to wit, the
identification of the nervous principle with electricity."
The models discussed by no means exhaust the weird and wonderful
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devices which neuroscientists found useful in their research in the
150 years between the publication of Descartes' seminal Treatise of Man
and Fontana's intimations of the electrical principle, nor was that
attempted. Rather I have tried to trace a sort of continuity of theory,
centred around the Cartesian concept of animal spirits and furthered by
the use of mechanical models. This theme can be restated and reinforced
by a liberalised version of an idea of Harmon and Lewis: "While the
present utility of ... these models can be doubted, their historical
value cannot ... a model or a theory that leads to a dead end is of
limited interest, but one that forms a link in the continuing chain is
extremely valuable regardless of whether or not subsequent events far
outreach it." Amen.
We have now completed our detailed investigation of particular
models. In the course of these investigations, various advantages and
problems of model use have been raised and discussed.
In the next three chapters, we go on to consider, and attempt to
meet, some other, more general problems that have been raised regarding
model use as a means of explanation.
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN .
FOOD FOR THOUGHT : A LOOK AT FODOR AND CRAIK.
"... the diagram of a hydraulic system for
motivation, or comparison of the nervous
system with a telephone switchboard, or the
human brain with an electronic computer,
... do not explain motivation, the nervous
system, the brain ... they may only make
them more familiar. They do not explain
because they, in turn, must be explained
either by another science or by another model.
Jay N. Eacker (1972).
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A recent work (Raphael, 1976) perhaps somewhat fancifully suggests
that several prominent computational theorists, Marvin Minsky, Johnny
von Neumann and Norbert Wiener, were/are all direct descendants of a
makev
1^th century golern, the chief rabbi of Prague, the Maharal. (Sussman
dedicates his A computer model of skill acquisition (1975) to the same
Rabbi, attributing to him the realisation that 'And God created man in
his own image' is recursive!)
It is true that the history of automaton-building-simulators is
by no means lacking in bizarre and interesting characters. As mentioned
earlier, Jacques de Vaucanson reputedly left the order of Minims of
Lyons after his creation of mechanical angels, which flew around the
room, incurred the wrath of the provincial. He gave himself up to a
life of debauchery in Paris before getting involved in the construction
of his more famous androids. He was later suspected of black magic dur¬
ing a voyage by a sea captain who discovered in one of Vaucanson's
trunks (and threw overboard) a life-size female automaton (allegedly)
constructed to while away the long evenings at sea. To take another
example, Julien Offray de La Mettrie added to his translation of
Boerhaave's 'Aphrodisiacus' a treatise on venereal diseases (1754) ?
wrote others on vertigo (1756) and smallpox (1740?) and later offended
almost the entire literary, religious and scientific world with his
brilliant mechanistic philosophy as expounded in L1 Homme Machine, which
he conceived whilst suffering from a fever during the siege of Freiburg
and which was later consigned to the flames by the Parliament of Paris
on July 9th 1766. He died, typically, from an unfortunate gastronomic
accident ... having consumed a prodigious amount of pate de faison aux
truffesl It is to this illustrious tradition that Kenneth Craik,
though separated by many intervening generations, clearly belongs,
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combining academic brilliance, technical virtuosity and a streak of the
ludicrous.
Originally a student of philosophy at Edinburgh, he did a little
psychology before being sent to Cambridge by James Drever, who forewarn¬
ed Bartlett (1946) (the then Professor): "Next term I am going to send
you a genius." Craik was renowned for his skill in devising and con¬
structing apparatus and gadgets and delighted in a minute working inter¬
nal combustion engine, which he used to carry around in his waist-coat
pocket in a test-tube. Typically, whilst at Cambridge he also attended
the Cambridge Technical College for a course on plumbing and welding.
As Bartlett remarked in a case of brilliantly insightful (but probably
unintended) juxtaposition: "He went to the Cambridge Technical College
for a course on plumbing and welding. He did a lot of physiology and,
later on, brain anatomy."
The A.P.U. was founded for Craik and he built (as well as designed)
there the famous first experimental training cockpit. A representative
selection of his published papers are: Origin of Visual After Images
('40); Instrument Lighting for Night Use ('40)5 Orange Self Luminous
Paint ('43) | Electrical Simulation of the Ear ('44) 5 White Plumage of
Sea Birds (1144) • Masses more of unpublished papers are stored away in
the A.P.U. Archives, Cambridge, but in his lifetime he published only
one actual books The Nature of Explanation (1945)* Craik who was by
all accounts a man of tremendous energy and pace, was also somewhat
impetuous; during one experiment at the Pleasance, he collapsed his own
eyeball and was rushed off to hospital and he eventually died after
being knocked from his bicycle into the path of an oncoming vehicle',
when he rode full-pelt into an open car door.
The main point of this section is not however to discuss Craik's
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connections with earlier mechanists (i don't assert a direct lineage!)
hut rather with one later one.
In particular, I want to discuss some of Craik's ideas together
with some of those of Jerry Fodor in 'The Language of Thought' (1975)•
My aim here is neither to show, as is often done in the purported his¬
tory of psychology, that (to Fodor's chagrin) Craik had said it all
before, nor (to Craik's credit) that some of his ideas are confirmed by
Fodor. It is rather to engage in a creative extension of the arguments
of both psychologists.
I try to do this in the following ways first I sketch in enough of
each man's theory to demonstrate that their quite outstanding similari¬
ties of view do provide a common ground between them 5 secondly I argue
that Craik pointed to the isomorphism of the position of the individual
coming to know about the world (building a model of it) and that of the
psychologist coming to know about the individual (building models of
his/her psychological processes); thirdly, I describe and discuss some
issues and problems raised by Fodor's work, concerning the way the
individual comes to know his/her world; fourthly, I show how, by means
of Craik's bridge, some of these considerations are relevant to the
problem of the psychologist qua model-builder and that they expose
(apparently paradoxical) inherent limitations of the model as an explana¬
tory tool.
1. Craik and Fodor.
Craik: "... thought models, or parallels, reality ... its essential
feature is ... symbolism ... this symbolism is largely of the
same kind as that which is familiar to us in mechanical devices
which aid thought and calculation ..." (1943)
Fodor: "The general structure of psychological theories of cognition
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presupposes underlying computational processes and a repre¬
sentational system in which such processes are carried out
... When we think of an organism as a computer, we attempt to
assign formulae in the vocabulary of a psychological theory
to physical states of the organism." (1975) •
Craiks "It may be that in genuine generalisations apparently abstract
properties of objects are really recognised as the same
because, acting on the brain mechanisms of the animal they
produce the same effect, ... Thus a balance 'recognises' a
weight of 1 grm., whether it be the weight of a piece of brass
or of lead. In the same way we can recognise colours apart
from the nature of the coloured objects." (1945)*
Fodor: "A sensory mechanism is a device which says 'yes' when excited
by stimuli exhibiting certain specified values of physical
parameters and 'no' otherwise. In particular, it does not
care about any property that environmental events fail to share
so long as the events have the relevant physical properties in
common, and it does not care about non-physical properties
that environments have in common so long as they fail to share
the relevant physical properties." (1975)•
Craik; "... when any calculating machine is in operation, there are
objects or events ... the number of teeth projecting from an
Odnes wheel (etc.) ... which represent numbers, and ... to
the man who observes the machine, these have a greater degree
of 'thinghood' and conceptual definiteness than the intercon¬
necting parts and the continuous transmission of motion from
one part to another. In the same way in a neural calculating
machine there may well be patterns of excitation in the cortex
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... and. so forth, which, to a physiologist sufficiently
skilled, would 'represent' concepts or sensations of objects."
(1943).
Fodor: "The criterial property of the machine language of computers
is that its formulae can be paired directly with the computa¬
tionally relevant physical states of the machine in such a
way that the operations the machine performs respect the sem¬
antic constraints on formulae in the machine code. Token
machine states are, in this sense, interpretable as tokens
of the formulae." (1975)»
Craik: "... the machine will parallel ... those phenomena whose
mechanisms most resemble itself ... the structure of the brain
... sets a limit to causal explanation ... because it is ill-
suited to representing ... strange processes." (1943).
Fodors "Nothing can be expressed in a natural language that can't
be expressed in the language of thought. For if something
could, we couldn't learn the natural language formula that
expresses it." (1975) •
Craik: "Our thought ... has objective reality because it is not fun-
I
damentally different ... from that objective reality but is
specially suited for imitating it." (1966 No. 28).
Fodor: "The device is so constructed that its use of the predicate
(e.g. in computations) comports with the conditions that such
a representation would specify." (1975) •
2. Craik.
For Craik the central question was: "What do we mean by explaining
anything?" (1945) and his answer was, to a first approximation, "A
phenomenon is unexplained if it strikes us as totally unique - uncorrelated
1
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and. incomparable with anything else in our experience" (1966, No. 28).
"We•understand something by comparing it with something else in our
experience which we do understand. ... we model it." Our thinking is
... part of a series of natural events, capable of paralleling and imi¬
tating them just as one natural phenomenon ... can resemble or imitate
another." (1966, No. 29). Craik, as Bartlett rightly says, "was
searching for and using physical analogies", and he looked long and
hard at machines "tiying to see them as evidence that insofar as they
are successful they show how the mind works, not in inventing the mach¬
ines and using them, but in actually solving the problems." (Bartlett,
1946). Indeed, even the experimental training cockpit was a "very
brilliant and beautiful application of a calculating machine principle
to a complex psychological problem."
For Craik, one of the most fundamental properties of thought is
its power of predicting events but "this process of prediction is not
unique to minds, ... A calculating machine, an anti-aircraft 'predictor'
and Kelvin's tidal predictor all show the same ability ... the physical
process which it is desired to predict is imitated by some mechanical
device or model." (1943)°
Memory too and the power to learn have their analogies in mechanism;
"A piece of sprung steel may bear signs of its previous history of strain"
(1943) and "'thought' is a term for the conscious working of a highly
complex machine ... this mechanism ... has the power to represent ...
certain phenomena in the external world as a calculating machine can
parallel the development of strain in a bridge" (1943)° Ideas are
"labels on parts of a continuously acting maching" (1966, No. 27) and
ambiguous or infinite concepts are "perhaps to the mind, what a contin¬
ual movement of the figure setting keys on a calculating machine would
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be ... they prevent the problem from ever being set unambiguously to
the machine." (1943)* On the issue of consciousness, Craik closely
followed La Mettrie (1747) ("Thought is so little incompatible with
organised matter that it seems to be one of its properties") in not
regarding "thought as an inactive halo round mechanical brain processes"
but rather attributing "consciousness and conscious organisation to
matter when it is physically organised in certain ways" (1945) •
However the reader will no doubt have observed that there are
really two similar but separate processes being discussed here. Craik
is saying both that the individual understand the world by constructing
(or using) an internal model of it, and that the theorist (for example
the psychologist) understands (psychological) processes by constructing
(or using) an external model. (Although he will need, of course, to
understand his external model by building (or using) an internal model
of it.) Thus, on an individual level, "thought models symbolise exter¬
nal processes and so allow a human being to predict and forestall events",
c
while on quite a different explanatory level, Craik is able to write:
"The eye resembles a multi range meter."
There is indeed a very strong formal analogy between the theoretical
I
process of constructing simulation models of natural phenomena and the
cognitive processes by which human beingsinstantiate their knowledge of
their environments and their place in them. (Shaw, 1971)*
To adapt Minsky's (1968) schema:
1) To an organism B, the set of cognitive structures A* is a model of
A to the extent that B can use A* to answer questions that inter¬
est him about A.
2) To a theorist B, the machine A* is a model of a psychological
phenomenon A to the extent that B can use A* to answer questions
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that interest him about A.
(due to Shaw, 1971).
It follows that the task of both the (higher) organism and the
simulation theorist is to construct a theoretical model which repro¬
duces the important features of what it is trying to understand, ...
but the tasks are logically the same process. Craik pointed to this
isomorphism and I shall use it as a bridge, to bring to bear considera¬
tions developed by Fodor, in connection with the modelling of the higher
organism, on the issue of simulation as a scientific explanation.
3. Fodor.
The idea that higher organisms' knowledge of themselves and their
environment is instantiated in cognitive representational systems is
common to such diverse writers ass Hebb ('49)5 Piaget ('67); Miller,
Galanter and Pribram ('60); Koffka ('35); McCulloch and Pitts ('43)5
Lashley ('42)5 but Fodor ('75) goes much further when he writes that
the only psychological theories of cognitive processes "that seem even
remotely plausible represent such processes as computational" and that
"computation presupposes a medium of computations a representational
system."
The Language of Thought is an attempt to characterise, or at least
to show how we could go about characterising, the internal system of
representation to which Fodor thinks we are committed by accepting the
only plausible psychological theories. He seeks to show, then, that
plausible psychological theories do commit us to a 'language of thought';
that this notion of a 'language of thought' is a coherent notion and
that it is not empirically totally.inaccessible. He admits that his
arguments may act as a reductio ab adsurdum (once we know what we are
letting ourselves in for by accepting certain theories, we may no longer
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be so keen to accept them), but he insists that if we do reject such
theories, we are left literally with nothing.
Fodor rehearses the same argument in several different scenarios
... considered action, perception and concept learning. In the case of
the latter, he (plausibly to my mind) argues that the only serious
theory of concept learning we have is that of hypothesis formation and
confirmation. But, "concept learning presupposes a format for represen¬
ting the experimental data, a source of hypotheses for predicting future
data and a metric which determines the level of confirmation that a given
body of data bestows upon a given hypothesis." The bitter pill to swal¬
low is that representation presupposes a medium of representation - -
there is no internal representation without an internal language. In
the case of learning a natural language (the classic case of concept
learning) it follows that you cannot learn a language whose terms express
semantic properties not expressed by the terms of some language you are
already able to use. Nothing can be expressed in natural language that
cannot be expressed in the language of thought, for, if something could,
we could not learn the natural language formula that expresses it (we
would have no hypothesis to put forward to be confirmed). You cannot
increase your expressive powers by learning .. or, as Wittgenstein put
it; "we predicate of the thing what lies in the method of representing
it."
Note that the claim is that you cannot learn a language unless you
(at least) already understand another one of equal expressive power.
This formulation obviates two apparent claims that a vicious regress is
involved. Fodor is not saying that you cannot learn a language unless
you have already learned one, nor is he saying that understanding (as
opposed to learning) involves hypothesising. Understanding may just
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consist in the fact that one's use of the unlearned language is in
fact appropriate e.g. conformable to a truth rule. The patent fact
that we do in fact have to learn natural languages e.g. English, neces¬
sitates the single regression, but we are not committed to an infinite
regression.
Thus, at least one of the languages one knows without learning is
as powerful as any that one can ever learn and not all languages one
knows are languages one has learned ... i.e. one (at least) is innate.
With this brief outline of 1 The Language, of Thought' , let us pause
and take stock of our situation. We now know enough of Fodor's thinking,
to expect some pretty tough problems concerning how a (higher) organism
B could construct- a model (symbolic representation) A* of A in order to
understand A e.g. where B is a child, A is a sentence of some natural
language and A* is a hypothesis as to its semantic properties. But by
virtue of our discussion of Craik and Shaw, we found that many problems
should transitively apply to the case of a theorist B, who constructs a
machine A* as a model of a psychological phenomenon A. —-
4. Craik1s Bridge.
It is instructive to substitute terms in Fodorian schemas:
1
, . . „ philosophical theories of cognitionThe general etrueture of psyohoiogical theories of modelling
presupposes underlying computational processes and a representational
system in which such processes are carried out.
The consequences of such a view are (however) as awful for us as
' ' ■ ' ' 1
fcpr FodOrs ] '
, , learn a language , terms semanticYou can t
simu],a^e a system W °Se parts Xpr S structuro-functional
properties eipre3sed by the teI~S of some lanff® you are .relations parts model
, n , useable to ,
understand.
Note: the claim is that you cannot simulate a structure unless you
already understand a structure, not that you cannot unless you have
already simulated one. Moreover, modelling a structure involves rep¬
resenting the structuro-functional properties of that system, under¬
standing the model needn't ... that mi^it just consist in the fact that
one's use of the model is always conformable to the isomorphism rule.
Thus, there are two ways in which it can come about that a device
(including presumably a person) understands a ^gyg^g^6s
jt \ mu j • v j ~i representation „ extension „ ,,1 ) The device has and employs a , , _ of the , of the* model system
predicate where the re^Q^g^a^0n itself given in some 'language'
that the device understands.
2) The device is so constructed that its use of the Pre(itcate c0Inp0r^ssystem
with the conditions that such a representation would specify.
It is difficult to see, then,how modelling extends the understanding
in the strong sense of increasing the power of one's explanatory frame¬
work. One only understands the modelled insofar as one realises both
that it is isomorphic with the model and, more importantly, insofar as
one understands the model itself. The gain seems to be merely that one
knows as a result of modelling that, as a matter of fact, the range of
application of a particular explanation is actually greater than one
previously had thought ... as, for example, when the wave theory of
transmission of energy (in water) was extended to cover cases of trans¬
mission of sound. Suppose one's inner language of thought were propo-
sitional calculus, then, given that learning is by hypothesis formation
and confirmation, it would be impossible to learn predicate calculus ...
because the latter systematically goes beyond the former in expressive
power.
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You cannot improve your grasp of English by looking in an English
dictionary ... you can only make it more concise, but you only make con¬
cise what you already knowl
Similarly, it is impossible to fully understand a system of greater
intrinsic qualitative complexity by modelling it with a model of lesser
intrinsic qualitative complexity ... for that by which the former exceeds
the latter will be forever out of reach.
There seem to be two options at this point. Either one can throw
up one's hands in horror and simply throw out the practise of modelling
as a futile occupation; or, accept some form of extreme nativism ...
that we are somehow endowed with an innate understanding of certain
models and accept that the development of that part of science which is
'
modelling is simplythe extension of the cases of application of these
models
There is, however, a point about performance, as opposed to com¬
petence, which is, it seems to me, important ... there may be computa¬
tional advantages associated with knowing a language (being able to
model) which are not principled, but which result from performance
parameters - memory, fixation of attention etc.
Thus whilst it is true that;
^iM- . cannot use the ^ra§m®n^ 0f ^he language ^a/t he/she knowsThe theorist model system '
to increase the expressive power of the concepts at his/her disposal;
he/she may use it for mnemonic purposes ... to abbreviate and thus
reduce demands on computing memory whilst ^^odelling11^'
Thus, although it is true that
o




model '; it does not follow that for every
natural language predicate
understandable structure
that can be entertained, there is an
entertainable predicate
model
In other words, it does not follow that an articulate (modelling)
organism has no cognitive advantage over an inarticulate (non-modelling)
one ... just that there is no principled advantage.
There certainly does seem to be a paradox here, but it should be
• made clear that this problem is not limited to, i.e. is not a difficulty
specific to, modelling, but rather is a general one attaching to notion
of understanding. How can it ever be (strictly speaking) that we under¬
stand something at time t+1 that we did not understand at t? How can
one ever extend one's understanding, as opposed to realising that some¬
thing new is only a case of something one already knew?
It may be, then, that this argument, like its twin in The Language
of Thought, merely acts as a reductio ad absurdum ... to make sense of
the notion of modelling we appear committed to accepting an extreme form
of nativism? we must have wired-in, innately or maturationally developed,
a complete set of models of a complexity equal to anything we can ever
understand by modelling. This may be simply too much for some to swal¬
low (it being little comfort that any account of explanation which relies
on a notion akin to hypothesis is subject to the same commitment). But
the penalty for rejecting it is to be left with precious little. It is
better, in this author's opinion, to live, if a little uncomfortably,
with this apparent paradox for the moment, believing with Wittgenstein
(1953) that "problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by
„ arranging what we have always known."
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN
SOME POTENTIAL DIFFICULTIES OF TRYING
TO PEEK INSIDE THE BLACK BOX.
"Miracles ... lie between his collar




The 'black box' is today one of the most widely used explanatory
devices in cognitive psychology. Given some process which we cannot
sufficiently comprehend, we often construe the situation as one involv¬
ing a black box which, when given a certain input, yields a certain out¬
put. Given the input and the output, we may attempt to deduce (some of)
the properties of the (contents of the) black box. Additionally and/or
alternatively, we may choose to design or even build a device which yields
the same output given the same input - and use this device as a model of
the contents of the black box. This, of course, would only be a first
step - once minimally, i.e. observationally, adequate the model would
have to be rigorously tested for descriptive adequacy.
A definitive statement of this black box approach is given by
Chomsky (19^5) in a psycholinguistic context: "We may think of the
theorist as given an empirical pairing of collections of primary linguis¬
tic data associated with grammars that are constructed by the device on
the basis of such data. Much information can be obtained about both the
primary data that constitute the input and the grammar that is the 'out¬
put' of such a device, and the theorist has the problem of determining
the intrinsic properties of a device capable of mediating this input-
output relation."
An alternative mode of statement makes even clearer the connections
between black boxes and the modelling strategy: "we must ask how on the
basis of the limited data available to him, the child is able to construct
a grammar of the sort that we are led to ascribe to him, ... What, in
other words, must be the internal structure of a learning model that can •
duplicate this achievement?" (Chomsky, 1969) (my underlining).
In modelling this 'internal structure' by designing a device which
'can duplicate this achievement', several options are open to us. We
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may describe such a device linguistically i.e. theorise conventionally;
draw it; or even actually build it. As has repeatedly been pointed out,
this latter option was one frequently taken up during the 17th and 18th
centuries with the concomitant exercise of an amazing amount of techni¬
cal, skill and ingenuity. More recently computer simulation has found
more favour, yet the principles are the same; "We postulate that the
subject's behaviour is governed by a program organised from a set of
elementary information processes. We encode a set of sub-programs (sub¬
routines) for a digital computer, each of which executes a process cor¬
responding to one of these postulated information processes. Then we
undertake to write a program, compounded from these subroutines, that
will cause the computer to behave in the same way that the subject be¬
haves - to emit substantially the same stream of symbols - when both
are given the same problem. If we succeed in devising a program that
simulates the subject's behaviour rather closely over a significant
range of problem-solving situations, then we can regard the program as
the origin of the behaviour." (Newell and Simon).
Clearly though, the possible pitfalls in this approach are legion.
One may be simply described: Chomsky's device capable of mediating the
input-output relation between linguistic data and grammar has often been
called a Language Acquisition Device or L.A.D. for short. Now one fairly
sure way of creating such a device has been suggested, in conversation,
by John C. Marshall: Problem - create a device which, given the limited
and degenerate linguistic input available to any normal human infant,
outputs a grammar of the language of which the input was a sample;
Solution - take a man and a woman, give them privacy, wait nine months
etc. This solution would, naturally, deliver the goods - we would
achieve a model matching in structure and function that which we were
<?
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trying to model. The trouble is, of course, that we would understand
the-model no more than the modelled; while we asked for a L.A.D. we
actually got a LAD (or perhaps a LASS). There is then a preliminary
constraint on the contents of the black box which we can dream up. As
Pylyshyn (1974-5) has put it: "The scientist must substitute for the
'real thing' a system built on principles which he can understand."
It is perhaps worth mentioning that this constraint is still not uni¬
versally appreciated by all researchers, some of whom continue to pos¬
tulate (or worse assume) homunculi in the head in their attempts to
explain problematic psychological processes or issues in the philosophy
of mind.
A second (slightly) more serious possible pitfall would occur were
the contents of the black box literally so bizarre that the chances of
a modeller achieving descriptive adequacy were virtually nil. This
could occur if, for example, the contents of the black box were chosen
arbitrarily or on a random basis or if it contained a structure c-reated
by an intelligence radically different from that of the modeller or by
an arational or even irrational one.
As an illustration, consider the following simplified case of a
I
blue box - and the problem of figuring out its contents. The problem
is ... given the initial 'input' of wet hair, to design a device to
yield the 'output' of dry hair. Obviously many devices could satisfy
such an input-to-output conversion (be observationally adequate) e.g.
a towel; a Saharan breeze; an electric hair dryer etc. But would they
achieve descriptive adequacy i.e. do what the contents of the blue box
do in the same way?
Consider, then, the blue box overleaf. When you have made your
hypothesis, check it by lifting the lid of the blue box.








If you actually did guess the contents of the blue box, may I recom¬
mend a long restful holiday and plenty of fresh fruit. However, it is
unlikely that you did so for, in our modelling, we tend to assume that
which we are modelling to be efficient, parsimonious, lacking in redun¬
dancy and in some sense 'reasonable': in short, we tend intellectually
to idealise that which we are seeking to understand. This point has been
well made by Ghiselin, who wrote of "the tendency of physiologists to
anticipate perfection in organic structures ... (which) ... leads them
to overlook the imperfection." (1969).
This is no isolated abstract case of splitting hairs without real
bearing on'scientific methodology. In 1862, Charles Darwin published
On the Various Contrivances by which British and Foreign Orchids are
Fertilised by Insects in which he intended to supplement On the Origin
of Species with detailed substantiation of the belief that "it is appar¬
ently a universal law of nature that organic beings require an occasional
cross with another individual."
The book has conventionally been received as merely a rather charm¬
ing guided tour of some eccentricities of nature ... and this was in
line with the generally held view of Darwin as a man of rather moderate
intellect but with a prodigious appetite for work. However, as Ghiselin
(1969) has made clear, Darwin's philosophical competence was not negli¬
gible and he was not so artless as to be incapable of satire. Read in
this context, the Orchids work does indeed seem "a sort of biological
Candide, which, albeit with the greatest restraint, holds up the very
idea of organic design to ridicule and contempt."
The general structure of Darwin's argument was to show that the
structure of organs was not deliberately designed to fit a particular
function, but rather was a fortuitous collection of parts originally
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adapted to completely different functions. At the core of this argument
is a distinction between purposes which do and functions which do not
presuppose (according to the Darwinian tradition) a designer. The con¬
trivances of orchids have functions but not purposes.
Most of the book is a description of the amazing variety of these
contrivances whereby orchids ensure that any one flower is fertilised
by the pollen of another. When Darwin began his researches, he was imme¬
diately struck by the apparent bizarreness of these devices. As he put
its "The flowers of Orchids, in their strange and endless diversity of
shape, may be compared with the great vertebrate class of Fish, or still
more appropriately with tropical homopterous insects which seem to us in
our ignorance as if modelled by the wildest caprice." However, in the
course of his researches, he came to believe that: "the endless diver¬
sity of structure" was not just a bizarre functionless freak of nature,
nor even less had "been created for the sake of mere vanity and beauty,
- much as a workman would make a set of patterns", rather they represen¬
ted a "prodigality of resources, for gaining the very same end, namely,
the fertilisation of one flower by the pollen of another."
However, Darwin leads us to ask, if God, the ultimate designer, had
I
designed orchids so that each could transfer pollen appropriately, why
were there so many devices - why didn't he install the most efficient
mechanism in all of them?
Of course, in one sense, all the mechanisms are equally efficient
... all the ones we can examine have after all survived! It is true
that some orchids thrive in greater numbers than others, but there is
no reason to attribute this to their pollen transferring mechanisms
rather than environmental conditions. However, in spite of this, there
is a tendency to attribute inefficiency to such natural mechanisms ...
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apparently on the intuitive conviction that a designer could come up
with a simpler more parsimonious way of achieving the same end.
It has been suggested in the literature stemming from Darwin that
machines are efficient in that they are designed to do a job with a
minimum of waste, whereas adaptations are merely efficacious in that
they just happen to do a job, regardless of waste. As our experience
of the blue box has just shown us, this is hardly credible at least in
the case of Heath Robinson machines ... and it is doubtful whether a
detailed study of the history of automata would support it either,
even granting that the suggestion is meant to apply to the intended
aims, rather than actual achievements of such machine builders.
However, one can see some truth in the suggestion. A skeleton, for
example, is an adaptation which has achieved its structure "through a
bizarre history of accretions and deletions" (Reed, 1978^)? so that not
only do aspects of its structure survive which did not actually hinder
(at least in the short term) the survival of its host but were coinci¬
dent with adaptive aspects (cf. 'superstitious' behaviour in conditioned
rats) but also so did aspects which did actually give the organism a
selectional advantage although in an outlandish or grotesque fashion.
I
The instructive point for us is that had we, for some reason, practical
or ethical, had denied to us the opportunity to make detailed observa¬
tions of the spine but had had to treat it like a black box, deducing
its structure from its load bearing etc. properties and had had to
build a model of it, it is most unlikely that we would have come up
with anything so 'inefficient' as a human spine!
Darwin did indeed think that because of our relatively poverty
stricken imaginations, we were unlikely to be able to model many aspects
of nature - but this was not because they were inherently bizarre, but
because of their complexity. As Darwin wrote: "The more I study nature,
the more I become impressed with ever increasing force with the conclu¬
sion, that the contrivances and beautiful adaptations slowly acquired
through each part occasionally varying in a slight degree but in so
many ways, with the preservation of natural selection of those varia¬
tions which are beneficial to the organism under the complex and ever
varying conditions of life, transcend in an incomparable degree the
contrivances and adaptations which the most fertile imagination of the
most imaginative man could suggest with unlimited time at his disposal."
It is, then, only our ignorance which makes us think nature "modelled
by the wildest caprice." What appears to be merely capricious on first
glance turns out on further investigation to have some functional con¬
tribution. Darwin mentions his own conversion: "I, for one, have often
and often doubted whether this or that detail of structure could be of
any service\ yet, if no good, these structures could not have been mod¬
elled by the natural preservation of useful variations." The problem
which Darwin points up then is that of the difficulty of generating
sufficiently rich, complex and unique models, i.e. a psychological one
in the methodology of scientific discovery.
t
There is then a very real problem facing modelling cognitive simu¬
lators. The conviction that the contents of the black box we are trying
to understand by modelling is a coherent, parsimonious, efficient reason¬
able system, is, alas, only an act of faith, buttressed by the (mistaken)
belief that because most of our hypotheses as to the contents of the
black box are reasonable etc., the contents themselves must be.
On the positive side, considerations such as these do not imply
that modelling, even of efficacious contraptions, is impossible - only
that it is more difficult than it would be were the structure of the
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world merely an embodiment of the structure of our mental processes.
The case of the Heath Robinson machine shows that the fact that a
machine is designed does not guarantee it is efficient; conversly, the
fact that a machine is not made (but evolves) does not imply it is not
efficient. As it is not laid down in advance, via the information as
to how the device has come to be, which parts of the natural world are
or are not efficient, how a machine came to be cannot act as a method¬
ological recommendation for or against modelling. The natural recourse
is to try to model it, achieve a model which is observationally adequate
and then, by subtle and ingenious experiments, to see whether it is or
is not descriptively adequate. Who knows; by innovation, accident or







"There are some human functions for which
computers ought not to be substituted.
It has nothing to do with what computers
can or cannot be made to do."
Joseph Weizenbaum (1976).
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If there is to be criticism, let it be informed. 'Computer Power
and Human Reason' ("an eloquent argument for the sanctity of the human
spirit") is dedicated to combatting the dehumanising metaphor, as Joseph
Weizenbaum sees it, of man the machine. Its particular interest, for us,
lies in the fact that Weizenbaum, a distinguished Professor of Computer
Science at M.I.T., past Fellow of the Centre for Advanced Studies,
Stanford, and creator of ELIZA (one of the most famous of all natural
language processing systems) i.e. a man exactly at the centre of A.I.
research, is forced to conclude that, in the debate on 'Computers and
the Mind', "the relevant issues are neither technological nor even math¬
ematical; they are ethical."
Thus, to combat the man-machine metaphor, Weizenbaum has to go
beyond his own area of considerable expertise on an informal venture
into ethics. (This is a trip often made in reverse, of course, human¬
ists arguing against the analogy on sinking ethical grounds are prone
to make appeals impugning the logical or epistemological status of the
analogy.) So let materialists take heart that a highly motivated
Professor of A.I. is unable to come up with powerful formal criticisms
of the machine simulation enterprise from within A.I. itself.
One might be tempted to suppose that Weizehbaum's twin roles, as
computer scientist and apocalyptic spokesman, would sit uneasily to¬
gether and this suspicion is substantiated by the structure and style
of the book. The first three chapters form a beautifully lucid expli¬
cation of the basic operations and notions of computing, whilst the
last seven gradually decline through wishy-washy humanism and well-
intentioned cliches towards the grandiose ("the salvation of the world
- and that is what I am talking about.") Yet the whole is punctuated
with not infrequent sparks of humour and piercing insights.
264.
Weizenbaum notes, for example, that the operating machine not only
abides by but embodies, or instantiates, laws. Thus it is impossible
for a machine to behave in an unlawful manner (or "capriciously" as
Weizenbaum puts it) - although it might embody laws different from the
ones we want at a particular time. It is nonsense, strictly speaking,
to say a machine is malfunctioning - rather we should say it is a well
functioning machine, but not the one we want. William James (1890) made
this same point some 90 years ago: "A machine in working order acts
fatally in one way. Our consciousness calls this the right way. Take
out a valve, throw a wheel out of gear or bend a pivot, and it becomes
a different machine, acting just as fatally in another way which we
call the wrong way ... A brain with part of it scooped out is virtually
a new machine, and during the first days after the operation functions
in a thoroughly abnormal manner."
Because computers, like brains, "interact with the real world",
the laws which they embody, unlike abstract machines, must of course,
be consistent with the laws of the physical universe. However, a com¬
puter, again like a brain, is "not completely characterised by only its
manifest interaction with the real world." Whilst it is true that,
looked at one way, machines are concerned with the transmission of
power (or, in the case of modern electronic digital computers, energy)
an alternative but much more useful way to look at them is, as Weizenbaum
points out, as concerned with transfer of information; "Our image of the
machine (has changed) from that of a transducer and transmitter of power
to that of a transformer of information." This realisation has very
significant implications for psychology. As Fodor (1975) puts it: "it
is the essence of cognitive theories that they seek to interpret physical
(causal) transformations as transformations of information, with the
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effect of exhibiting the rationality of mental processes."
We cannot therefore completely characterise a machine (brain or
computer) by talking about its physical workings and interactions with
the physical world. Its physical states are symbols which can stand
for virtually anything and its symbolic transfdrmations are "regulated
J ' I'- 'by systems of ideas whose range is bounded only by the limitations of
the human imagination." In short, although considered physically a
computer (brain) cannot violate natural law, considered symbolically it
is not thus restricted; one thinks of Atkin's interpretation of chess-
playing as the expansion and contraction of two geometrical structures
in 55 dimensional space.
Weizenbaum is led to the conclusion that "whatever else man is,
then, and again he is very much else, he is also a receiver and trans¬
mitter of information", indeed, since we can all learn to imitate uni¬
versal Turing Machines; "we are by definition ... at least universal
Turing Machines." On the other side, he accepts "the idea that a modern
computer system is sufficiently complex and autonomous to warrant our
talking about it as an organism ... a kind of animal." This modern
'computer-organism' can be "socialised" (modified by experience of the
world), "can form a model of itself which could, in some sense, be con¬
sidered a kind of self consciousness" and the degree of intelligence
it can in principle attain is limitless. We could sum up Weizenbaum's
thoughts on this then as ... men are at least machines and machines
(some at least) are at least organisms.
Weizenbaum raises a criticism of man-machine simulation however
which is apparently fairly powerful when he says it is "not obvious that
all human knowledge is encodable in 'information structures', however
complex."
One purportedly glaring difference between a brain and a computer
is the flexibility of the former as to the nature of the information
which it will accept and upon which it will act. Dreyfus (1972) is a
good example of a holder of this view: "the, data with which the computer
must operate if it is to perceive, speak, and in general behave intelli¬
gently, must be discrete, explicit and determinate; otherwise it will
not be the sort of information which can be given to the computer so as
to be processed by rule."
Is can be seen, there are really two points at issue; what informa¬
tion must be like if it is to be given to a computer; and what informa¬
tion must be like if it is to be operated on by a computer.
As for the former, it is now notorious that in programming we must
be totally precise and unambiguous; the set of instructions and their
order of operation must be made totally explicit. But this is a prag¬
matic point - it concerns getting the computer to do what we want, (to
be a particular machine), not the nature which the information must (in
a strong logical sense) have, if the computer is to be able to operate
at all. In this former sense it is, alas, only too easy to put indeter¬
minate and ambiguous instructions into a computer - but the result is
that we have no idea what machine the computer then is; or, if you like,
what operations it is going through and what problems it is solving.
The explicitness and non-ambiguity at this level is thus for our benefit
- so that we might know what is going on and be able to utilise it.
The second issue is rather more weighty, as it purports to show
that the only sort of information which a (digital) machine can possibly
handle and manipulate is inappropriate for solving the sorts of problems
which humans solve.
Typically the argument goes as follows:
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1. (i) The. basic components of a digital, computer are binary-
states (yes/no choices), which can be either on or off,
i.e. in one of two mutually- exclusive, discrete and
determinate states.
(ii) The total information manipulable by a digital computer
is but a summation of such states.
Therefore
(iii) The total 'knowledge' of a computer is a set of
discrete and determinate elements.
(Dreyfus (1972) states in one place that there is an "ontological-assump¬
tion underlying A.I. work" that "everything essential to intelligent
behaviour must in principle be understandable in terms of a set of deter¬
minate independent elements" and in another place (19^9)» even more ex¬
plicitly writes: "digital computers, composed of flip/flops, must ulti¬
mately contain a model of the world represented as a structured set of
facts or propositions which are either true or false." Note also, that
this objection is extended by Dreyfus (1972) to all discrete state mach¬
ines - all the machines and automata we have dealt with so far - as well
as digital ones: "the flip/flops are only a technical convenience, as is
t
the binary system which they dictate. Any finite state machine whether
with three state elements, ten cog gears, or any other set of discrete
states would dictate the same ontological conditions."
2. (i) At best, to humans individual elements only become determinate
subsequent to an awareness of the whole.
(ii) Often, humans make a 'configurational response' which is
indivisible into elements.
(iii) Configurational response is essential to all intelligence.
Therefore
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3. (i) At test, (according to 1 and 2 (i)), computer intelligence
presupposes human intelligence to previously analyse the
configurational data.
(ii) Worse, (according to 1 and 2 (ii)), the computer is incapable
of making a human like (configurational) response.
(iii) Worst of all, (1 and 2 (iii)), the computer is incapable of
intelligence.
Strictly speaking the validity of (2) is an empirical matter upon
which Dreyfus little elaborates apart from vague gestures towards
Gestalt psychology, introspection and phenomenonological doctrine. He
cites perspicuous grouping, our recognition by touch of silk and fringe
consciousness as the sort of thing he means by indivisible and holistic
capacities. However we need not bother ourselves too much with empiri¬
cally questioning (2), for the argument in (1) is quite clearly fallacious.
Digital computers are discrete state machines but note that in say¬
ing that the operations of a digital computer are discrete, we are saying
something about the way it represents information ... not about the way
it goes from one physical state to another, for in this sense there are
no discrete state machines (which would go instantaneously from one state
to another without passing through any intervening state). Rather we are
saying that states in between have no significance as regards information
representation. The difference between a digital and an analogue compu¬
ter is not that one clicks and one creeps (Williams, 1973)> tut that, in
the latter case,.any pointecrept through represent something but in the
former any states clicked through do not.
Because of this, it is quite acceptable and not at all contradictory,
to admit that a computer processes information in teims of discrete and
determinate states and yet assert that the information itself is not at
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all discrete and determinate. This is because the way information is
conveyed and the information itself are simply not identical - the in¬
formation is conveyed in a code or language but the information itself
is not identical with that code (Sayre, 1968). In particular, the fact
that the code is in terms of a set of discrete determinate elements
does not entail that the information expressed is - in fact it is not
easy to make sense of this claim. Fairly uncontroversially, the code
token "the brown cow" is composed (lexically) of three discrete items;
the referent of the phrase i.e. the brown cow,is not, at least not three
elements in any sense corresponding to the lexical elements. The case
of the information contained in the phrase is more problematical. It
seems we must await an acceptable theory of semantics. However, note
that, for familiar reasons, as we can understand, derive information
from, indefinitely many new code tokens, there must be primitives of
some kind. This sort of consideration leads us further to doubt Dreyfus'
claims in (2) above. Although there are not indefinitely many chess
configurations, there are so astronomically many that we couldn't pos¬
sibly learn a ' c.onfigurational response' to each one we might conceiv¬
ably come across - it- seems vastly more likely that chess ability, like
language ability, is reliant upon primitives and a syntax of moves
rather than a completely novel and holistic response to each individual
board layout.
To return to the main theme, as many commentators have pointed out,
Dreyfus himself "uses the 26 letters of the Roman alphabet as a symbolic
code to represent his 'ambiguous and indeterminate' information"(Boden,
1977). To press this point right home, it is a trivial matter to num¬
ber the letters of the alphabet from one to twenty-six, express these
in binary notation (on a base of two), write anything in English in
1
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terms of bits ... and then store them in a digital computer. Thus the
digital computer is quite capable of handling representations of
Shakespeare sonnets or works of HeideggQr - surely ambiguous and inde¬
terminate enough - without change of content.
Of course it remains true that the code with.which the nervous
system operates may turn out not to be digital ... though the informa¬
tion it handles is codifiable in digital terms to any required degree
of accuracy, but this is an empirical matter. To break this code is
of course a supreme challenge - one to which the machine simulation
research is rising. Whilst it is true, as Farrell (1968) has said, and
as I hope to have here demonstrated, "the history of psychology is
strewn with models that have exhausted themselves ... without cracking
the code of organismic functioning", there is no a priori reason to
expect that the story will always be the same.
There is then no convincing argument, presented here, as to why
digital computers, because of their binary constitution should be unable
to operate on any information whatsoever - so long as that information
can be codified. (As Wittgenstein (1921) said in a different connection:
"What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.") Moreover,
on the positive side, as McCulloch (1955) puts it: "To the theoretical
question, Can you design a machine to do what a brain can do?, the answer
is this: If you can specify in a finite and unambiguous way what you
think a brain does with information., then we can design a machine to do
it. Pitts and I proved this constructively. But can you say what you
think brains do?", thus substantiating Miller, Galanter and Pribram's
assertion that "History suggests that man can create almost anything he
can visualise clearly." The interesting point is that in their work
McCulloch and Pitts showed that any exhaustive and complete description
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of the brain was "ipso facto realisable by q. suitable finite neural
network" (von Neumann) - where the neural network was composed of ab¬
stract neural modules, of simpler structure than living neurones and
capable of assuming only one of two states 1 It is interesting to note
that Minsky's Ph.D. thesis of 1954 was devoted to showing that "almost
any of the proposed models of the neuron is a universal computing ele¬
ment" (McCarthy, 1974)»
To return again to the main theme. We have discovered that a
highly sophisticated and motivated critic of A.I. was unable to come up
with any powerful formal arguments against the possibility of a digital
simulation of human intelligence. * His apparently strongest argument -
based on formalisability - fails to achieve its purpose even in Dreyfus'
elaborate form. To which arguments does Weizenbaum get thrown back?
Whilst a person's behaviour is generally observable, the function¬
ing of his brain is not. One way to get over this problem is to treat
the brain as a 'black box', which yields a certain output given a cer¬
tain input, and try to build a model, which one understands, which dup¬
licates the output given the same input. Weizenbaum recognises the use¬
fulness of this approach but is worried that we might be overwhelmed by
the seductiveness of the model: "the computer is a powerful new meta¬
phor for helping us to understand many aspects of the world, but ... it
enslaves the mind that has no other metaphors."
The root of Weizenbaum's worry is that because the computer pro¬
vides such a good metaphor for man as an information processor, it leads
us to ignore aspects other than these abilities. In other words,
because cognitive psychology is powerfully aided by machine simulation
it may lead us to forget that man has moral qualities, emotions and
motivation etc. In fact however, the mechanist's vision is more all
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embracing than Weizenbaum seems aware. Taking his cue from La Mettrie,
who wrote; "We think we are, and. in fact we are, good men, only as we
are gay or brave; everything depends on the way our machine is running",
the modern mechanist can assert that all aspects of a person's psycho¬
logy (not only the cognitive ones) are, in principle, simulable by a
machine. Since, as Turing showed, a digital computer (being an instan¬
tiation of a Turing machine) can mimic any other machine, people in toto
are in principle simulable psychologically by digital computers, though
in practice we have at present little idea how to go about simulating
many areas of them.
Of course, on a purely methodological level, the computer metaphor
is merely a tool and it would be foolish to restrict ourselves arbitra¬
rily to a single tool. However, Weizenbaum seems to be attributing to
machine simulation workers what Margaret Boden (1977) has called; "the
mistaken epistemological assumption that the use of one interpretive
scheme to extend our understanding excludes the use of others." However,
the real issue is not poverty of imagination. We do not have to compare
man to a machine, we could compare him to an angel or magician ... the
objection to these latter models is not so much methodological monism
as the conviction that they would not extend our understanding.
Weizenbaum, then, is left with his final reservation; "What I con-
" elude here is that the relevant issues are neither technological nor
even mathematical; they are ethical. They cannot be settled by asking
questions beginning with "can". The limits of the applicability of
computers are ultimately statable only in terms of "oughts"." Thus,
for example, he rejects Colby's suggestion that we could use computers
as surrogate psychotherapists "not on the grounds that such a project
might be technically infeasible, but on the grounds that it is immoral."
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This argument based on morality is difficult to evaluate. The
hypothesis that man is a machine is a scientific one, justified only
by its fertility in suggesting illuminating experimental hypotheses
and systematising generalisations and, as such, is neither moral nor
immoral but amoral. Moreover, in a situation in which psychotherapists
are in short supply and where people could benefit from psychotherapy,
it would seem to me to be immoral to prohibit the use of automaton
psychotherapists, providing the patients knew with whom (or if you
prefer, with what) they were interacting.
It is difficult to be certain, but Weizenbaum's rationale for
this type of statement seems to be that such uses of computers are
subtly dehumanising. The computer used in this way is "an instrument
pressed into the service of rationalising, supporting and sustaining
the most conservative, indeed reactionary components of the current
Zeitgeist." This complaint can be amplified as followss the use of
machines to explain, or in place of, people suggests to those people
that they are machines and as such should treat each other as, and
expect to be treated as, machines. There is some force to this criti¬
cism, I admit. In one of the most important points of her recent book,
\
Margaret Boden has pointed out that psychological theories do not only
describe but to some extent also constitute psychological reality -
because people tend to become what they think they are (as the mistaken
belief, whilst walking a high wire, that you are falling might make you
fall). As she puts it: "technological analogies (often of a crudely
debased popular form) can enter deeply into the personality and self
image of individuals ... if the public believes - rightly or wrongly -
that science regards people as 'nothing but clockwork5, then clockwork-
people we may tend to become." It is a strange paradox, if in fact it
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is true, that man is such a sensitive machine that he can turn himself
into an insensitive machine.
Even the sophisticated simulator may be in some danger. Seymour
Papert, writing the forword to Sussman's A computer model of skill
Acquisition (1975)> a model called Hacker, wonders whether Sussman has
"in creating Hacker in his image, also, to some extent, recreated him¬
self in Hacker's image?" However, even if the working simulation
psychologist escapes this recursive fate, and even if his/her concept
of a machine, a computer, may be extremely rich, there is always the
real possibility that, in ignorance of, or unpersuaded by, the resear¬
cher's actual beliefs, the subject of the research, or even more the
casual bystander, may turn himself into what he thinks he is - an im¬
poverished machine. In consequence, it may be important to enrich the
generally held concept of machine, so that it becomes no longer an in¬
sult to be compared to one. But this is precisely what current machine
intelligence studies are going! It is generally complained that it is
dehumanising to compare man to a machine, but one seldom hears that it
is 'demachinising' to compare a machine to a man! It is assumed with¬
out warrant that in comparing man and machine we have to bring man
I
'down to the level of' a machine, it is equally possible, and less
potentially offensive, to think of bringing a machine 'up to the level
of' a man. This is what machine intelligence studies are doing.
It is thus significant that the real conclusion of Margaret Boden's
recent book is precisely that: "the prime metaphysical significance of
artificial intelligence is that it can counteract the subtly dehumanis¬
ing influence of natural science ... by showing, in a scientifically
acceptable manner, how it is possible for psychological beings to be
grounded in a material world and yet be properly distinguished from
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Boring (1950) attributes to Ebbinghaus the remark that psychology-
has a long past, but only a short history. If by 'history1 we mean a
formal record of the past, a chronicle, Ebbinghaus' aphorism is still
today both true and false of experimental psychology. It is true in
the sense that the history of experimental psychology is still, by and
large, regarded as beginning in 1862, false in the sense that Boring's
monumental A History of Experimental Psychology, with its close on 800
densely packed pages, cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be
considered short. This latter sense is by no means as trivial as may
initially appear, nor is it unconnected to the former sense. Let me
expand: the prevailing view of the recent nature of the origin of experi¬
mental psychology is due, almost single handedly, to Boring's magnum
opus, to which there are no serious rivals, as opposed to abridged
imitations, whatsoever. The reason for this unchallenged supremacy is,
however, nothing more than the colossal nature of the task of rewriting
the history of experimental psychology more adequately. Of the few
psychologists interested in the history of their subject, still fewer
are satisfied with Boring's efforts to do it justice. However, by the
time one becomes thus interested, one has already been grist for the
\
Boring mill and a considerable mental exertion is required to detach
oneself and see the Boring myth for what it is. Of the psychologists
who have achieved this relatively objective pristine state, few any
longer have the inclination to devote the unavoidably many years of
scholarly research demanded by a serious rival to the History.
Objection can be taken to two unifying ideas of the History.
Boring's general vision of the history of psychology, indeed of science,
is that it is "intensely personal". He appears to believe that the way
to write a history of psychology is to write an account of the
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personalities of men who have played a dominant role in it ... indeed
"rapid scientific progress" is, one way or another, made possible by
the operations of the nervous systems of "Great Men".
In this work, although occasional reference has been made to the
(often eccentric) characters of the main figures behind research, little
explanatory significance is read into this. Far more emphasis, as
regards responsibility for the progress of the science of psychology,
has however been placed on developing technology. Again and again,
scientific psychological advances have been made as a result of the
■
use of neutral analogies of implicit models suggested by progress in
technology, and the expression and development of theories in the form
of formal models has often only been made possible by technological
breaksthrough. Indeed, the grip of mechanical models on the scientific
imagination is so tenacious that they are seldom abandoned, except for
yet other models, themselves suggested by technological developments.
However, what about the aetiology of technology itself? This
question trespasses on a whole new field of enquiry, and I do not intend
here to follow it. Suffice it to say that it is at least likely that
the aetiology of technology involves questions of technological demand,
hence industry, hence economics, hence politics, hence power. We seem
in danger, then, of circuitously explaining theoretical developments in
psychology by (ultimate) appeal to socio-economic factors. This does
not, in itself, disturb the present author unduly, although I feel it
is not the whole story, but there are scientists, and even more philos-
» ophers of science, who hold such a view to be an expression of total
epistemological anarchy.
This view, which allegedly reduces science to a mere epiphenomenon
of economic and social conditions, is often labelled externalism, as
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opposed, to internalism, which sees scientific development as being
governed by its own immanent laws ... whose inexorable progress can
only be expedited or hindered by 'peripheral' socio-economic factors.
As usual, with such extreme characterisations, the 'truth' lies
somewhere in between. In classic dialectical fashion, internalism and
externalism, rather than being warring mutually-exclusive alternatives,
actually jointly provide an answer. This is because psychology, or
indeed science in general, may have external causal factors operating
on it and yet still retain its own internal rationality. How is this
conjuring trick accomplished? At any stage in the development of a
science, there is never one theory alone which is uniquely determined
by the data ... there are always (indefinitely) many theories consis¬
tent with (making evidence of) the available data. Which of these
theories is in fact chosen, is itself a phenomenon worthy of explana¬
tion ... and it is here that causal factors can enter the explanation
without overwhelming it. This has important implications for the phil¬
osophy of science, for, as Mary Hesse (1977) has pointed out, it ex¬
plains how causal explanation need not entail causal determinism.
To return to the particular case in hand, in this thesis we have
seen how it is possible for technological developments to causally
influence psychological theory without rendering it totally dependent
on external factors. Boring, in his History, places little or no empha¬
sis on the role of technology in the history of experimental psychology,
and (far too) much emphasis on the personality of the main researchers;
in this he has his priorities radically misplaced.
My other principle objection to the History is, of course, Boring's
oft repeated myth that experimental psychology was "founded" (p.21) in
1860, with the publication of Fechner's Elemente der Psychophysic.
This assertion has "been echoed since Boring's first edition of 1929, in
the pale offspring spawned in its shadow. Plugel (1933), for example,
fixes the Birth of psychology "about the middle of the last century",
and repeats the Boring line that the parents were the philosophy of mind
and sensory physiology and the midwives the "sturdy trio of English
J • ' i! i
empiricists Locke, Berkeley and Hume." It is to be hoped that this thesis
has at least established that an experimental psychology, which attempted
to explain by simulating, was thriving long before Pechner was even ■
thought of (conceived), let alone forsook his legendary armchair for
the laboratory.
Perhaps, however, something should be said, if not justifying at
least explaining, the noted lacunae in the History. Artists are notor¬
iously bad at verbalising about their creations. This may not be a
result of intrinsically inadequate verbal skills in general however, so
much as the inaccessibility to the linguistic brain of the processes
upon which the artistic products are contingent, (i will resist any
specific talk of hemispheres). The fabrication of machines, apart from
being an art form in its own right, may similarly draw upon non-verbal
skills, and the ideas they embody may be extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to describe and communicate in words. Mayr (1976) attri¬
butes the unique charm of machines to the difficulty of grasping their
intellectual substance in terms of conventional forms of communication.
He also notes that the ideas instantiated in clocks and mechanical auto¬
mata at least tend to be related to those of geometry and kinematics
and thus be more easily verbalisable than those instantiated in thermal
and electrical machines which "transcend the boundaries of the existing
mathematics and philosophy."
Be that as it may, it is certainly true that adequate descriptions
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of automata and simulacra of the past are not easily found. This may
he, as suggested, due to the difficulty of describing linguistically '
entities incorporating ideas radically different from any verbal con¬
cepts. How often would the requisite mechanical ingenuity and verbal
virtuosity needed to create a machine model worthy of insightful des¬
cription and also to insightfully describe it, be combined in one per¬
son? Presumably seldom.
Of course, the builders of mechanical simulacra might have thought
that the actual machines themselves were just as, if not more, elucida¬
tory and indeed durable as any written account. Sadly however, rela¬
tively few of the machines in question have survived the ravages of
time. This was partly due to storage problems ... the objects usually
took up a lot of room and thus tended to be pushed into attics, damp
storehouses or vast warehouses, when their initial appeal waned} and it
was partly due to the lack of mass production ... as each was handmade,
they tended to be unique. When Barnum's museum in Philadelphia burned
down, not only the Automaton Chess-Player was destroyed, but also lit¬
erally thousands of other automata. Some simulacra, of course, strug¬
gle through any tribulation. Charles Roberts, a mechanic at the Research
Museum of the Franklin Institute, recently painstakingly restored an
anonymous fire-damaged writing automaton. When he had completed his
task, he set the machine in motion and it wrote out a poem, signing it
"Written by Maillardet's automaton" (in French, of course). The
Maillardets were a famous 18th century automaton building family.
A third possibility is that the lack of texts describing the
efforts and motives of mechanical simulators of yore is due to a
policy, conscious or unconscious, on the part of the major libraries
as to which books were, and which were not, desirable or even worthy of
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being shelved. As we have seen, the machines themselves, and so too
no doubt works discussing them, have been considered by turns literally
works of the devil or trivial playthings for the wealthy and gullible,
neither much of an incentive for a hard pressed, and, often in the past,
clerical, chief librarian.
■Whatever the reason, the vitality and importance of mechanical
simulation in early psychology does not lie exposed on every library
shelf or in every science museum showcase, but requires some teasing
out and making explicit. I hope this too has been accomplished in these
pages.
So much for historical contributions, what about issues more
relevant to theoretical psychology?
For a long time, philosophy of science saw its role as elucidating
general principles of scientific method, which when followed would
guarantee the production of "true science'; indubitably certain know¬
ledge. It is now generally accepted that there are no such algorithms,
or effective procedures. We have to explain nature's riddles by hook
or by crook, seizing and exploiting opportunities to extend our under¬
standing as available. The use of models, it has been argued, is. such
an opportunity, and one not to be missed, although, of course, it does
not guarantee an increase in understanding. Mechanical models have thus
mainly been recommended for their heuristic value in the furthering of
our understanding.
Strictly speaking, this recommendation is neutral with regard to
an answer to the question "Are people machines?". Even if people were
to turn out not to be machines, whatever that may mean, the heuristic
value of treating them as if they were machines, for the purposes of
* explanation, would not be impugned. Indeed, treating people as if they
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were machines, in the above sense, may be one good way of showing they
are not. Of course, people may turn out to be partly machines and
partly not, and, in that case, that in which they were not mechanical
would be forever beyond the reach of mechanical models i.e. a mechani¬
cal model would be necessarily incomplete, but this seems to me to be
an empirical question, best resolved by continuing mechanical simula¬
tion, rather than one to be settled a priori.
I do not adopt a pessimistic attitude towards this question of
completeness. I believe the extension of the mechanistic conception
of the world into the cognitive domain, which I see as an indication
of the gradual clarification of human thought about such issues, to be,
in principle, completable. The question is not whether people are
machines, but what kind of machine people are I As Patricia Smith
Churchland (1978) puts it in terms entirely appropriate to this thesis:
"we humans are basically information processors, albeit of a remarkably
intricate and splendidly complex variety. Au fond, we are epistemic
engines, whose epistemic states are a function of environmental influx
and existing internal states."
I do not intend to get involved here in, largely fruitless, meta-
\
physical wrangles about the human-machine question. However, one com¬
ment is in order? it is a merit of this approach that it, whilst being
entirely materialist, avoids the threat of reductionism.
Following Fodor and Putnam, I take materialism to be the belief
that all real events (ones that can figure in causal sequences) that
fall under the laws of a special science, also fall under the laws of
physics and are therefore physical. The subject matter of psychology
is thus part of the subject matter of physics.
Every science has a vocabulary of predicates such that events
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fall under the laws of that science by satisfying those predicates ...
these are the 'kind' predicates, which pick out the events talked about by
it.
Reductionism is the belief in materialism plus the belief that
there are kind predicates in (an ideally completed) physics, or whatever
reducing science is chosen, corresponding to each kind predicate in
(an ideally completed) psychology, or whatever reduced science is chosen.
The point is that whilst special sciences make generalisations
about events, each of which is physical, these events need have nothing
in common except that they fall under the generalisation of the special
science| a fortiori, they need have nothing physical in common.
Anything which is an intelligent system will necessarily be a
physical object (materialism), but it is not laid down in advance what
its physical constitution must be (neurones, cams, flip-flops, valves,
transistors etc.). "What makes several things (brains, computers, etc.)
be intelligent systems is not anything physical they have in common,
but the fact that they fall under some predicate (" - is an intelligent
system") of theoretical psychology. Consequently, theoretical psychology
is not reducible to physics (there are no kind terms of physics corres¬
ponding to the kind terms of theoretical psychology, in particular, to
the kind term "intelligent system"). Incidentally, it is not even pos¬
sible to give a brute enumeration in terms of physics of what it is to
be an intelligent system (e.g. x is an intelligent system if and only
if x is a brain or x is a computer or ... etc.), for there are indefin¬
itely many possible instantiations in physics of the kind term of theo¬
retical psychology 'is an intelligent system1, and an enumeration of the
infinite is impossible. (Strictly speaking, whether or not physics
actually has an adequate vocabulary for stating the laws of the special
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sciences is an empirical question, but, at present, we have no grounds
for optimism that it has.)
Theoretical psychology then,thus construed, deals with events
which are physical, but it is not in any interesting sense reducible
to physics. In this manner, it not only avoids the ogre of reduction-
ism, whilst being wholly materialist, but has the complementary advan¬
tage of avoiding the spectre of the homunculus in the machine. In
mechanical models, we really do_ have wheels, rather than men, within
wheels. The existence of machines which really do function entirely
mechanically, yet perform as intelligent beings, provides persuasive
grounds for abandoning dualistic notions. As Buchner (1870) wrote;
"Why even man is able to form out of coarse metal or bits of
wood, by the aid of very imperfect tools, instruments that play many
tunes, timepieces that tell the hour, machines that weave, knit, sew,
write, run, and outstrip the speed of the swiftest animals. In these
we see nothing marvellous. But just put a savage, or a man who has
never heard of mechanics, in our place; would he not imagine that
these machines were living things, moving by their own volition? and
would not one of the imbecile aborigines of New-Holland have as good
a right, as Virchow remarks, to maintain that these machines do not
act on mechanical principles as the partisans of the spiritualistic
theory have to maintain that the mind cannot be explained by material
motions?"
Of course, these grounds are not compelling. The philosophy of dualism
is a complex and all-embracing framework within which any counter argu¬
ment or demonstration may be defused (as, to be fair, is monism). Thus
a dualist, if pressed by apparent advances in cognitive simulation,
could admit that machines can be intelligent ... but only in the sense
that brains (mere physical entities) can, i.e. by interacting with the
quite separate realm of mind. Any alleged success on the part of cog¬
nitive simulators might, then, be explained, by their having produced
a material entity with which, because of its sufficient complexity,
mind has been tempted to interact. No empirical demonstration will
o
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then, persuade a committed dualist. However, for the rest of us, such
machines as have been discussed above do provide encouragement for the
belief that intelligence is possible without spectral interaction.
On the other hand, the theoretical psychology of epistemic engines
stresses the importance of internal states as well as environmental in¬
flux, i.e. it is no simplistic S-R theory. Indeed, the intervening
mechanisms are so richly interwoven that the likelihood of extensive
pre-natal or maturational wiring is looming ever larger on our explan¬
atory horizons.
The uses that mechanical models have actually had in research
have, I hope, been amply demonstrated above. Some of them are concep¬
tually trivial but experimentally important. Experiments can be done
torrentially on mechanical models: they do not get tired; do not com¬
plain of boredom; ethical restrictions do not apply to them; hypotheses
and the implications of assumptions can be tested at a speed unthinkable
in humans ... potentially months of tests can be run in a few hours.
Some of these advantages, the ethical ones will, of course, have to be
reassessed as mechanical systems grow in intelligence. There may come
a day when mechanical subjects (legitimately) demand the right to join
a union.
More interestingly, models have the capacity to focus disparate
evidence into a single coherent view, the explicitness they demand in
their construction is of inestimable value to the clarity of thought
and the use of their neutral components gives some rationally heedable
advice for the further prosecution of research.
Finally then, what is the relationship between models and theories?
Theories are formal statements only of (and formal models are
material expressions only of) what we have been calling the positive
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component but as such they allow no principled, justification of new
testable predictions. That in which we, as experimental psychologists
at least, are interested are not static correlations of data with res¬
pect only to economy and elegance, but dynamic explanations which offer
positive predictions into new domains. (Mary Hesse goes so far as to
define a model as ..."any system, whether buildable, picturable, imagin¬
able, or none of these, which has the characteristic of making a theory
predictive.")
Intimate models are both more and less than theories. We have
seen how they are more (positive and neutral components as opposed to
positive alone.) In what sense are both they and formal models less?
Consider a model A and its modelled B. In so far as A does model B,
A and B will have, or instantiate, the same structure; therefore there
is some level of theoretical description which will describe them both.
But this is to say that A and B are particular instantiations of a more
general theory - as it may be that brains and computers will both instan¬
tiate the (ideally completed) theory of cognitive psychology, where the
material of construction constitutes the negative component. But nec¬
essarily a theory is more general than an instance covered by the theory.
A theory states but a model instantiates general laws ... this consti¬
tutes the less. •
Modellers, of course, must not merely generalise from an instance
of one (the model) to the theory, and thus commit the inductive fallacy.
The interaction is far more subtle ... there is continuous readjustment
of the positive in the light of the neutral components and vice versa
(in other words theory and model interact). As von Kempelen wrote, he
aspired both "to establish a complete system of human speech" and to
build a simulating speaking machine, but the two became an integrated
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concerns "my speaking machine and. my theory of speech have made equal
progress, the one serving as a guide for the other."
Where does all this leave us with regard to the relations between
intimate and formal models and theories? The relative usefulness of
formulation in terms of model or theory depends partly on the level of
development of the particular science. The domain of application of
the positive components of both intimate and formal models and of
theories coincides - but in an ideally completed explanation there
should be no neutral component. Moreover, in an ideally completed
science, a theory will always be more general than an equivalent model
which (together with its modelled) instantiates the theory, and, inso¬
far as the theory carries no negative component, it will be (in some
sense) correspondingly simpler.
On the other hand, when (as now) one is nowhere near a completed
science of psychology, what one needs are dynamic instruments of explan¬
ation. At this stage, in respect of their licensed suggestions for fur¬
ther research, intimate models are more useful than formal models or
theory| whilst in respect of enforced explicitness, formal models are
most useful ... all the notorious difficulties of programming, but
where you not only have to make your programming language formulae
precise and unambiguous, but also actually design and structure the
machine language.
It may well be, then, that Black (1962) is right when he writes:
"Perhaps every science must start with metaphor and end with algebra;
and perhaps without the metaphor there would never have been any algebra."
Certainly, for all his vitriolic attacks on models, even Duhem actually
makes use of intimate models, where his knowledge is slight, as in
psychology. Of Napoleon, he wrote: "The slightest and most fleeting
289.
detail ... did not escape Napoleon's scrutiny, and his visual memory
fixed it once and for all as would an instantaneous photograph."
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